

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change COP18 and CMP8

State of the Negotiations

DOHA 2012
UN CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCE
COP18 • CMP8

26 November to 7 December 2012



Institut de l'énergie et de l'environnement
de la Francophonie
IEPF

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change COP18 and CMP8

State of the Negotiations

26 November to 7 December 2012
Doha, Qatar

Drafting Committee and Editorial Committee



In partnership with



Editorial Management

Frédéric Gagnon-Lebrun, ÉcoRessources

This summary document has been prepared by EcoRessources, on behalf of the *Institut de l'énergie et de l'environnement de la Francophonie* (IEPF). It does not necessarily represent the viewpoint of one or other of these organisations.

Authors

Marine Franck, ÉcoRessources

Caroline De Vit, Ecofys

And with the participation of Alex Perreault, Consultant

Publication Director

Fatimata Dia Touré, Directrice

Coordination

Rajae Chafil, Program Specialist, International Environment Negotiations and Sustainable Development, IEPF

Institut de l'énergie et de l'environnement de la Francophonie (IEPF) publication team

Prosper Biabo, Deputy Director, Programmes

Louis-Noël Jail, Communications Officer, Manager, Information and Documentation Department

Jacinthe Potvin, Assistant, Information and Documentation Department



UNEP Division of Environmental Law and Conventions (UNEP-DELC)

contributed to the translation of this Guide from French into English.

Layout

Code Jaune, Design and Creativity, Quebec City, Canada

ISBN printed version: 978-2-89481-123-8

ISBN electronic version: 978-2-89481-124-5

This guide is the subject of a Summary for policymakers. The French and English electronic versions of these works are available at: <http://www.iepf.org/ressources/ressources.php>

© Institut de l'énergie et de l'environnement de la Francophonie (IEPF) 2012

56 rue Saint-Pierre, 3rd floor, Quebec City (Quebec) G1K 4A1 Canada

Telephone: 418 692-5727

Fax: 418 692-5644

E-mail: iepf@francophonie.org

Web: www.iepf.org

PRINTED IN CANADA - November 2012

This guide has been printed using vegetable inks
on recycled paper.



United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change COP18 and CMP8

State of the Negotiations

26 November to 7 December 2012
Doha, Qatar



HOW TO USE THIS GUIDE

First and foremost, the guide presents brief information on the general context of the Doha Conference by tracing a brief history of negotiations from Rio to Doha. It reports on the outcome of the Durban Conference and intersessional negotiation sessions in 2012 (Section 1), thereby acting as a benchmark for putting the main negotiation issues of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the First Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (COP18 and CMP8) in Doha into context.

This is followed by detailed discussion on the COP18 and CMP8 issues. To assist the reader, the table summarising the main questions which will be examined during the Doha Conference lists all the questions examined, with cross-references to the agendas of the various decision-making bodies, subsidiary bodies and working groups. This table can be found in the first pages of the guide. The guide deals with negotiation questions under the Durban Platform (Section 2), the UNFCCC long-term cooperative action (Section 3) and the Kyoto Protocol (Section 4). Section 5 deals with the cross-cutting negotiating issues. Finally, the guide puts forward the expectations of the Doha Conference. Miscellaneous data sheets for potential use as a reading benchmark and which are referred to in the different sections are found at the end of this guide. The sheets present among other things the institutional aspects of the negotiation process, the main negotiation coalitions and the conclusions of UNFCCC side discussion forums. The reader will find a table before Section 1 listing the various meetings since the adoption of the UNFCCC which are referred to in the guide, sometimes as acronyms. Lastly, terminology sheets, highlighting the French vocabulary specific to the negotiations on climate change and its English equivalent and the abbreviations and acronyms currently used under the negotiations, are also included at the end of the guide.

In terms of the references of UNFCCC documents, only the document listings are given to facilitate the reading. The documents referred to can be accessed very easily on the UNFCCC website using these listings¹. Sheet A explains the various listings of UNFCCC documents in detail.

1. See <http://unfccc.int/documentation/items/2643.php>.

FOREWORD

Rio 1992, Kyoto 1997, Marrakesh 2001, Montreal 2005, Nairobi 2006, Copenhagen 2009, Cancún 2010, Durban 2011, Doha 2012 - intense negotiations on climate change have now been going on for twenty years. These are significant stages and dates in the negotiation process which has raised global awareness to the importance of grasping the climate problem by the horns and including it in all economic and social development policies that are meant to be sustainable.

From diplomatic negotiation between environmental, climate and foreign affairs experts and technicians on the principles of international law capable of managing climate change, we are now currently witnessing, in addition to negotiations, popular discussions and exchanges at all levels and by all categories of development players seeking appropriate solutions. From the simple citizen to the top policymakers via the elected representatives, the private sector, the civil society and others, this search for solutions with negative impacts on climate change is becoming a priority in the desires expressed during the various Conferences of the Parties and forums. Note, however, that it is struggling to transform into actual national and international commitments that all the countries in the United Nations community must take to resolve the problem, be they developed or developing.

Although Montreal in 2005 saw the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol without the blessing of all the countries involved, Copenhagen 2009 was a decisive moment in this negotiation process, with an agreement on the shared vision (maintain the warming rate below 2 degrees Celsius) and on the need and importance of technical and financial means to support the reduction and control of greenhouse gases (quick-start initiative of US\$30 billion 2010-2012 and US\$10 billion a year until 2020) with low-carbon development activities.

Cancún 2010 and Durban 2011 set out to provide the content and some pragmatic guidance for the financial and technical commitments laid down in an international context marked by the emergence of economically-significant countries, working to play their parts and take their places in the global arena. The global political and geostrategic environment has moved on and henceforth we shall have to reckon with all the countries and groups of countries conscious of climate issues in these negotiations.

Doha 2012 will launch a new negotiation period, where each player should manage to commit to clear and precise GHG reduction ambitions as well as to concrete low-CO₂ development actions under the Durban Platform. The Platform will set up a second period for the Kyoto Protocol whilst waiting for all the countries to adopt a legally-binding international tool.

Doha will also be used to good effect to ensure:

- the operationalisation of the Green Climate Fund,
- the introduction of in-depth training and capacity-building programmes in combating climate change for sustainable development,
- the establishment of financial, technical and technological mechanisms and means for adaptation, mitigation and technology transfer.

This guide made available by the OIF through its subsidiary body the IEPF is intended to provide information on and explain the challenges and issues of climate change debated during this conference. Each player and each country will be able to take a position in line with its interests and provide a conscious, controlled contribution to the global programme of combating the negative consequences of climate change. It is nowadays understood and agreed that EVERYONE must become work on this fight through local, national and international actions. Success is only guaranteed if all developed and developing countries commit to it as included and adopted in the Durban Platform, which is on the agenda for this 18th Conference of the Parties.

Let us give this new stage in negotiations that is about to start the hope and actions required for the fight against poverty, sustainable development and the survival of our planet.

Pleasant reading and enjoy the conference!

Fatimata DIA Touré
Director of IEPF

Table summarising the main questions which will be examined during the Doha Conference.

Section	Main questions for consideration	Session agenda items							Page
		COP	CMP	SBSTA	SBI	AWG-KP	AWG-LCA	ADP	
2	ISSUES RELATING TO THE DURBAN PLATFORM								
2.1.2	Election of the ADP officers							2a	23
2.1.3	Scheduling the work of the ADP (issues relating to paragraphs 2 to 6 of Decision 1/CP.17)							3a	24
2.1.4	Work plan to improve the level of ambition (issues relating to paragraphs 7 and 8 of Decision 1/CP.17)							3b	26
3	THE CONVENTION ISSUES, INCLUDING THE ISSUES DISCUSSED WITHIN SUBSIDIARY BODIES								
3.1	Shared vision for long-term cooperative action.						3a		35
3.3	Enhanced action for adaptation.			4			3c		73
3.3.2	The issues concerning the least developed countries (LDC)	11f			6b 6d 7b				77
3.3.3	Support for the execution of national adaptation plans (NAP)				9				77
3.3.4	Implementation of the Nairobi work programme on the impacts of climate change and the vulnerability and adaptation to this change			3					79
3.3.5	Work programme on loss and damage				10				80
3.3.6	Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund		10		6c				83
3.2	Enhanced action for mitigation.						3b		41
	Register of nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMA)				5a				44
	Main methodologies relating to activities to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation of forests (REDD) and the role of the conservation and sustainable management of forests and the increase of forest carbon stocks in developing countries			5					55

Section	Main questions for consideration	Session agenda items							Page
		COP	CMP	SBSTA	SBI	AWG-KP	AWG-LCA	ADP	
3.5	Emissions from fuel used for international aviation and maritime transport			11d					64
	Agricultural questions			10					63
	Enhanced action in financing and investment.	11					3e		91
	Enhanced action on technology development and transfer.			6	13		3d		84
	Development and transfer of technologies, interaction modalities and rolling work plan of the Technology Executive Committee for 2012-2013			6	13				87
	Questions relating to the Climate Technology Centre and Network: choice of host entity and constitution of the Advisory Board	9b			13b				89
	Poznań strategic programme on technology transfer				13c				90
3.6	Examination						4		98
4	THE KYOTO PROTOCOL ISSUES, INCLUDING THE ISSUES DISCUSSED WITHIN SUBSIDIARY BODIES								
	Examination of new commitments of Annex I Parties		5		16 19	3			103
	Review of the form of the reserve and the second commitment period				18				105
	The inclusion of carbon capture and storage in geological formations as an activity under the CDM		7	12a		4			115
	Impacts of the potential inclusion of lands with forests in exhaustion under afforestation and reforestation activities of the CDM		7	12b		4			116
	Procedures, mechanisms and institutional arrangements for appealing the decisions of the CDM Executive Board		7		17	4			117
	Modalities of accounting for emissions by sources and removals by sinks in the LULUCF sector					4			119

Section	Main questions for consideration	Session agenda items						Page
		COP	CMP	SBSTA	SBI	AWG-KP	AWG-LCA	ADP

	Eligibility of LULUCF activities related to carbon capture for project-based mechanisms					4			120
5	CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES								
5.1	MRV requirements	10							123
	Issues relating to communications and inventories of Annex I Parties.	12a	12 13	11e 12f	3				125
	Work programme on the revision of guidelines for the examination of biennial reports and national communications, including the examination of national inventories of developed countries			11b					126
	Work programme on a common presentation framework for the "UNFCCC guidelines for drawing up biennial reports of developed country Parties"			11a					127
	Issues relating to communications by non-Annex I Parties.	12b			4				125
	The mandate of the Consultative Group of Experts (CGE) on national communications for Parties not included in Annex I				4a				130
	Additional guidance for the GEF on the provision of financial resources to cover all costs incurred to prepare national communications of non-Annex I Parties				4c				130
	Identification of technical experts for the international consultation and analysis (ICA)				5b				133
	Defining the general guidelines on measuring, notifying and verifying nationally appropriate mitigating actions undertaken by the developing countries and supported nationally			11c					133
5.2	Response measures	14	15 16		12				139
	The SBI and SBSTA operationalise the modalities and main themes of the work programme of the Forum on response measures			8 9	7a 11				140

Section	Main questions for consideration	Session agenda items						Page
		COP	CMP	SBSTA	SBI	AWG-KP	AWG-LCA	ADP
5.3	Capacity-building.	13	14				3f	142
	The SBI studies the report of the first meeting of the Durban Forum on capacity building				15			143
	The SBI analyses the progress and effectiveness of the application of the framework for capacity building in countries with economies in transition intended to support the third in-depth review				15			144
	The SBI implements Article 6 of the Convention	15			14			146
5.4	Research and systematic observation			7				147

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	1
1. BRIEF HISTORY OF NEGOTIATIONS ON CLIMATE CHANGE	5
1.1 NEGOTIATION FRAMEWORK	7
1.2 THE BALI ACTION PLAN	8
1.3 THE COPENHAGEN ACCORD	11
1.4 THE CANCÚN AGREEMENTS	12
1.5 THE DURBAN PLATFORM	15
THE MAIN NEGOTIATION ISSUES	17
2. ISSUES RELATING TO THE DURBAN PLATFORM	19
2.1 DEFINITION OF THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE AGREEMENT AND THE LEGAL NATURE OF COMMITMENTS	20
2.2 ELECTION OF THE ADP OFFICERS	21
2.3 SCHEDULING THE WORK OF THE ADP	22
2.4 IMPROVING THE AMBITION LEVEL	24
2.5 TOWARDS AN AGREEMENT APPLICABLE TO ALL THE PARTIES	26
3. THE MAIN CONVENTION ISSUES, INCLUDING THE ISSUES DISCUSSED WITHIN SUBSIDIARY BODIES	29
3.1 SHARED VISION FOR LONG-TERM COOPERATIVE ACTION	31
3.1.1 The global GHG emission reduction objective by 2050 and identification of a time frame for the peaking of emissions	32
3.1.2 Definition and application of the principle of equitable access to sustainable development	35
3.2 ENHANCED ACTION AT NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SCALE FOR THE MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE	37
3.2.1 Measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally-appropriate mitigation commitments or initiatives, including quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives of developed countries (AWG-LCA)	38
3.2.2 Mitigation in the developing countries	44
3.2.3 Reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD-Plus)	50
3.2.4 Cooperative sectoral approaches and actions specific to a given sector	58
3.2.5 The various approaches designed to improve the cost/effectiveness ratio of mitigation actions, including the markets	62
3.3 ENHANCED ACTION FOR ADAPTATION	67
3.3.1 Identification of the path to follow for the negotiations on adaptation within the AWG-LCA	767
3.3.2 The issues concerning the least developed countries (LDC) (SBSTA)	70
3.3.3 Support for the execution of national adaptation plans (NAP) (SBSTA)	71
3.3.4 Implementation of the Nairobi work programme on the impacts of climate change and the vulnerability and adaptation to this change (SBSTA)	72
3.3.5 Work programme on the loss and damage (SBSTA)	74
3.3.6 Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund	76

3.4	TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT AND TRANSFER TO SUPPORT MITIGATION AND ADAPTATION ACTIONS	77
3.4.1	Enhanced action in technology development and transfer to support mitigation and adaptation actions (AWG-LCA)	78
3.4.2	Development and transfer of technologies, interaction modalities and rolling work plan of the Technology Executive Committee for 2012-2013 (SBI and SBSTA)	80
3.4.3	Questions relating to the Climate Technology Centre and Network: choice of host entity and constitution of the Advisory Board (SBSTA)	81
3.4.4	Poznań strategic programme on technology transfer	82
3.5	ENHANCED ACTION ON THE PROVISION OF FINANCIAL RESOURCES AND INVESTMENT TO SUPPORT ACTION (AWG-LCA)	83
3.5.1	Administrative issues of the Green Climate Fund (GCF)	84
3.5.2	Relationship between the Green Climate Fund and the Conference of the Parties	85
3.5.3	Standing Committee work programme	85
3.5.4	The relay between early financing and long-term financing	87
3.5.5	Mobilisation of long-term financing	88
3.6	REVIEW: COMPLEMENTARY DEFINITION OF ITS SCOPE AND PREPARATION OF ITS MODALITIES	90
4.	ISSUES RELATED TO THE KYOTO PROTOCOL	95
4.1	EXAMINATION OF NEW COMMITMENTS OF ANNEX I PARTIES (AWG-KP)	95
4.1.1	The conversion of Annex I Parties' targets into QELRO (quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives) for the second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol.	96
4.1.2	The carryover of assigned amount units (AAU) to the second commitment period	103
4.1.3	Continuity between the two commitment periods and the duration of the second commitment period	105
4.2	ISSUES RELATING TO THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM	107
4.2.1	The inclusion of carbon capture and storage in geological formations as an activity under the CDM (SBSTA)	107
4.2.2	Impacts of the potential inclusion of lands with forests in exhaustion under afforestation and reforestation activities of the CDM (SBSTA)	108
4.2.3	Procedures, mechanisms and institutional arrangements for appealing the decisions of the CDM Executive Board (SBSTA)	109
4.3	THE QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE LAND USE, LAND USE CHANGES AND FORESTRY ACTIVITIES (LULUCF) UNDER THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND THE CLEAN DEVELOPMENT MECHANISM (SBSTA)	110
4.3.1	Modalities of accounting for emissions by sources and removals by sinks in the LULUCF sector	110
4.3.2	Eligibility of LULUCF activities related to carbon capture for project-based mechanisms	111

5. CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES	113
5.1 MEASURING, REPORTING AND VERIFYING REQUIREMENTS (MRV)	113
5.1.1 The MRV of mitigation commitments by developed countries	114
5.1.2 The MRV of mitigation actions by developing countries	118
5.1.3 Climate financing MRV	123
5.2 RESPONSE MEASURES	127
5.2.1 Economic and social consequences of response measures under the AWG-LCA	128
5.2.2 The SBI and SBSTA operationalise the modalities and main themes of the work programme of the Forum on response measures	129
5.3 CAPACITY BUILDING	130
5.3.1 Enhanced capacity-building action under the AWG-LCA 143	
5.3.2 The SBI implements capacity building under the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol	133
5.3.3 The SBI implements Article 6 of the Convention	135
5.4 RESEARCH AND SYSTEMATIC OBSERVATION	136
5.5 GENDER IN CLIMATE NEGOTIATIONS	137
EXPECTATIONS OF THE DOHA CONFERENCE	141
FACT SHEETS	143
Sheet 1. Timeline of important milestones in the negotiations on climate change	143
Sheet 2. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)	145
Sheet 3. Kyoto Protocol	146
Sheet 4. The Durban Platform	148
Sheet 5. UNFCCC structure and the role of the main decision-making bodies	149
Sheet 6. The Parties to the Convention and the Protocol	151
Sheet 7. The regional groups and the main negotiation coalitions	153
Sheet 8. Positions of main countries and negotiation coalitions on the post-2012.	157
Sheet 9. UNFCCC side discussion forums	164
Sheet 10. Basic information on the Kyoto Protocol flexibility mechanisms	167
Sheet 11. Forthcoming UNFCCC events	170
TERMINOLOGY SHEETS	171
Sheet A. Unfccc and Kyoto Protocol document listings	171
Sheet B. Abbreviations and acronyms	172
Sheet C. Lexicon	178
Sheet D. Themed glossary	180
BIBLIOGRAPHY	187
LIST OF TABLES	
Table summarising the main questions which will be examined during the Doha conference	VII
Table 1. History of Conferences and meetings of the Parties and of subsidiary bodies and working groups of the convention and the Kyoto Protocol	XV
Table 2. Les qelro proposés par les parties	99
Table 3. Subsidiary and specialist bodies	150
Table 4. Kyoto Protocol flexibility mechanisms	170

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Chronology and structure of post-2012 regime negotiation bodies	8
Figure 2: UNFCCC process bodies after the Durban Conference	18
Figure 3: Current state of mitigation commitments in the negotiations	33
Figure 4: GHG emission reduction objectives proposed by the Parties in 2011 under the AWG-LCA	39
Figure 5 : Possible trajectories for the mission levels by 2020 and 2050	40
Figure 6 : Register functions and possible sources of financing for the NAMA	48
Figure 7 : The Parties included in Annex i (october 2010)	151
Figure 8 : UN Member countries or Parties to the UNFCCC not included in Annex I (October 2010)	152

LIST OF BOXES

Box 1: Bali Action Plan	9
Box 2: The Cancún Agreements	12
Box 3: The common but differentiated responsibility under the Convention, Article 4.7	26
Box 4: The AWG-LCA work programm and the negotiating text structure	29
Box 5: Structure of REDD+ activities	51
Box 6: Adaptation Committee	68
Box 7: The GEF Resource Allocation Framework (RAF) and System for Transparent Allocation of Resources (STAR)	121

TABLE 1.
HISTORY OF CONFERENCES AND MEETINGS OF THE PARTIES AND OF
SUBSIDIARY BODIES AND WORKING GROUPS OF THE CONVENTION AND
THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

11995	Geneva	Meetings of Subsidiary Bodies (SB-1): - Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) - Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA)
	Berlin	First Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP1)
1996	Geneva	SB-2, SB-3 and SB-4 COP2
1997	Bonn Kyoto	SB-5, SB-6 and SB-7 COP3
1998	Bonn Buenos Aires	SB-8 COP4 SB-9
1999	Bonn Bonn	SB-10 COP5 SB-11
2000	Bonn Bonn and Lyon The Hague	SB-12 SB-13 COP6 SB-13 resumed
2001	Bonn Marrakesh	COP6 resumed SB-14 COP7 SB-15
2002	Bonn New Delhi	SB-16 COP8 SB-17
2003	Bonn Milan	SB-18 COP9 SB-19
2004	Bonn Buenos Aires	SB-20 COP10 SB-21
2005	Bonn Montreal	SB-22 COP11 First Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP-1) SB-23

2006	Bonn	First session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the further commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP 1)
	Nairobi	SB-24 COP12 CMP2 AWG-KP-2 SB-25
2007	Bonn	AWG-KP-3 SB-26
	Vienna Bali	AWG-KP-4 COP13 CMP3 AWG-KP-4 resumed SB-27
2008	Bangkok	AWG-KP-5 First session of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA-1)
	Bonn	AWG-KP-5 resumed AWG-LCA-2 SB-28
	Accra	AWG-KP-6 AWG-LCA-3
	Poznań	COP14 CMP4 AWG-KP-6 resumed AWG-LCA-4 SB-29
2009	Bonn	AWG-KP-7 AWG-LCA-5
	Bonn	AWG-KP-8 AWG-LCA-6 SB-30
	Bonn	Informal meeting of the AWG KP Informal meeting of the AWG LCA
	Bangkok	AWG-KP-9 AWG-LCA-7
	Barcelona	AWG-KP-9 resumed AWG-LCA-7 resumed
	Copenhagen	AWG-KP-10 AWG-LCA-8
		SB-31 COP15 CMP5

2010	Bonn	AWG-KP-11 AWAG-LCA-9
	Bonn	AWG-KP-12 AWG-LCA-10 SB-32
	Bonn	AWG-KP-13 AWG-LCA-11
	Tianjin	AWG-KP-14 AWG-LCA-12
	Cancún	AWG-KP-15 AWG-LCA-13 SB-33 COP16 CMP6 AWG-KP-16
	<hr/>	
	Bangkok	AWG-KP-16 (continued) AWG-LCA-14
	Bonn	AWG-KP-16 (continued) AWG-LCA-14 (continued) SB-34
	Panama	AWG-KP-16 (continued) AWG-LCA-14 (continued)
	Durban	COP17 CMP7 SB-35
2012	<hr/>	
	Bonn	AWG-KP-17 AWG-LCA-15 ADP-1 SB-36
	Bangkok	AWG-KP-17 (continued) AWG-LCA-15 (continued) ADP-1 (continued)
	Doha	COP18 CMP8 AWG-KP-17 (continued) AWG-LCA-15 (continued) SB-37
	<hr/>	

INTRODUCTION

The reality of climate change today is addressed within a difficult political context, characterised by an agenda that is mainly concentrated on long-term mitigation and financing issues. Following the success of maintain climate discussions in a multilateral context in Cancún and the cautious optimism generated by the Durban compromise, the 18th Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 8th Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP), which will be held on 26 November to 7 December 2012 in Doha, will constitute a critical stage in climate negotiations.

The Doha COP18 and the CMP8 coincides in fact with the end of the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and of the Bali Action Plan adopted in 2007. This must mean the end of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) and the Ad Hoc Working Group on the further commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP). The Doha Conference will therefore be the one that reviews the Bali Action Plan, mainly on the questions of ambition of climate finance and mitigation efforts. It will also be the planned launch conference of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.

Doha will mark the advent of a new era in climate negotiations with the review of the first year of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP), which is working on preparing for 2015 an agreement on a post-2020 climate regime applicable in 2020 to all countries. The Doha Conference will mark a shift from the negotiations on a post-2012 climate regime which will be characterised by the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol to a post-2020 climate regime characterised by the Durban Platform.

The Durban Platform must culminate in an agreement applicable to all the Parties. It should therefore go beyond the traditional lines of the Bali Action Plan that maintained a differentiation of obligation between the developed and the developing countries. Since 2007, the developing countries have insisted on the commitment of the United States, the second largest emitter of GHG, in a legally-binding agreement that would respect the principle of historical responsibility and of the right to development. The developed countries have insisted on a long-term agreement which would commit the large GHG emitters among the emerging countries to implementing national mitigation actions in order to reach a concrete and rapid reduction of

global GHG emissions in the medium to long term, thereby avoiding an irreversible impact on the climate. Reconciling these viewpoints is at the heart of the Durban Platform's mandate.

The main objective of the Doha Conference will be to raise the mitigation and financing ambition, to settle on the duration and modalities of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and to shape the main focal points of the Durban Platform. Doha will therefore test the strength of the Durban compromise, whereby the Parties have approved a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol provided negotiations start on a post-2020 agreement applicable to all countries.

In Copenhagen in 2009, the Parties agreed to limit the rise in the global average temperature to 2° C. The mitigation targets announced by the developed countries and the mitigation measures of developing countries are not enough to avoid exceeding this global limit. The "ambition deficit", i.e. the difference between the level of emissions to be reached to limit the rise in temperature to 2° C and the level of emissions corresponding to the targets and actions by countries, represent between 6 and 12 gigatonnes of equivalent carbon dioxide depending on the scenarios envisaged². The increased ambition of country promises and the use of additional measures, like increased recourse to renewable energies, substituting renewable energy sources for fossil fuels and enhancing energy efficiency will therefore be necessary to limit the risk of the costs of these actions spiralling and the average global temperature rising to 3.5° C³.

In addition, climate financing will be a major issue in Doha as many developing countries condition their actions around the granting of financial and technological support and for capacity building. As recalled by Mrs Christiana Figueres, Executive Secretary of the UNFCCC, "the governments have undertaken to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions and to assist the poorest and most vulnerable countries to adapt to climate change. They know that they must keep these promises, increase their efforts before 2020 and redouble their efforts afterwards". The developed countries in fact have undertaken to provide 30 billion US dollars for the period 2010-2012 and 100 billion US dollars a year until 2020. Several outstanding issues augur arduous discussions on the ability of the developed countries to provide this support in a sustainable and predictable fashion.

The adoption of the second Kyoto Protocol period in 2013, the only legally-binding agreement to date, will boost the trust between the countries under the Durban Platform negotiations by guaranteeing that the developed countries committed under Kyoto continue to take the initiative in terms of emission mitigation. For the other

2. Bridging the Emissions Gap, UNEP

3. <http://climateactiontracker.org/news/126/Emissions-gap-looks-set-to-increase-if-government-action-doesnt-step-up.html>

developed countries, it will be question in Doha of examining the manner and form of engaging their mitigation promises made in Copenhagen and Cancún for the period 2012 to 2020.

The question of the form of the future agreement to be achieved by the Durban Platform is another issue for Doha. In 2015, the Durban Platform must reach an international legal agreement on climate change that aims to maintain the average global temperature below 2° C or 1.5° C. In Doha, the countries should state how they envisage the outline and characteristics of this agreement, which could be a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreement with legal force.

The progress in Durban, including the launch of the Durban Platform, an agreement in principle on a second Kyoto Protocol period and the operationalisation of institutions provided for under the Cancún Agreements, offer numerous strengths and opportunities that could be exploited by the Parties in Doha. The negotiators will therefore need to continue to demonstrate their tenacity and creativity to overcome the deadlocks and to make the Doha Conference a success.

The aim of this guide is to assist negotiators to a clearer understanding of the main issues which will be discussed at the Doha Conference. Although this guide is intended especially for negotiators from member countries of the International Organisation of la Francophonie (OIF), we hope that it will also be useful to delegates with a wide variety of outlooks⁴.

4. Please visit the UNFCCC website for further useful information:
http://unfccc.int/portal_francophone/cooperation_and_soutien/ldc/items/3308.

1. BRIEF HISTORY OF NEGOTIATIONS ON CLIMATE CHANGE

Since the adoption in 1992 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) on the heels of the Rio Declaration, consideration of the threat from global warming for human beings and ecosystems has gradually been included on the international agenda (see Sheet 1 and Sheet 2). In the belief that the commitments made in Rio under the UNFCCC to stabilise greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions at a level that prevented dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system fell short of the mark, the 3rd Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP3) adopted the Kyoto Protocol in December 1997 (see Sheet 3). By virtue of this Protocol, the Parties included in Annex I of the UNFCCC which have ratified the Protocol are obliged to reduce jointly, by the end of this year (2012), the emission level of six greenhouse gases (GHG) by 5.2% compared with the 1990 level.

Having postponed the adoption of decisions on how to achieve this goal after signing the Protocol, the Parties continued with negotiations after 1997 on its more controversial items. The Marrakesh Accords adopted in 2001 subsequently adopted the operationalisation modalities for the Kyoto Protocol. However, the Protocol was only ratified in 2005 and its implementation was delayed in a number of countries. Australia only ratified it in December 2007, for example. The United States, the world's second largest GHG emitter⁵ after China, has not ratified the Protocol and is therefore not subject to any obligation to reduce GHG emissions under it. Furthermore, certain Annex I countries which have ratified the Protocol, such as Australia and Japan, will find it difficult, if not impossible, to comply with their individual emission reduction or limitation targets for the first commitment period⁶. Canada with-

5. See: <http://www.pbl.nl/en/dossiers/Climatechange/moreinfo/Chinanowno1inCO2emissionsUSAinsecondposition>

6. The UNFCCC Annex I countries designate the developed countries whereas the non-Annex I countries designate the developing countries.

As a rough guide, GHG emissions (excluding the Land Use, Land Use changes and Forestry - LULUCF - sector) between 1990 and 2005 increased by 13.6% in Japan, 27% in Canada and 38.7% in Australia. According to the databases of the Climate Analysis Indicator Tool of the World Resources Institute Version 7.0., Japan produced GHG emissions (excluding the LULUCF sector) of 1.193 megatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (MtCO₂e) in 1990 and 1.356 MtCO₂e in 2005; Canada produced 582 MtCO₂e in 1990 and 739.3 MtCO₂e in 2005; Australia produced 402 MtCO₂e in 1990 and 559 MtCO₂e in 2005.

drew unilaterally from the Protocol in December 2011, before the end of this first period, believing that the efforts required to achieve its objectives had become too costly⁷. Nevertheless, Canada remains committed to the negotiation of a legally-binding agreement to reduce the GHG emissions which will be adopted by 2015⁸.

Given the difficulty the Parties are having in reaching their GHG reduction objectives and in order to include the large GHG emitters in a legally-binding agreement, the Parties have expressed their desire to continue to combat climate change after 2012. The Parties therefore commenced a dialogue on long-term cooperation in 2005. A specific framework for negotiations on the post-2012 issues under the Convention (Section 3) was thus formed side by side with the working group discussing the modalities of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (Section 4). To this end, the COP13 (2007) strengthened the framework for negotiations on the post-2012 issues by creating a working group under the Convention for which the Bali Action Plan supplied a roadmap rolled out over two years.

This roadmap aimed to reach an agreement in 2009 in Copenhagen on a post-2012 climate regime under the Convention. Having failed to reach a detailed agreement in Copenhagen, the Parties did however agree to move the negotiations forward on a post-2012 regime during the next COPs, in Cancún (2010) and Durban (2011).

In 2011, a new negotiating framework was created - the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action⁹ (ADP). This new working group started its mandate in 2012 with the aim of adopting an agreement by 2015 that should be implemented in 2020. The decision to create the Durban Platform marks the start of a new and significant chapter in the collective effort by Parties to enhance the multilateral nature under the auspices of the Convention. After the failure in Copenhagen and the attempt to keep the discussions going under a multilateral climate regime in Cancún, the negotiators changed direction by adopting the Durban Platform. This opens negotiations on a more inclusive climate regime in order to transcend the traditional lines separating the developed and developing worlds¹⁰. The COP18 and the CMP8 taking place in Doha in 2012 will therefore mark the entry into a new era of climate negotiations.

Before describing briefly the history of the negotiations by analysing the main stages that are the Bali Action Plan (Section 1.2), the Copenhagen Accord (Section 1.3), the Cancún Agreements (Section 1.4) and the Durban Platform (Section 1.5), Section 1.1 will enlighten the reader on the current structure of negotiations that has altered during each of these stages.

7. See: http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/background/application/pdf/canada.pdf.pdf
8. See: <http://www.ec.gc.ca/default.asp?lang=En&n=FFE36B6D-1&news=6B04014B-54FC-4739-B22C-F9CD9A840800>
9. Decision 1/CP.17
10. IISD, 2012a.

1.1 Negotiation framework

After the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, technical discussions on climate change took place mainly under the auspices of two bodies, namely:

- the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI), mandated to advise the COP and COP/CMP on improving the effective application of the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol;
- the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) which advises the COP and COP/CPM on scientific and technical issues which are specific to or shared by them.

To date, these two bodies are responsible for examining technical questions in support of the work of the COP and the CMP (see Sheet 4)¹¹. At the same time, the UNFCCC Parties are able to meet in three working groups to move the negotiations under the Convention and Kyoto Protocol forward.

- The Ad Hoc Working Group on further commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP)¹² assembles the Parties to the Protocol. It was established to facilitate the negotiations on the commitments of Annex I Parties for the second commitment period that will commence in 2013. These negotiations cover new targets for Annex B Parties under the Kyoto Protocol and how to achieve them, for example market mechanisms¹³.
- Acknowledging the need to enhance the implementation of the Convention, mainly by making it easier to analyse cooperation approaches in respect of sustainable development, adaptation, technological potential and market opportunities, the Dialogue on long-term cooperative action to address climate change by enhancing implementation of the Convention (Dialogue) was instigated in 2005 during the Montreal Conference (COP11). This two-year process uniting all the Parties to the Convention was subsequently made official as an Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) in Bali in December 2007¹⁴. Although its work is scheduled to end in 2009, when the Bali roadmap should have reached an agreement on the post-2012 period, the Parties, who had not reached a detailed agreement in Copenhagen, nevertheless agreed to move the negotiations forward. The Parties decided in Durban to extend the AWG-LCA mandate for one year.

11. See: <http://unfccc.int/bodies/items/6241.php>


12. By virtue of article 3.9 of the Kyoto Protocol, following Decision 1/CMP.1, Study of paragraph 9 of Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol on the commitments of the Annex I Parties for the following periods.

13. Annex B countries: EU-15, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Monaco, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Canada, Hungary, Japan, Poland, Croatia, New Zealand, Russian Federation, Ukraine, Norway, Australia and Iceland.

14. Decision 1/CP 13

- The Parties launched a new negotiation process in Durban - the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action¹⁵ (ADP). Its mandate is to develop a new protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force by virtue of the Convention that will apply to all the Parties. Under the ADP timetable, this agreement should be adopted by 2015 for implementation in 2020.

**FIGURE 1:
CHRONOLOGY AND STRUCTURE OF POST-2012 REGIME NEGOTIATION BODIES**



Source: Ecofys, 2012.

There were several stages in the negotiations on a post-2012 regime, the most significant being the Bali Action Plan in 2007 (Section 1.2), the Copenhagen Accord in 2009 (Section 1.3), the Cancún Agreements (Section 1.4) and the Durban Conference (Section 1.5). These stages are fundamental in conceptualising the negotiation process from Bali to the present time.

1.2 The Bali Action Plan

The Bali Conference delegates applied themselves to establishing a multilateral cooperation framework for the post-2012 period in an atmosphere of conciliation and awareness-raising that was widely publicised in the media. Their efforts produced an agreement on a two-year negotiation process - the Bali Action Plan. The Bali Action Plan is a set of decisions and processes emanating from the Dialogue on long-term cooperative action to address climate change by enhancing implementation of the Convention, initiated during the Montreal Conference (2005). The Action Plan forms

15. Decision 1/CP.17

a coherent basis for negotiations with a view to adopting an agreement on the post-2012 regime by applying a roadmap staggered over two years (Box 1).

A change in formulation was one of the most significant developments instigated by the Bali Action Plan. For the first time, a language of "developed" and "developing" countries was replaced by a language of Parties "included in Annex I" and "not included in Annex I". This new order extended the perspective to new combinations and effort levels for the countries¹⁶. Although several developing countries refuted any idea of differentiating between them, the developed countries hope that the negotiations on the post-2012 climate regime will consider different levels of economic development, emissions and mitigation potential in each developing country when determining the efforts made by these countries. Another innovation of the Bali Action Plan was to link the mitigation efforts of developing countries to financial and technological support from developed countries.

BOX 1. BALI ACTION PLAN¹⁷

The **Bali Action Plan** is a set of decisions and processes emanating from the Dialogue on long-term cooperative action to address climate change by enhancing implementation of the Convention, initiated during the Montreal Conference (2005). The Action Plan forms a coherent basis for negotiations with a view to adopting an agreement on the post-2012 regime.

Shared vision for long-term cooperative action

The Action Plan calls for the examination of the possibility of adopting a shared vision for long-term cooperative action. This revolves around the long-term global objective of reducing GHG emissions to achieve the ultimate Convention objective. This objective considers the principles of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities depending on the social and economic conditions and other factors specific to each country.

The four constituent components of the Bali Action Plan

Mitigation:

Mitigation was shown clearly as one of the most thorny issues during the plenary closing session in Bali. The United States, Canada and other Parties favoured tough language on developing countries' actions and commitments; the Group of 77 and China (G-77/China) sought greater emphasis on a discourse dealing more with the commitments of Annex I Parties.

Notwithstanding these different views, the Parties agreed to consider the following elements:

16. Watanabe *et al.*, 2008.

17. Decision 1/CP.13 and IISD (2007).

- "measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions, including quantified GHG emission limitation and reduction objectives, by all developed country Parties, while ensuring the comparability of efforts among them, taking into account differences in their national circumstances; and
- nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing country Parties in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner"¹⁸.

Adaptation:

The decision was taken to examine international cooperation in supporting the urgent application of miscellaneous adaptation actions, given the immediate needs of developing countries particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, mainly the Least Developed Countries (LDC), the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and the African countries.

Technology development and transfer:

Effective mechanisms and significant resources to eliminate obstacles and provide financial incentives are envisaged to promote access by developing country Parties to environmentally sound technologies at affordable cost. These discussions cover the financing of these technologies and intellectual property rights. The issues are also discussed in other forums such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO)¹⁹.

Financing:

The Bali Action Plan links the mitigation actions of developing countries to financial and technological support from developed countries. Such financial support is also necessary to help developing countries to adapt to the adverse effects of climate change. The Bali Action Plan thus sets out the bases for the financial framework to support developing countries in their mitigation and adaptation efforts.

18. *Ibid.*

19. The WTO Agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS), negotiated during the Uruguay Round from 1986 to 1994 (Article 66.2), enjoins the developing country governments to offer their businesses incentives to promote technology transfer to the least developed countries. This agreement is struggling to be applied as noted by developing countries during the Doha Round (9-13 November 2001). Thus the TRIPS Council Decision of 19 February 2003 on implementation of Article 66.2 of the Agreement on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights is attempting to remedy the situation by requesting the developed countries to submit annual reports on the actions taken or planned pursuant to their commitments under Article 66.2. On 15 May 2006, the General Council decided to make public all the official documents published under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This includes all official documents on the TRIPS and other negotiation areas of the Uruguay Round. These documents have been available since 20 May 2010.

1.3 The Copenhagen Accord

The two negotiating processes, firstly under the Kyoto Protocol, that should culminate in a second commitment period, and secondly under the Convention, that should culminate in a legally-binding agreement, were supposed to form the main components of a post-2012 regime. This regime should have been adopted during the Copenhagen Conference in December 2009. Neither process reached a successful conclusion in Copenhagen, despite the active involvement of the United States in the post-2012 issues in 2009.

Apart from the lack of compromise on the most disputed questions, such as reduction targets for developed countries, the negotiations were marred mainly by transparency and procedural issues. Despite the attendance of 130 Heads of State at this Conference, only a restricted group mainly comprising economic powers and regional group representatives were involved in preparing texts.

The negotiations nevertheless produced the Copenhagen Accord, a political agreement in the form of a high-level declaration by a few States. In July 2012, 141 Parties had indicated their association with the Accord²⁰. Despite not being legally binding, note that the Copenhagen Accord includes the two principal GHG emitters in the battle against climate change, namely China and the United States.

The Accord underlines the political desire of States associated with the agreement to address climate change in accordance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Noted by the COP15²¹, the Copenhagen Accord clarifies certain aspects of the negotiations, like the long-term GHG emission reduction targets and financing. The developed countries committed to collective financing objectives of:

- 30 billion US dollars for the 2010-2012 period;
- 100 billion US dollars per year until 2020.

The countries also undertook to enhance their long-term cooperative action to combat climate change, given the scientific opinion whereby the rise in the global temperature should be limited to 2°C²².

This Accord served as the basis for negotiations leading to the Cancún Agreements. No significant progress was made on the Kyoto Protocol during the Copenhagen Conference.

20. See: http://unfccc.int/meetings/copenhagen_dec_2009/items/5262.php

21. Decision 2/CP.15

22. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1

1.4 The Cancún Agreements

Although the Parties had more modest expectations of the Cancun Conference than the Copenhagen Conference, some hoped for a legally-binding outcome under the Convention and the adoption of targets under the Kyoto Protocol. Others expected more to see a "balanced set" of decisions.

After the disappointment of Copenhagen, the international community greeted the Cancún Agreements with enthusiasm (see Box 2). They crystallised the progress in Copenhagen into a formal agreement of the COP and sent a political signal to continue the discussions on the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. As a whole, it forms a balanced set of decisions under the two negotiation processes (under the Convention and under the Protocol) accepted by all, except Bolivia that has stated its disagreement.

The Agreements acknowledge the historical responsibility of developed countries and take note of emission reduction objectives of these countries, encouraged by the Copenhagen Accord²³. The developed countries adopted an emission reduction objective of 20% under normal business activities by 2020, whilst the developing countries should record their nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMA) in a UNFCCC register. These objectives are however not enough to limit global warming to an average of 2°C.

The significant progress established by the Cancún Agreements mainly consists of the formal creation of institutions, such as the Green Climate Fund, the Committee for Adaptation and the Climate Technology Centre. Other progress made includes setting up a register to optimise the NAMA and the launch of the REDD+, which targets reduced emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries and includes the role of conservation, durable forestry management and development of forest carbon stocks in developing countries.

BOX 2. THE CANCÚN AGREEMENTS

Under the auspices of the Kyoto Protocol

The AWG-KP mandate was renewed to finalise an agreement on the issues relating to the Kyoto Protocol, including:

- the legal issues related to the AWG-KP mandate and the gap between the two commitment periods of the Kyoto Protocol;

23. FCCC/SB/2011/INF.1/Rev.1

- the GHG emission reductions to be achieved by Annex I Parties, individually, jointly and in aggregate;
- the flexibility mechanisms;
- the definitions, modalities, rules and guidelines for dealing with Land Use, Land Use changes and Forestry in the second commitment period (LULUCF);
- the scope of the list of GHG, sectors and categories of sources and the common metrics;
- information on potential environmental, economic and social consequences, including spillover effects, tools, policies, measures and methodologies available to Annex I Parties.

LULUCF

In Cancún, the Parties agreed to debate the means of accounting for emissions by sources and removals by sinks in the LULUCF sector. In this sense, the Parties focused on the possibility of applying a cap on emissions and removals linked to the LULUCF sector and on the possibility of looking into ways of considering emissions caused by events which are beyond a Party's control (commonly referred to as "force majeure")²⁴. The Parties also agreed to discuss the eligibility of LULUCF activities related to carbon capture for project-based mechanisms.

Under the auspices of the Convention

The shared vision

The Agreements set the objective of stabilising the temperature increase at 2°C with respect to pre-industrial levels, while opening the door to an eventual objective of 1.5 degrees. They agree that the peak emission year for developing countries will fall later than for the developed countries but do not specify a year.

Mitigation

Developed countries: The Agreements noted the developed country targets and required an increase in the level of ambition. The Agreements also set out the outline for a work programme to improve the transparency of mitigation efforts and the support granted to the developing countries to ensure their measurability, reportability and verifiability.

Developing countries: The Agreements create a register to record nationally appropriate mitigation measures (NAMA). The objective is to make them easier to match to the available support. The Agreements also improve national communications between non-Annex 1 Parties.

24. Decision 6/CMP.3 page 22.

Financing

The Agreements take note of the collective commitment of the developed countries to grant new, larger, predictable and adequate increased financing and improve access to it for mitigation efforts, including REDD+, the adaptation of developing countries, technology development and transfer and capacity building. The financing provided by the developed countries will be measured, reported and verified in accordance with existing guidelines and those that may be adopted by the CMP.

The Agreements create the Green Climate Fund and define its main structural components. A Transitional Committee was set up to prepare the operationalisation modalities of the Fund.

A permanent committee has been created to support the COP in improving the coherence, mobilisation and coordination of the climate financing.

Adaptation

The Agreements create the Cancún Adaptation Framework whose objective is to strengthen the action engaged in the area of adaptation. The Agreements also create a support process for LDCs to formulate and implement adaptation plans. They also create an adaptation committee charged with promoting the implementation of enhanced action for adaptation coherently under the Convention. Finally, a work programme is established to meet the adaptation needs of particularly vulnerable developing countries.

REDD+

Agreement was reached in Cancún on the definition of the activities of REDD+. It confirms, inter alia, that the REDD+ mechanism will be deployed in three phases (Phases I, II and III) and details these three phases.

Response measures

The Agreements set up a forum to prepare a work programme on the response measures under the SBSTA and the SBI²⁵.

Technology development and transfer

The Agreements introduce a technology mechanism charged with accelerating the development and transfer of technologies in support of adaptation and mitigation measures. An Executive Technology Committee and a Climate Technology Centre and Network were established in this context.

25. Paragraph 93 of Decision 1/CP.16

1.5 The Durban Platform

The Durban Conference provided a new opportunity to discuss the structure of the climate regime. This meant obtaining a clear mandate in Durban to negotiate a unique agreement under the auspices of the UNFCCC, which would engage developing countries in global mitigation efforts to the same extent as developed countries. In addition, the Parties would have to be imaginative in order to avoid a possible deadlock that risked blocking the negotiations on the issues of substance, like increasing the ambition of mitigation targets and mobilising the support needed for the mitigation and adaptation actions of developing countries. The operational issues fuelled more realistic expectations thanks to the necessary milestones laid by the Cancún Agreements.

In Durban, the announcements by Canada, Russia and Japan regarding their refusal to commit to a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol and the Australian-Norwegian proposal to end the Protocol in favour of a broad agreement had caused discontent among the developing countries. Certain of them feared that it would be decided to end the Durban Protocol, which represented the last real occasion to seal an agreement for a second commitment period under the auspices of the Kyoto Protocol. In addition, the developing countries insisted on the need to respect the principle of historical responsibility and the right to development and sought the commitment of the United States, the second largest emitter of GHG, in a legally-binding agreement.

The developed countries have insisted on a long-term agreement which would commit the large GHG emitters among the emerging countries to implementing national mitigation actions in order to reach a concrete and rapid reduction of global GHG emissions in the medium to long term, thereby avoiding an irreversible impact on the climate.

Although the parties failed to adopt a legally-binding agreement in Durban, the conference nevertheless made a series of decisions, including those establishing²⁶:

- a new Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP) and a "process to prepare a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force, applicable to all the Parties" which should enter into force in 2020;
- a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol;
- an agreement to end in Doha the mandates of the AWG-LCA and the AWG-KP.

26. No less than 36 decisions.

In addition, the negotiations under the Convention produced four pillars of the Bali Action Plan (mitigation, adaptation, technology and finance) after four years of negotiation. The Parties moved forward significantly in implementing the Cancún Agreements. The Durban Decisions establish the operational and institutional guidelines to make sure that the key elements agreed in Cancún become operational. This new institutional context includes, for example, the NAMA register, the Adaptation Committee, the technology mechanism and the Green Climate Fund.

The negotiations under the auspices of the Durban Platform have commenced in 2012; the aim is an agreement adopted by 2015 for implementation in 2020. By launching long-term cooperation involving all the countries, the Durban Platform represents progress in the question of whether the developed countries or the developing countries should act first. The Durban Platform ensures that the negotiated agreement will be applicable to all the Parties and will have a "legal force". The extent of the agreement's "legal force" will be decided in the years to come based on three options established by the Durban Platform, namely:

- a protocol;
- another legal instrument; or
- an agreed outcome with legal force.

The effect of the Durban Conference was to boost the trust between the Parties and to maintain the promise of support provided for the mitigation actions by developing countries. It testifies to a universal political will to combat climate change with a constructive commitment by the most vulnerable countries and the initiative of China, which announced its willingness to commit to reducing its emissions from 2020 onwards, bringing with it other countries, including, possibly, the United States and Brazil.

Nevertheless, the Durban Decisions are not the solution to putting the emissions "on the right track" to achieve the objective of 2°C. The carryover of decisions on the actions to be taken in terms of climate change until 2015 or 2020 means a likely increase in the average global temperature to 3.5°C²⁷.

27. See: www.climateactiontracker.org

THE MAIN NEGOTIATION ISSUES

Since Durban, the climate regime issues have been examined under a "three-pronged" approach:

- The Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP), which commenced its mandate in 2012. The mandate of the Durban Platform is to prepare a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force by virtue of the Convention applicable to all the Parties and which should be adopted at the latest in 2015 (Section 2);
- The Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA), which ends its mandate at the end of 2012. The mandate of the AWG-LCA is take charge of the process "to enable the full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention through long-term cooperative action, now, up to and beyond 2012" with a view to reaching agreement on a post 2012 regime (Section 3);
- The Ad Hoc Working Group on further commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP), which ends its mandate at the end of 2012. The AWG-KP provides a framework for negotiations on the commitments of the Annex I Parties. Its main mandate is to agree the GHG emission reduction targets for these countries for a second commitment period and how these reduction targets can be achieved (Section 4).

At the same time, the subsidiary bodies aim to resolve the technical questions:

- the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) is mandated to advise the COP/CMP on improving the effective application of the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol;
- the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) advises the COP/CPM on scientific and technical issues which are specific to or shared by them.


The Guide subsequently studies:

- The main issues of the Durban Platform (Section 2);
- The main issues relating to the Convention, including those discussed within the AWG-LCA and within subsidiary bodies (Section 3);
- The main issues relating to the Kyoto Protocol, including those discussed within the AWG-KP and within subsidiary bodies (Section 4);

- The cross-cutting issues relating to both the Kyoto Protocol and the Convention, such as the response measures and capacity building, or which cover several negotiation issues such as measuring, reporting and verifying (MRV) (Section 5).

The following sections present these issues and the key positions of countries and highlight the stumbling blocks pertaining to these issues.

**FIGURE 2:
UNFCCC PROCESS BODIES AFTER THE DURBAN CONFERENCE**



Source: UNFCCC Secretariat.

2. ISSUES RELATING TO THE DURBAN PLATFORM

The Durban Platform is the fruit of a consensus by the main negotiating groups on climate change. The European Union (EU), supported by the Alliance of Small Island Developing States (AOSIS) and the least developed countries (LDC), fought during the Durban Conference for a mandate to negotiate a new legally-binding instrument engaging all the countries. The rapid adoption of this mandate was the condition for the EU adopting a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol²⁸.

The Durban Platform meets this demand by introducing a process to negotiate "a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force by virtue of the Convention applicable to all the Parties"²⁹. This mandate commenced in 2012 and is scheduled to end in 2015. In exchange, the European Union agreed to extend the Kyoto Protocol for five to eight years by adopting an amendment providing for a second commitment period for 2012-2017 or 2012-2020³⁰. This should be adopted at the Doha COP.

In addition, the Durban Platform responds to the United States' concern for the adoption of a symmetrical mandate between the developing and developed countries, by calling on "the widest possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate international response" and by anticipating that the Durban Platform will be "applicable to all the Parties" after the negotiations³¹. Lastly, the countries in the BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa, India and China), which sought to renew the Kyoto Protocol, do well in the Durban Platform; its outcome will enter into force in 2020, possibly as an agreed outcome with legal force³².

28. See: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/envir/125026.pdf

29. Decision 1/CP.17, para. 2

30. FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/10/Add.1

31. Durban Platform, preamble para. 1 and 2

32. *Idem* para. 2 and 4

The decision creating the Durban Platform provides for setting up an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP). The ADP must complete its work as early as possible but no later than 2015 in order to adopt a legal agreement at the COP21³³ so that it can come into effect and be implemented from 2020³⁴ (see Figure 1).

The Parties decided in Durban to set up a work plan to raise the mitigation ambition level which will study a set of specific measures to reduce the gap between the commitments made under the Copenhagen Accord and the Cancún Agreements and the necessary emission reduction to maintain global warming below 2°C. This gap will be 6 GtCO₂-eq. by 2020³⁵. The Decision also provides for all the Parties to ensure the highest possible mitigation efforts³⁶.

The issues relating to the Durban Platform mainly cover the implementation of Decision 1/CP.17 on the Durban Platform. For that, in Doha, the Parties should approve the election of the ADP officers, schedule its work and state their vision of an agreement applicable to all the Parties. The Parties should also focus on the type of the new agreement and introduce a work plan that will study a set of specific measures to reduce the ambition gap.

2.1 Definition of the legal framework for the future agreement and the legal nature of commitments

The negotiations on the legal framework of the future agreement include the legal form of the agreement, the legal form of commitments within this agreement, the binding nature and the commitment modalities of the Parties and the procedures and institutions set up to comply with the Parties' commitments.

The ADP must achieve "a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force by virtue of the Convention"³⁷. A legally-binding agreement implies the willingness of the Parties to be held responsible for meeting their obligations. For example, the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol are legally-binding agreements; one is an international treaty and the other is a protocol.

33. Decision 1/CP.17, para. 4

34. This delay in implementing the outcome is due to the fact that most developing countries that are large GHG emitters, especially China, had stated that they would only agree to legally-binding commitments for the post-2020 period.

35. UNEP, 2010 and UNEP, 2011.

36. Paragraph 7 of Decision 1/CP.17

37. Paragraph 2 of Decision 1/CP.17

The Convention specifies that the agreement under a post-2012 regime must be a protocol, an amendment and/or an annex to the Convention³⁸. Nevertheless, the decision establishing the Durban Platform opens the way to the adoption of a mutually-agreed text with a legal value.

The issues cover the extent of the "legal force" of the agreement to be achieved by the Parties by 2015 and the question of whether the legal nature of the outcome of the platform should already be defined or whether the content and the relationship of the future agreement with the Kyoto Protocol should be defined first.

The extent of the "legal force" of the agreement will be determined in the next few years. Various interpretations can emerge from three options established by the Durban Platform, namely a legally-binding treaty providing for emission reductions by all or a set of formal decisions with legal value.

Although all the countries agree on the option of an outcome with legal force, certain developed countries, like the EU, and some developing countries, like the SIDS, wish to opt as quickly as possible for a legally-binding form like a protocol or international treaty. In addition, for the Like Minded Group, the legal form of the outcome must not be decided in advance nor must the discussions on this point constitute an immediate priority. These countries prefer to develop the content before agreeing on a set form. Many countries, including the Coalition for Rainforest Nations and the EU, believe that a new international agreement is necessary before 2020, which could result in the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol to ensure "seamless continuity" of the Protocol beyond 2012. Ultimately, the Parties should also determine whether the Kyoto Protocol must continue to exist side by side with the new instrument by adopting a third commitment period which would apply to the post-2020 period (see Section 4).

2.2 Election of the ADP officers

To make the ADP working group operational as quickly as possible, the Parties started during the Bonn intersessional meeting in June 2012 to identify the ADP officers. South Africa chaired the ADP on a temporary basis for the Bonn session.

The structure of the UNFCCC governance is based primarily on the agreement of Parties to split up into Annex I Parties and non-Annex I Parties, but the dynamics have changed. In addition to the traditional distinction between developed and developing countries, a third category of "emerging developing countries" or "advanced developing countries" has appeared. Its inclusion in the vote for the ADP officers and the potential consequences of this process therefore represented a major challenge when electing the ADP officers.

38. Articles 15, 16 and 17 of the Convention. <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/convfr.pdf>

Several Parties felt that the Group of Latin American and Caribbean countries (GRULAC) should chair the ADP given its low representation in the other working groups. However, some Asian countries, especially China, wished that the chairmanship of the ADP be allocated to the Asia-Pacific Group³⁹.

The Parties finally agreed on a provisional arrangement. The Parties opted for a multi-annual approach for the officers, with two vice-chairmen, one from a non-Annex I country and the other from an Annex I country. The candidate of the Asia-Pacific Group, Moreshwar Mauskar (India) would be appointed for one year in 2012-2013 with his counterpart coming from an Annex I country - Harald Dovland (Norway) - and subsequently, the joint chairman of the GRULAC, Kishan Kumar-singh (Trinidad and Tobago) would take on an eighteen-month mandate. In 2015, the joint chairman of a non-Annex I Party would be a representative of the African Group and the Rapporteur would come from a non-Annex I country.

This provisional agreement should be approved by the Parties in Doha during the COP18.

2.3 Scheduling the work of the ADP

The Decision on the Durban Platform adopted at the end of 2011 does not specify the content of the new agreement. There is no explicit statement, for example, on whether the agreement should contain emission limitation conditions. The Decision created the ADP requires it to launch a work plan on "improving the mitigation ambition" and calls for exploring options for a "series of measures" to ensure the highest possible mitigation efforts by all the Parties. The Parties should negotiate "the options and the means" to face up the climate challenges, mainly those covering the mitigation, adaptation, financing, development and transfer of technologies, transparency of measures, support and capacity building⁴⁰.

The ADP started to schedule its work during the first half of 2012. An informal ministerial meeting on the Durban Platform for enhanced action took place in Bonn (May 2012) in Germany at the invitation of the Chairman of the COP17, Maite Nkoana-Mashabane. Ministers and senior civil servants from 32 countries, representing all the UNFCCC negotiating groups, attended the meeting. The discussions covered what should be done in the next four years to ensure the implementation of the ADP mandate. The participants also discussed options for bridging the gap between the current commitments by governments and the necessary action for countries resilient to the climate. During this meeting, the Parties expressed their willingness to build on the impetus of the Durban Conference and to achieve a strong result at the COP18 in Doha, Qatar⁴¹.

39. IISD, 2012b.

40. Paragraph 5 of Decision 1/CP.17

41. IISD, 2012c

At the Bonn intersession in June 2012, the Parties identified points that should be dealt with by the ADP work plan. A large number of Parties questioned the relevance of listing these points. These Parties fear that listing the points to be included on the agenda risks excluding other important points. Whereas many Parties consider mitigation is the core of the ADP mandate, some developing countries have emphasised that all the components, including financing, adaptation, capacity building and technology transfer, should also be included in this core⁴². Many feel that improving the ambition to bridge this "mitigation gap" was a critical aspect of Decision 1/CP.17, but the Parties encountered problems in determining whether mitigation should be dealt with under the work plan on increasing the mitigation ambition or under the ADP work plan.

In Bonn, the Parties also questioned whether the work plan on increasing the mitigation ambition should be included in the ADP work scheduling or whether this component was independent of the ADP and could be dealt with under the AWG-LCA. The Decision on the Durban Platform that launches a work plan on increasing the mitigation ambition states neither the time nor the implementation of the work plan, nor the body charged with its execution. Whereas some developing Parties such as China supported a review of the pre-2020 mitigation ambition under the AWG-LCA, many other Parties, including the SIDS, the LDC and some developed countries, insisted that this review take place under the ADP. Some Parties also prefer to deal with enhancing the mitigation ambition under the AWG-LCA because, unlike the ADP, its mandate is based on the Bali Action Plan, which lists the basic principles of the Convention, including the common but differentiated responsibility.

In Bonn, the Parties finally identified two working themes for the implementation of all the components of the Decision on the Durban Platform⁴³:

- a process to prepare under the Convention a protocol, another legal instrument or a mutually-agreed text with legal force, applicable to all the Parties and which will schedule its activities, including those covering the mitigation, adaptation, financing, development and transfer of technologies, transparency of measures, support and capacity building (paragraphs 2 to 6 of Decision 1/CP.17);
- a work plan intended to raise the ambition level of mitigation efforts in order to define and study a set of specific measures to reduce their disparities, with the aim that all the Parties make as much effort as possible in favour of mitigation (paragraphs 7 to 8 of Decision 1/CP.17).

42. IISD, 2012b.

43. FCCC/ADP/2012/L.2

Exploratory discussions into these two work themes took place in Bangkok (August-September 2012). The Parties expressed their vision of the main outlines of the ADP work, including:

- A work plan up to 2015, including the main stages of the ADP work.
- How the Convention principles should be considered in the ADP work.
- How the outcome of the ADP will be applicable to all the Parties.
- The inclusion of national circumstances and the degree of flexibility in the work of the ADP.

The negotiators have little hope of an agreement in Doha on a precise work plan combined with fixed deadlines for 2013. Nevertheless, the Parties should set out and adopt the outlines of the ADP work scheduling. Some Parties recalled in Bangkok that the conclusions of the ADP in Doha should be part of the whole, based on progress made in other ad hoc working groups⁴⁴.

2.4 Improving the ambition level

In Decision 1/CP.17, the COP noted with grave concern the major gap between the aggregate effect of Parties' mitigation pledges and the emission pathways that would hold the increase in global average temperature below 2°C or 1.5°C compared with pre-industrial levels. The Parties therefore instigated a work plan to increase the mitigation ambition. The paragraphs on the ambition gap in the Decision instigating the Durban Platform do not state the period to which these paragraphs apply⁴⁵. Although these paragraphs did not cover the pre-2020 period, the delays in decisions on actions to be taken to mitigate climate change until 2015 or 2020 would imply a risk of costs of these actions spiralling upwards and a likely increase in the average world temperature of 3.5°C⁴⁶.

The issues cover the establishment of a mitigation framework for the post-2020 period whilst recognising the need to enhance the mitigation measures during the 2012-2020 period, the emission reduction level sought by the Durban Platform negotiations, the means to be implemented to achieve an increase in the mitigation ambition and the question of whether the new regime will be based on the absolute emissions of reduction targets, like the Kyoto Protocol, or whether the intention is to adopt a different approach to reducing emissions.

An ADP workshop was held in Bonn on 21 May entitled "Workshop on increasing the level of ambition under paragraph 8 of decision 1/CP.17." The workshop

44. FCCC/ADP/2012/INF.1

45. Bodansky, D., 2012.

46. See: <http://climateactiontracker.org/news/126/Emissions-gap-looks-set-to-increase-if-government-action-doesnt-step-up.html>

gave the participants a chance to broaden their understanding of the ambition gap and discuss options and means to increase the ambition level.

The Chief Scientist for the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the representative of the International Energy Agency (IEA) underlined that the technologies and strategic approaches required to plug this emission gap are currently available and include⁴⁷:

- scaled-up use of renewable energy, including biomass;
- increased energy efficiency and more robust energy efficiency standards;
- sustainable forest management;
- the reduction of non-CO₂ greenhouse gas emissions.

However, the UNEP and IEA considered that the current infrastructures, for example the use of carbon-rich, inefficient technologies block the implementation of these solutions and are likely to last for decades. They therefore call for changes in investment policies and patterns to achieve the objective of the Convention⁴⁸.

The Parties examined the role of national governments, the private sector and international cooperation in enhanced action for the mobilisation of necessary resources to promote the action. The participants proposed options for the next steps in increasing the ambition⁴⁹.

The Parties underlined the need to consider the ambition holistically and suggested four specific ways to enhance the ambition:

- Enhance the UNFCCC Secretariat and higher United Nations policy initiatives to facilitate the process of increasing the ambition level. The Parties also recognised the importance of the work under the AWG-LCA on clarifying mitigation objectives and actions;
- Boost the other international cooperation initiatives to increase the ambition. The participants suggested a more in-depth assessment of these initiatives;
- Some participants suggested that more information should be provided by the developed and developing countries on reducing their emissions;
- The importance of exchanging information was highlighted by a wide spectrum of participants, both to enhance transparency and trust and to share the lessons learnt to improve the effectiveness of actions.

47. FCCC/ADP/2012/INF.1

48. *Idem.*

49. *Ibidem.*

In Bangkok, the Parties used the conclusions of this workshop as a basis for moving their discussions forward on how to raise this ambition and on defining an objective to be achieved. They dealt with the scope of this work plan. Numerous developing countries underlined that the ambition must cover the adaptation, mitigation and means of implementation. The Parties underlined the transparency of mitigation measures and discussed the type of regime able to ensure this transparency. Some Parties highlighted the need to encourage the complementary measures (e.g. carbon market, HFC and methane). The EU suggested that the Secretariat prepare a technical document with structured, quantified options on the complementary initiatives. Barbados recommended concentrating on the options proposed in the UNEP report "Bridging the Emissions gap", including enhancing the rules on Land Use, Land Use changes and Forestry (LULUCF) and the control of the double accounting of emission reductions. Numerous developing countries underlined the need for medium-term financing and emphasised the need to give clear and predictable signals for the private sector as well as providing technology transfer and dealing with intellectual property rights issues, so that concrete mitigation actions could be implemented and encouraged. The Parties also raised the question of how the work of the ADP will related to the 2013-2015 assessment.

2.5 Towards an agreement applicable to all the Parties

The mandate of the Bali Action Plan kept a differentiation of obligation between the developed and developing countries in terms of the mitigation objectives and actions. The developed countries were bound by an obligation of result whilst the developing countries were bound by obligations of means, provided technological and financial support was received from developed countries. The 2009 Copenhagen Accord and the 2010 Cancún Agreements restated that combating climate change was based on "equity" which had to be achieved through the principle of common but differentiated responsibility (Box 3). The developing countries have traditionally fought for this principle and the principle of historical responsibility to justify the asymmetrical mitigation efforts between the developed and developing countries.

BOX 3.

THE COMMON BUT DIFFERENTIATED RESPONSIBILITY UNDER THE CONVENTION, ARTICLE 4.7

"The extent to which developing country Parties will effectively implement their commitments under the Convention will depend on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments under the Convention related to financial resources and transfer of technology and will take fully into account that economic and social development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of the developing country Parties."

In Durban, the Parties wished to reach a decision that would give rise to a more inclusive and symmetrical negotiating process on the mitigation efforts of the Parties. The Durban Platform includes no reference to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities of the Convention, except for the revision process. The Durban Platform is a springboard for new negotiations that could exceed the traditional lines separating the developed from the developing world.

The issues focus on how to include the principles of the Convention such as common responsibility, equity and historical responsibility in the outcome of the Durban Platform whilst ensuring the universal applicability of this outcome to all the Parties. The issues also focus on how the outcome of the Durban Platform will distinguish between the obligations of developed and developing countries.

A new fluid set of coalitions is starting to take form under the impulse of changing interests. Bonn saw the emergence of the Like-Minded Group of about forty countries, mainly the Arab Group, Latin-American countries including Argentina, Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, India and China. The Group is fighting for the outcome of the ADP to comply with the principles of common but differentiated responsibility, equity and historical responsibility of developed countries in climate change. These countries support the concept that any outcome under the ADP must be equitable so that the "universality of application" does not become the "uniformity of application"⁵⁰.

The Arab Group underlined that the negotiations under the ADP should seek to ensure the full and effective implementation of the Convention. It also underlined the need to respect, and not renegotiate, the principles governing the international action.

Some developing countries, including the SIDS, the LDC and some Latin American countries including Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Peru and Panama, refer to this universality of application as "the start of a new paradigm to respond to climate change"⁵¹.

The EU considers that the UNFCCC principles are a good basis, but that they must be interpreted to reflect the constantly-changing common but differentiated responsibilities of countries and the respective capacities⁵².

It will be up to the Parties to determine how the differentiation between the developed and developing countries will be achieved, if necessary, mainly when choosing the approach for reducing emissions.

50. IISD, 2012b.

51. FCCC/ADP/2012/Misc.1 & Add.1 and FCCC/ADP/2012/Misc.2

52. *Idem*.

Main issues relating to the Durban Platform

The issues for Doha on the vision for the main outlines of the ADP:

- What are the ADP working components? How to define these components to implement the ADP concretely and without omitting a single essential point?
- What are the next steps between now and 2015, especially in 2013, towards achieving these results?
- How to interpret and incorporate the "national circumstances" into the work of the ADP?
- How to interpret and incorporate the "applicability to all the Parties" into the work of the ADP? How and to what extent will the outcome of the Durban Platform distinguish between the obligations of developed and developing countries. Will commitments be differentiated according to their type, timetable, rigour or some other way?
- How to incorporate "flexibility" into the work of the ADP?
- How must the principles of the Convention be applied in the context of the ADP vision?
- What must be the extent of the "legal force" of the agreement to be reached by the Parties by 2015? Must the legal nature of the outcome of the platform be defined already or is it better to start by defining the content? Should the Kyoto Protocol continue to exist side by side with the new instrument by adopting a third commitment period which would apply to the post-2020 period?

The issues on improving the ambition level

- How should the work of the ADP relate to the relevant work inside and outside the UNFCCC? What international cooperation initiatives have the potential to generate important emission reductions to plug the gap and how can they be supported and widened?
- How can the work plan contribute to widening and intensifying the support to enhance the mitigation measures of developing countries? What are the means to be implemented to achieve an increase in mitigation ambition?
- How must the principles of the Convention be applied in the context of the work plan on ambition?
- How should be work of the ADP relate to the 2013-2015 review?
- How to establish a post-2020 mitigation framework, whilst acknowledging the need to enhance the mitigation measures during the period 2013-2020?
- What is the emission reduction level sought by the Durban Platform negotiations? Will the new regime be based on the absolute emissions of reduction targets like the Kyoto Protocol or does it intend to adopt a different approach towards emission reduction?

3. THE MAIN CONVENTION ISSUES, INCLUDING THE ISSUES DISCUSSED WITHIN SUBSIDIARY BODIES

This section reviews the Convention issues, theme by theme, including issues dealt with under the Ad hoc working group on long term cooperative action within the Convention (AWG-LCA) which has the mandate of reaching a post-2012 agreement which would cover the four pillars of the Bali Action Plan and the common vision of long-term cooperative action (see Box 4). In addition, this section of the guide will also review the Convention measures dealt with under the auspices of subsidiary bodies: the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI).

Since Cancún, Decision 1/CP.16 (see Box 2) has been a reference for the discussions under the Convention. One of the most problematic issues for Doha under the Convention is the scheduling of a new cycle of negotiations embodied by the Durban Platform working group. The Parties should reach an agreement in Doha that will signal the end of the AWG-LCA. It will also be question of establishing more ambitious common objectives for 2020. In this context, the Parties are going to start to clarify national mitigation commitments and set up emission accounting modalities.

In addition, in Doha, the technological and financial support for adaptation and mitigation of developing countries will dominate concerns. The Parties will also discuss how to increase the aid procured for the developing countries to 100 billion dollars a year by 2020.

BOX 4. THE AWG-LCA WORK PROGRAMME AND THE NEGOTIATING TEXT STRUCTURE

The AWG-LCA work programme is organised around the shared vision for long-term cooperative action and four elements constituting the Bali Action Plan - mitigation, adaptation, technology development and transfer - and the provision of financial and investment resources.

The AWG-LCA will use the negotiating text for its work in Doha, with the following structure:

- I. A shared vision for long-term cooperative action, including a long-term global goal for emission reductions, to achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention, in accordance with the provisions and principles of the Convention, in particular the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, and taking into account social and economic conditions and other relevant factors;
- II. Enhanced action at national and international scale for the mitigation of climate change:
 1. Measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or actions, including quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives, by all developed country Parties, while ensuring the comparability of efforts among them, taking into account differences in their national circumstances;
 2. Nationally appropriate mitigation actions by developing country Parties in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, financing resources and capacity-building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner;
 3. Policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries, the role of conservation and sustainable management of forests and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries;
 4. Cooperative sectoral approaches and sector-specific actions, in order to enhance implementation of Article 4, paragraph 1(c), of the Convention;
 5. Various approaches, including opportunities for using markets, to enhance the cost-effectiveness of and to promote mitigation actions, bearing in mind the different circumstances of developed and developing countries;
 6. Economic and social consequences of response measures;
- III. Enhanced action on adaptation and its implementation means
- IV. Enhanced action in technology development and transfer to support mitigation and adaptation actions
- V. Enhanced action on the provision of financial resources and investment to support mitigation and adaptation actions and technological cooperation
- VI. Intensified action for capacity building
- VII. Review: complementary definition of its scope and preparation of its modalities

3.1 Shared vision for long-term cooperative action

The shared vision is intended to spearhead the four pillars of the Bali Action Plan and achieve a global objective of reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and the guiding principles and general objectives for the long-term cooperative action.

The Parties recognised in 2009 that it was essential to limit the rise in temperature to below 2°C of pre-industrial levels. The Cancún Agreements provide for the possibility of revising the limitation objective of temperature rise to adopt an objective of 1.5°C instead of the 2°C, if appropriate. The countries put forward emission reduction targets in Copenhagen and Cancún⁵³. Several countries expressed reduction objectives conditional on a series of criteria, such as comparable commitments by other Parties or using specific accounting rules for the Land Use, Land Use Changes and Forestry (LULUCF) sector as well as market mechanisms. There are therefore several emission mitigation pathways.

The UNEP reports on the emission gap and the Climate Action Tracker 2012 estimate an emission gap of 12 GtCO₂eq. in 2020 between the unconditional commitments of Parties to the Convention and the scientifically-based required emission levels^{54, 55}. The analysis of advanced targets by the countries under the AWG-LCA and AWG-KP for 2020 leads to an increase in the average global temperature of 3.5°C, which could have devastating consequences, especially for the most vulnerable countries⁵⁶. The mitigation efforts announced in Copenhagen and Cancún are therefore not enough in the long term to limit the increase in world temperature to 2°C over pre-industrial levels.

The UNEP report underlines that, to offer a "high probability" of keeping the rise in global temperature below 2°C, the emissions should peak by 2020 and the emission levels in 2050 should be less than 50% to 60% of the 1990 levels⁵⁷. Where the peak in global emissions is only reached after 2020, the adverse effects of climate change will be aggravated severely.

The Durban Decision on the shared vision does not set a global emission reduction objective by 2050 nor even a year for global emissions to reach a peak⁵⁸.

53. FCCC/SB/2011/INF.1/Rev.1

54. UNEP, 2010 and UNEP, 2011

55. See: <http://www.climateactiontracker.org/>

56. Climate Action Tracker 2011

57. UNEP, 2010

58. Paragraphs 1-3 of Decision 2/CP.17

In Doha, the Parties should continue to identify a global objective for long-term emission reduction by 2050 and establish a time frame for the peaking of GHG emissions based on reliable scientific knowledge and equitable access to sustainable development^{59, 60}. In addition, the Parties should decide on the importance given to the principle of equity in the context of the shared vision.

3.1.1 The global GHG emission reduction objective by 2050 and identification of a time frame for the peaking of emissions

The global objective of reducing GHG emissions in the long term and the identification of a time frame for the peak of emissions constitute the crux of the disagreement of the Parties on the shared vision. The first issue deals with the size of the objective and the second with the division of mitigation efforts between the Parties.

In terms of the size of the long-term collective emission reduction objective, the Parties have failed to set an emission reduction objective by 2050 compared with 1990. The disagreements are over the size of this reduction and the reference year⁶¹. The developing countries demand a more ambitious commitment from the Annex I countries which varies from 80% to 95% by 2050 over the 1990 levels⁶².

Figure 3 illustrates the emission pathway projections and highlights the fact that the mitigation efforts announced in Copenhagen and Cancún are not enough in the long term to limit the rise in the global temperature to 2°C of pre-industrial levels.

During 2012, the Parties considered that the objectives should be flexible and updated⁶³. The Parties discussed whether it was possible to divide efforts in a context where the mitigation effort as such had yet to be agreed by the Parties, as suggested by the SIDS group⁶⁴. Some Parties, like the African Group, the LDC, China and Brazil, among others, underlined the link between these objectives and the means implemented. Given that the discussions on the shared vision is targeting the identification of objectives, other Parties believe that they should not depend on the implementation of these objectives, which is not negotiated under the shared vision. The Parties added that the context of the shared vision should be concise and allow the identification of precise figures for the global objective and emission peak.

59. As stated in Decision 1/CP.16

60. Paragraphs 1-3 of Decision 2/CP.17


61. FCCC/AWGLCA/2011/CRP.39

62. *Idem*.

63. See: http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg-lca/application/pdf/sv_outome_final.pdf

64. IISD, 2010b, p.10.

FIGURE 3:
CURRENT STATE OF MITIGATION COMMITMENTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS



Source : Analytics / PIK, 2012

Concerning the emissions peak, the plan is for the Parties to agree in Doha on the adoption of an emissions peak time frame. Although the majority of countries agree that this peak must occur as soon as possible and that the year can potentially be different for developed countries and developing countries, the two groups disagree over the year and how to formulate the option of a later peak for the developing countries. While the majority of the Parties predict that the emissions peak must be established as early as possible, by 2013, 2015 or 2017⁶⁵. The developing countries recalled that the developed countries should have reached this peak in the 1990s according to the Convention⁶⁶ and that it is therefore essential that the peak occurs as quickly as possible, and not after 2015 or 2015⁶⁷.

65. FCCC/AWGLCA/2011/CRP.39

66. Article 4 para. 2 of the Convention

67. FCCC/AWGLCA/2011/CRP.39

68. See: http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg-lca/application/pdf/sv_outome_final.pdf
69. See: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/lca/application/pdf/shared_vision_170611_11.30.pdf para. 7- sub para. 4 and 5
70. Kartha, S. and Erickson, P., 2011, UNEP 2010

3.1.2 Definition and application of the principle of equitable access to sustainable development

While the developing countries have limited responsibility in the current climate change, the LDC are the most vulnerable to these impacts. In addition, these countries do not have resources and technologies available that could help to build up their ability to adapt. For example, the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) explain that private sources of financing are not normally available for their adaptation needs. They note the need to intensify the financing, technology transfer and capacity building. Due to the disproportionate impact of climate change on the most disadvantaged countries, the principle of equity is receiving more and more attention in the climate change negotiations. Equity is an ethical concept with social, economic and environmental connotations. The emphasis is placed on the equity of both the decision-making processes and outcome⁷¹.

The 2009 Copenhagen Accord and the 2010 Cancún Agreements restated that combating climate change was based on "equity" which had to be achieved through the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities" (Box 3). In the Cancún Agreements, equity is cited as a basic principle for achieving a global objective and actions for achieving this long-term goal under the shared vision⁷². The developing countries have traditionally fought for this principle to justify the asymmetric mitigation efforts between the developing and developed countries (see Section 2).

The COP17 asked the AWG-LCA to examine the question of equitable access to sustainable development, as stated in Decision 1/CP.16⁷³ in a workshop in Bonn⁷⁴. This workshop focused on the context of equity and equitable access to sustainable development, on the definition of equity and on the application of the principle of equity⁷⁵.

Although as a general rule the developing countries consider that equity is a route towards ambition and an incentive to act, the developed countries fear that equity is used as justification for not acting. In this sense, the EU stated that the UNFCCC principles are a good basis, but that they should be interpreted to reflect the constantly-changing common but differentiated responsibilities of countries and their respective capacities. In addition, the developing countries consider social and economic development to be their absolute priority. The Parties underlined the essential role of low-carbon development in sustainable development and the need to uncouple carbon growth and development⁷⁶.

71. Schwarte C. and Massawa E., 2009

72. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1

73. *Ibid.*, p. 2, para. 6

74. Paragraph 4 of Decision 2/CP.17

75. See: http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg-lca/application/pdf/20120524_equity_1130.pdf

76. *Ibid.*

On defining the principle of equity, some Parties focused on what is equity whilst other Parties described what equity is not. Generally speaking, the presentations underlined that equity should include⁷⁷.

- past and future contributions, including historical responsibilities;
- national circumstances and how they will be determined and recognised in the future regime;
- the climate change mitigation and adaptation capabilities.

On applying the principle of equity, several opinions were expressed regarding the aspects of the new agreement that should be targeted specifically under these discussions. The question is whether equity should be applied to all aspects of the new agreement or if this principle should be limited to certain aspects and, if so, which ones.

Bolivia and China suggested establishing a long-term work programme on equity with a concrete roadmap in order to define better equitable access to sustainable development under a shared vision and broader negotiations. India proposed that this issue be discussed within the AWG-LCA and the ADP⁷⁸. The Parties finally adopted two possible options for the next stages:

- A work programme on equity in order to define the question better under the shared vision and broader negotiations. This work programme could include a dialogue for understanding the positions of Parties, the identification and adoption of key principles and criteria for their operationalisation and the application of principles to key issues;
- A monitoring workshop to pursue the dialogue on this question.

In Bangkok, regarding the global objective and the time frame for the emissions peak, diverging views persisted on whether the context or the numbers should be dealt with first⁷⁹. In Doha, the Parties should choose from among these options and determine how to continue the discussions on defining and applying the principle of equity. In addition, the Parties should discuss the body that will be in charge of the shared vision once the AWG-LCA has been closed.

The main issues on the shared vision for long-term cooperative action

- What should be the size of the collective GHG emission reduction objective under the shared vision for long-term cooperative action? Should the developed countries take on a separate collective objective to ensure the success of the global objective

77. IISD, 2012d

78. IISD, 2012d

79. FCCC/AWGLCA/2012/INF.3/Rev.1

and thus “show the way” to the other countries? How do we divide the efforts implied by this objective between the countries? Should the specific numbers for goals be defined first, or a range of numbers for goals or a decision-making process or mechanism to identify specific numbers or a range of numbers for goals?

- Which year should be the peak year for global emissions? How can it be guaranteed that this emission peak will be early enough to achieve the objective of 2°C? How is the possibility that this peak might be different for developing and developed countries expressed?
- What is the definition of the principle of equity? Must the principle of equity apply to all issues or to a list of issues? What should be the framework for continuing discussions on the principle of equity?

3.2 Enhanced action at national and international scale for the mitigation of climate change

Mitigation is at the heart of the climate negotiations. The ultimate aim of the Convention is the stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Consequently, in conformity with Article 4.1(b) of the Convention, all Parties are bound to undertake efforts to mitigate climate change and, by virtue of the Kyoto Protocol, the Annex I and Annex B countries have a legally-binding GHG emission reduction obligation.

In Bali in 2007, the Parties identified mitigation sub-issues, such as the reduction of GHG emissions resulting from deforestation and the forest degradation in developing countries (REDD). They agreed to deal with the mitigation efforts of developed and developing countries separately under the AWG-LCA agenda. Moreover, the Bali Action Plan uses the terms “developed countries” and “developing countries” rather than “Annex I Parties” and “non-Annex I Parties”.

During the AWG-LCA negotiation sessions, the entire mitigation issue was addressed not just under the shared vision for long-term cooperative action but also in its own right, in accordance with the Bali Action Plan. The debates on mitigation therefore focus on the following themes:

- Mitigation in the developed countries;
- Mitigation in the developing countries;
- The REDD;
- Cooperative sectoral approaches;

- Various initiatives, including market-based approaches, to improve the cost/effectiveness ratio of mitigation actions;
- Economic and social consequences of response measures;

With regard to the division of mitigation efforts, the developing countries urge recognition of the historical responsibility of the developed countries so that they can achieve an ambitious collective reduction objective. The Cancún Agreements thus recognise that the developed countries must “show the way” in addition to acknowledging the need for developing countries to access the resources necessary to achieve durable economic and social development⁸⁰. The developing countries, supported by the international reports⁸¹, underline that the developed countries’ targets do not match up with the objective of 2°C; the developed countries, on the other hand, point out the increase in emissions in the developing countries.

Figure 4 shows the significant differences in country GHG emission reduction ambition levels. Some have suggested becoming carbon-neutral if international support is forthcoming whilst others have not yet proposed an emission reduction action beyond “business as usual”.

Nevertheless, it is difficult to compare these ambition levels as the conditions associated with the targets and the emission accounting rules can vary from one country to the next. Transparency and comparability of targets are therefore a major mitigation issue.

3.2.1 Measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally-appropriate mitigation commitments or initiatives, including quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives of developed countries (AWG-LCA)

The contribution of developed countries to limit the increase in temperatures to 2°C has been at the heart of climate negotiations since the adoption of the Bali Action Plan in 2007. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the Annex I Parties, as a group, must reduce their GHG emissions by 25% to 40% below their 1990 levels by 2020 to limit the increase in temperature to 2°C⁸². Since 2009, the majority of developed countries have announced, then stated individual emission reduction targets, or collective targets for the member countries of the European Union. Recent analyses suggest that the current commitments of Annex I


80. See: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/lca/application/pdf/shared_vision_170611_11.30.pdf para. 7- sub para. 4 and 5

81. Kartha, S. and Erickson, P., 2011, UNEP, 2010


82. IPCC, 2007a

FIGURE 4:
GHG EMISSION REDUCTION OBJECTIVES PROPOSED BY THE PARTIES IN 2011 UNDER THE AWG-LCA

DEVELOPED COUNTRIES GHG reduction objectives compared with 1990 (including forestry credits)



DEVELOPING COUNTRIES GHG reduction objectives compared with the CNA




Source: Climate Action Tracker/Ecofys / Climate Analytics / PIK, 2012.

Parties would result in a global reduction of emissions of between 11% and 16% by 2020 according to the conditions associated with these targets compared with the 1990 level⁸³. The difference between these accumulated targets and the IPCC recommendation is often called "the ambition gap".

The report of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) on the gap in terms of emission reduction states that to contain the increase in the temperature to below 2°C, the level of emissions by 2020 should be limited to 44 gigatonnes CO₂eq. (see Figure 5). A gap of 5 to 9 gigatonnes CO₂eq. is indicated with the current most ambitious commitments announced after Copenhagen⁸⁴. In Doha, the Parties should thus examine the solutions to plug this gap.

**FIGURE 5:
POSSIBLE TRAJECTORIES FOR THE EMISSION LEVELS BY 2020 AND 2050**



Source: Ecofys, 2012.

The ambition gap is difficult to assess precisely given the conditions attached by some countries to their targets and to the various hypotheses to which they refer. For example, some developed countries make achieving their most ambitious target conditional on adopting accounting rules for the Land Use, Land Use Changes and Forestry (LULUCF) sector and rules for using market mechanisms. These rules will have a

83. See: <http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/developed.html>

84. UNEP, 2010

huge impact on the amount of effort these countries should make to achieve a target. In addition, the ambition of these targets and the amount of effort required will also vary according to the decision on carrying over assigned amount units (AAU) from one commitment period to the next, which will be taken under the Kyoto Protocol negotiations. Some countries also make achieving their target conditional on comparable commitments being made by the most advanced developing countries.

In Durban, the countries agreed to organise an exercise to clarify targets announced by developed countries in order to explore the common points and the differences in the approaches used by these countries and, ultimately, assess the collective ambition of targets. To achieve this, the countries have been requested to record their targets in a common format document and to present them during session workshops⁸⁵. These are also compiled into a technical document⁸⁶.

The information contained in these documents is additional to the information submitted in the national communications and biennial reports that have to be prepared by the developed countries. With the adoption in Durban of guidelines for preparing biennial reports by developed countries⁸⁷, these countries will have to submit precise information that will help to assess the collective ambition of targets (e.g. updated emission forecasts for 2020 and 2030). The application of these guidelines and those for preparing national communications help with the compliance with measurable, reportable and verifiable (MRV) requirements for the mitigation efforts by developed countries (see Section 5.1).

To understand the magnitude of developed country targets, the Bonn and Bangkok workshops attempted to clarify the accounting approaches and the hypotheses (e.g. accounting rule for the LULUCF sector) and the conditions relating to each target (e.g. comparable commitments taken by large emitter countries), including:

- **reference year:** while some countries are using 1990 as the reference year (e.g. European Union), others refer to 2005 (e.g. United States), justifying better quality of data⁸⁸.
- **the global warming potentials (GWP), the gases and the sectors covered:** the results of emission and removal calculations depend largely on the selection of gases and sectors covered and the choice of GWP. Until Durban, the countries disagreed over the choice of GWP, gases and sectors. In Durban, the Parties revised the UNFCCC guidelines for the GHG inventories of Annex I Parties which refer to the GWP of the 4th IPCC Report (applicable in 2015)⁸⁹. This revision

85. See: http://unfccc.int/meetings/bonn_may_2012/workshop/6659.php

86. FCCC/TP/2012/5

87. Paragraphs 12-22 of Decision 2/CP.17

88. The difference between the reference years generates large target gaps. For example, the US target of 17% corresponds to 3% in 1990.

89. Decision 15/CP.17

thus limits the divergences between the developed countries, with the majority referring to the GWP and GHG indicated in the Durban Decision in terms of targets for 2020 (e.g. Switzerland, European Union, etc.). However, some countries have not indicated GWP nor GHG covered, which makes it difficult to assess the ambition of their target. All the countries have confirmed that they accounted for the emissions and removals of sectors indicated by the IPCC. Only one country has stated that it does not account for those of the LULUCF sector.

- **the role of Land Use, Land Use Changes and Forestry (LULUCF):** the clarification exercises in Bonn highlighted the differences between the approaches used by the developed countries to account for the emissions and removals from this sector, especially between the countries Party to the Kyoto Protocol and those that are not. Whereas the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol use an activity-based approach, other Parties, such as the United States, prefer a land-based approach (see Section 4.3). These divergences make it difficult to compare and assess the ambition of targets conditional on adopting specific accounting rules.
- **the role of carbon credits issued by market-based mechanisms:** the potential share of carbon credits in achieving country targets remains uncertain due to the variety of market systems that the developed countries intend to use (e.g. Kyoto Protocol mechanisms, regional, bilateral and national markets, etc.) and which use different accreditation rules. Most countries have therefore not indicated the potential share of carbon credits in emission reductions in achieving their target.
- **the hypotheses and conditions relating to the level of ambition of stated emission reduction objectives:** The achievement and/or the magnitude of numerous GHG reduction targets are associated with conditions such as using specific LULUCF accounting rules and carbon credits to achieve the targets of developed countries. Some countries in fact intend to increase the ambition of their targets if the LULUCF and carbon credit rules offer economically efficient compensation options for their emissions. Progress in negotiating these rules taking place in other working groups at the same time will undoubtedly facilitate these discussions (see Section 4.3).

Some countries also make the magnitude of their target conditional on the adoption of a global agreement including all the large emitters. While some countries insist on such an agreement involving comparable efforts and actions for the large economies (e.g. Australia⁸⁸), others are satisfied that the developing countries are taking measures in accordance with the principle of differentiated responsibilities and

88. The difference between the reference years generates large target gaps. For example, the US target of 17% corresponds to 3% in 1990.

89. Decision 15/CP.17

90. FCCC/TP/2012/2

their respective capacities (e.g. European Union and New Zealand⁹¹). In Bonn, the countries welcomed the usefulness of the workshop and the technical document to clarify the conditions associated with certain targets. The developed countries are however expected to state by Doha whether or not the conditions laid down are satisfactory to date.

Following clarification of these components, the UNFCCC Secretariat has attempted to compare the potential emission levels given the efforts by each country using different indicators, including, for example, the absolute or relative emission levels with respect to the GDP per inhabitant or the emissions per inhabitant. This exercise was intended to move the discussions on the comparability of mitigation efforts forward and comes up with very different results depending on the indicators used.

Following these analyses, the countries suggested continuing these target clarification exercises. Some countries requested that the common format document be updated so that new submissions could be made by Doha stating the conditions mainly associated with the targets. In Bonn, the countries agreed to continue the target clarification workshops, but in a more "useful" manner. In view of the issues on accounting approaches, for the LULUCF sector for example, they are expected to be the subject of intense discussions despite not being a specific agenda item.

The AOSIS has thus requested that discussions be opened on the common accounting rules in a workshop⁹². Many developing countries, like the G77/China, believe that it is essential to adopt common rules as well as an agreement on the legally-binding nature of targets in order to agree on the ambition level that the developed countries should achieve. How these countries envisage measuring the progress towards these targets by 2020 and the link with the international assessment and review process are other outstanding issues that the developing countries wish to deal with in Doha (see Section 5.1).

These countries believe that such issues must be resolved before the negotiations under the AWG-LCA can be concluded as they are an integral part of the Bali Action Plan. The developed countries, including the EU, Norway, Japan and the United States, favour continuing to analyse the question of ambition under the ADP by transferring to it the unsolved issues from the AWG-LCA. Nevertheless, the agreement expected from the ADP by 2015 will only be applicable in 2020, which would imply the absence of a legal guarantee for the implementation of developed country targets by 2020.

91. *Ibid.*

92. FCCC/AWGLCA/2012/MISC.1/Add.2

In Bangkok, during the negotiations under the AWG-LCA and a workshop on quantified economy-wide emission reduction targets⁹³, there was still disagreement over the comparability and ambition of targets. While numerous developed countries underlined the progress in such areas as clarification of commitments and international assessment, many developing countries emphasised their disappointment in, among other things, the lack of concrete results, the low level of ambition of developed country existing commitments and the gaps in the comparability of efforts⁹⁴.

In Doha, the countries will discuss the magnitude and comparability of ambition of developed country targets in the light of new submissions and, perhaps, the confirmation by some countries that certain conditions have been met. It is highly unlikely at the moment that the countries will agree on how to increase the ambition of their targets by Doha. They will also undoubtedly be faced with the question of continuing the discussions under the ADP as the Durban Decisions make provision for negotiations under the AWG-LCA to be completed in Doha.

The main issues on measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally-appropriate mitigation commitments or initiatives, including quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives of developed countries

- Have certain conditions for achieving targets of certain developed countries been met?
- Should there be a formal negotiation framework to deal with common accounting rules?
- Which measure should be used to compare the target ambitions of developed countries?
- Should a new common format document be adopted to report the details of developed country targets?
- How can target comparability be improved?
- Should target ambitions and their comparability be dealt with under the ADP?

3.2.2 Mitigation in the developing countries

Nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMA) supported and made possible by technologies, financing means and capacity building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner (AWG-LCA)

93. FCCC/AWGLCA/2012/INF.1

94. FCCC/TP/2012/5

The debate has been intense since 2007 on the developing countries' contribution to the global effort to reduce GHG emissions through nationally appropriate mitigation actions supported by the developed countries. The developed countries insist that mitigation actions by developing countries must be transparent. They also insist that the large emitter countries commit to GHG emission reductions so that they can be compared with those of the developed countries. The developing countries make adequate financing and technological support a condition for implementing mitigation measures. Over the last few years, most large emitter developing countries have announced non-binding quantified emission reduction targets, for which some require international support.

Distinction is made today between the supported NAMA (or "internationally supported mitigation actions"), which receive or require international support, and unilateral NAMA (or "nationally supported mitigation actions"), implemented using domestic resources. A third category of NAMA known as "crediting" has been raised by certain countries such as South Korea⁹⁵, but this is not however discussed by the countries under the negotiations on the NAMA. This category refers to the possibility that the NAMA generate credits under the market mechanisms. To date, these discussions have taken place under the issue of market approach-based mechanisms, but the crediting NAMA are not an issue for Doha (see sub-section on the new market mechanism).

According to the Cancún Agreements, the NAMA aim to reach a deviation of emissions compared with the level corresponding to business as usual thanks to appropriate and adequate assistance from the industrialised countries in the form of technical and financial cooperation focused on capacity building⁹⁶. The main NAMA-related issues focus on the level of transparency of emission reductions resulting from these measures and the financial, technological and capacity-building support required to prepare and implement these NAMA. It will be important to understand the mitigation impacts of these measures better, mainly for the scheduled review process of 2013 to 2015 which will re-assess the GHG reduction needs.

To ensure transparency, the Parties agreed in Cancún that the internationally supported mitigation actions had to be measured, reported and verified nationally then internationally according to the guidelines to be prepared under the Convention. The nationally supported mitigation actions must be measured, reported and verified nationally according to guidelines to be prepared under the Convention. These measuring, reporting and verification requirements (MRV) have been operationalised from Durban onwards with the adoption of guidelines for the biennial update reports and the modalities and guidelines for the international consultations and analyses (ICA) (see Section 5.1).

95. See: <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/awglca14/eng/misc02a03.pdf>

96. See: <http://Cancún.unfccc.int/mitigation/decisions-addressing-developing-country-mitigation-plans/#c178>

The Parties also agreed in Durban to hold workshops to improve the understanding of components forming the diversity of NAMA, including the hypotheses and corresponding methods, the list of sectors, the list of gases, the global warming potentials (GWP) used, the support required to implement NAMA and an estimation of anticipated results in terms of mitigation. The diversity of NAMA refers to the type of mitigation actions that the developing countries can take. They have no wish to limit the type of NAMA and would like to keep a broad definition that can encompass both sectoral targets, strategies, policies and measures as well as projects with mitigation impacts.

During the first workshop on the diversity of NAMA held in Bonn in June 2012, ten developing countries submitted NAMA⁹⁷. Fifty countries have submitted NAMA to the UNFCCC since 2009⁹⁸. These presentations and submissions testify to the huge diversity of measures and possible sectors for the NAMA. Whereas certain countries have indicated emission reduction targets (e.g. Central African Republic), others have announced national strategies (e.g. Chad) or specific projects (e.g. Congo)⁹⁹.

However, as underlined by the developed countries, little information is available¹⁰⁰ on the expected results of emission reductions, the GWP used, the additional costs or the emission forecasts to determine the base scenario. The developed countries have therefore insisted on the need to clarify the hypotheses of these NAMA to be able to assess the emission reductions and the status of these actions better. A workshop was organised in Bangkok on this issue¹⁰¹. Using a "structured" approach, as suggested by the EU¹⁰², is therefore one option that the countries will discuss in Doha. The Parties will debate the possibility of developing a common format document for all the developing countries, where the targets announced by certain developing countries and the accounting rules used can be recorded. Nevertheless, for the developing countries, this exercise in understanding the diversity of NAMA must not result in standardised and categorised NAMA being submitted, at the risk of opening the way to a review of the relevance of a NAMA (for example, an investigation into whether a specific measure can be qualified as a NAMA). The developing countries also wish to avoid recording their NAMA in an official document which could open the way to the adoption of legally-binding commitments.

97. See: http://unfccc.int/meetings/bonn_may_2012/workshop/6660.php

98. FCCC/AWGLCA/2011/INF.1 and FCCC/AWGLCA/2012/MISC.2

99. Several sources of information list the different NAMA announced within and outside the UNFCCC: www.nama-database.org and www.namapipeline.org

100. Several sources of information list the different NAMA announced within and outside the UNFCCC: www.nama-database.org and www.namapipeline.org

101. See: <http://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/application/pdf/wsnamasummary4sep12.pdf>

102. See: http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg-lca/application/pdf/20120518_eu_1315.pdf.

During the Bangkok workshop on this issue¹⁰³, the developing countries underlined the need to receive support to be able to estimate the anticipated emission reductions, the additional costs and the emission forecasts to determine the base scenario. The EU underlined, among other things, the need for the countries to contribute to their own financing¹⁰⁴. With the setting up of the NAMA register imminent (see sub-section on the NAMA register), developing countries will be able to submit NAMA with a view to receiving support for the preparation phase. As many announced NAMA are conditional on support being provided, the developing countries have also requested a support needs assessment for the NAMA requiring support.

In Bangkok, the Parties examined the components that could be part of an outcome in Doha, including¹⁰⁵:

- a call for more NAMA and to improve the provision of support;
- on-going discussions on understanding the diversity of NAMA;
- development of guidelines for the support MRV; and
- proposals to build up the capacity of countries to prepare and implement NAMA.

Lastly, the countries should also agree on which aspects should be given priority in future workshops, with the developing countries insisting on the support needs assessment. They should also decide whether these discussions should take place within a subsidiary body after Doha and agree on how to take into account the lessons learned from the NAMA register pilot phase.

The main issues relating to the nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMA) supported and made possible by technologies, financing means and capacity building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner

- Should a structured approach be used, including the possibility of using a common format document to clarify the NAMA hypotheses and thus assess the emission reductions and the status of these actions?
- How can the necessary and adequate support be provided for the preparation and implementation of NAMA? Must it be a central issue in discussions on the NAMA? Should these discussions take place in a subsidiary body after Doha?
- What process should be introduced to assess the support required to prepare and implement NAMA?

103. See: <http://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/application/pdf/wsnamasummary4sep12.pdf> and FCCC/AWGLCA/2012/INF.2

104. FCCC/TP/2012/3

105. FCCC/AWGLCA/2012/MISC.2/Add.1


Register of nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMA) (SBI)

In Durban, the Parties laid out the operating modalities for the NAMA Register, adopted in Cancún¹⁰⁶. The Register is likely to fulfil two objectives, as illustrated in Figure 6 below:

- record the NAMA in a separate part of the register to provide international recognition of these measures; and
- record the NAMA for which international support is sought to prepare and/or produce them to facilitate matching them to the support to be provided.

To achieve this, the Register also includes a section where the developed countries and the financial institutions, such as the Global Environment Facility and the Green Climate Fund, but also multilateral and bilateral donors and non-governmental private organisations, can indicate the support they wish to make available or that they have already provided. It is therefore expected that several sources of financing combine to produce NAMA, as illustrated in Figure 6 below. All submissions to the Register are on a voluntary basis.

FIGURE 6:
REGISTER FUNCTIONS AND POSSIBLE SOURCES OF FINANCING FOR THE NAMA



Source: Ecofys, 2012.

106. Paragraph 53 of Decision 1/CP.16

A prototype version was launched in July after the Bonn session¹⁰⁷. Its aim was to let the users share their experience with the Register and learn lessons from it. A Decision will be adopted in Doha for setting up the definitive version of the Register based on this experience and these lessons.

In Bonn, the countries discussed strictly technical operationalisation aspects of the Register, such as the criteria for researching the NAMA submitted or the support indicated. For example, the countries envisaged introducing automatic filters and discussed the need to suggest a list of potential donors automatically based on keywords following the submission of a NAMA.

Issues involving politically-sensitive questions still have to be settled. These include, for example, who in each developing country would be authorised to submit a NAMA (e.g. only the focal points, as demanded by Brazil and Canada). The question of the mandatory submission of information was also raised in Bonn. The Secretariat mentioned that only the title, description and contact details were mandatory fields¹⁰⁸. During the session to present the Register prototype in Bonn, the Secretariat also confirmed that there would be no deadline for selecting the NAMA that the countries wished to submit.

To facilitate the submissions during the "prototype" phase, the draft decision prepared by the SBI in Bonn for adoption in Doha provides for designing a manual on using the Register¹⁰⁹. By Doha, the countries will therefore discuss their experience and how to take into account the lessons learned under the final version of the Register.

The main issues relating to the Register of nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMA)

- How should the lessons learned from the experience with the Register prototype be taken into account in the final version?
- Should the focal points only be authorised to submit NAMA to the Register?
- Do the mandatory information fields prejudice the voluntary nature of submissions?

107. Paragraphs 54-55 of Decision 1/CP.17

108. Information note on the NAMA registry prototype: unfccc.int/files/adaptation/application/pdf/info_note_on_the_registry.pdf

109. FCCC/SBI/2012/L.10

3.2.3 Reduction of emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries (REDD-Plus)

According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), deforestation, which is essentially the conversion of forests into farming land, is happening at an alarming rate of around 13 million hectares per year¹¹⁰. Deforestation leads to immediate release of the carbon initially stored in the trees in the form of CO₂ emissions, especially if the trees are burnt¹¹¹. Release is slower for emissions from decomposition of organic matter¹¹². The problem of deforestation and forest degradation caused by extending farmland, converting lands into pasture, developing infrastructures and felling trees, accounts for nearly 20% of global GHG emissions, in second place after the energy sector¹¹³. The IPPC also points out that reducing and preventing deforestation is the most significant and most effective short term option for global mitigation of emissions¹¹⁴.

The reduction in emissions from deforestation and the forest degradation (REDD) became REDD+ due to the potential role that can be played by conservation, sustainable forest management and the increase in forest carbon stocks to reduce the emissions resulting from deforestation and forest degradation. The Parties agreed to call these activities "REDD+" at the COP in 2005¹¹⁵.

In Cancún, it was agreed that the implementation of Phases I and II of REDD+ (see Box 5) must mainly be based on public financing. To this effect, since 2009, the developed countries have promised around 4.5 billion US dollars for REDD+ from 2010 to 2012 to support developing countries' ability in construction, planning and implementing the REDD+¹¹⁶. These "intermediate" actions in implementing the REDD+ aim to encourage the establishment of a learning consensus and the necessary trust for a potential international agreement on the future actions of the REDD+¹¹⁷.

110. For the period 2000 to 2010, see: <http://www.fao.org/forestry/fra/fra2010/fr/>

111. With small amounts of CO₂ and CH₄.

112. See: http://unfccc.int/methods_and_science/lulucf/items/4123.php

113. UNDP, 2012

114. *Ibid.*

115. FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/CRP.5

116. Davis, C. and F. Daviet, 2010

117. *Ibid.*

BOX 5.
STRUCTURE OF REDD+ ACTIVITIES¹¹⁸

Objective: reduce the anthropogenic pressures in forests leading to carbon emissions.

Conditions: adequate and predictable financing, technology transfer and capacity building, to promote and support the guarantees¹¹⁹.

REDD+ activities must be based on:

- A national REDD+ strategy or plan;
- A national reference level for forestry (or forest) emissions or, if applicable, sub-national forestry (or forest) emission reference levels as an interim measure with the aim of converging towards a national approach;
- A national monitoring and reporting system (or sub-national systems as an interim measure);
- A system to report the actions taken to take account of and comply with safeguards.

The REDD+ mechanism is rolled out in three phases:

- Phase I comprises capacity-building activities, data collection and development of national strategies or national plans;
- Phase II comprises implementation of pilot policies, measures and activities;
- Phase III involves full roll-out of the mechanism through concrete activities leading to results.

In Durban, the Parties decided that the Phase III activities should be subject to the MRV to benefit from financing¹²⁰. The results-based financing must be new, additional and predictable. It can come from a wide variety of sources - public or private, bilateral and multilateral - and be made up of alternative sources. Market-financing approaches can be set up by the COP to support the results-based actions ensuring that environmental integrity is preserved. The Parties are going to study the possibility of creating a non-market-based financing mechanism to compensate for the benefits of adaptation and mitigation linked to the REDD+.

118. Decision 1/CP.16 in Chapter III C.

119. Appendix I includes the "directives and guarantees applicable to the policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries, the role of conservation and sustainable management of forests and the enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries".

120. Decision 2/CP.17, Section II.C

The negotiations on the issue of the REDD+ have taken place mainly within the AWG-LCA and focus on the questions of financing under Phase III. However, certain issues such as the preparation of a work programme to study the causes of deforestation and degradation and the methodologies for measuring, reporting and verifying (MRV) the emissions of REDD+ activities, are discussed within the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA).

Clarification of Phase III financing under the AWG-LCA

Phase III financing of the REDD+ mechanism remains a contentious issue in current discussions. A large number of Parties wish this Phase to be rolled out through private and public sources of financing (mixed approach). This mechanism is launched thanks to public financing for Phase I and Phase II and combines public and private financing for Phase III¹²¹.

In Durban, the Parties agreed that the results-based actions (concrete activities leading to measurable results) undertaken by the developing countries, which will be subject to measurability, reportability and verifiability requirements (MRV), can benefit from results-based financing¹²². The Durban Decision states that this financing must be new, additional and predictable. It can come from a wide variety of sources - public or private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources.

For the Phase III financing, the Durban Decision envisages that the COP can prepare financing approaches focused on the market to support the results-based actions implemented by the developing countries ensuring that environmental integrity is preserved. The Decision also envisages that non-market-based financing approaches are also developed, like the common adaptation and mitigation approaches for integral and sustainable management of forests, which support and boost the governance, the application of guarantees and the multiple functions of forests¹²³.

The issues for Doha focus on the clarification of financing mechanisms that will be used for Phase III, including:

- the preparation of modalities and procedures for financing the full implementation of results-based actions;
- the identification of a new market mechanism for Phase III of the REDD+;
- how to "fix the financing gap" to support the REDD+ preparatory phases;

121. See: http://unfccc.int/methods_and_science/lulucf/items/4123.php

122. I.e. on the actual reduction in emissions or the increase in carbon sequestration. This financing will only be made once the emissions (or the increased sequestration) have actually taken place.

123. Paragraphs 63-73 of Decision 2/CP.17

- the possibility of transferring the work on financing to the SBI;
- the support MRV;
- the support for the related activities that do not involve carbon sequestration, like the adaptation activities; and
- the links with the discussions held within other groups focusing on finance and various approaches.

In terms of clarifying financing mechanisms that will be used for Phase III, the Secretariat has prepared a technical document on the sources of financing during 2012, which focuses mainly on those linked to the market¹²⁴. This document provides useful indications and clarifies the proposals for financing the full implementation of results-based REDD+ actions.

A large number of Parties consider that the private sector could play a financing role, particularly in dealing with the causes of deforestation. Thus, Colombia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Indonesia and Mexico note the shortfall in public funds and underline the role of private investment for the REDD+ activities. Nevertheless, some Parties, especially Bolivia and China, express a preference for public sources of financing, whilst being willing to explore other sources to finance Phase III of the REDD+ mechanism. They underline, among other things, the need for predictable, effective and additional financing¹²⁵.

Moreover, the use of market-based approaches is envisaged, for this would ensure sustainable financing for the REDD+ activities (for several Parties, financing based only on funds would not be viable in the long term). The Coalition for Rainforest Nations and the Brazil are among those fighting for a market mechanism to be set up in Doha. And yet, some developing countries do not wish the REDD+ credits to constitute a means whereby Annex I Parties can offset their emissions at little cost. Bolivia is reticent about a market-based approach in the absence of transparency and environmental integrity measures. Some Parties have also underlined that market-based approaches are only valid in the context of a legally-binding system.

The Parties opposed to these market mechanisms have also suggested determining sources of financing based on the nature of the activities undertaken under the REDD+, establishing national financing systems for mitigation and creating a community fund to help local communities to develop their capacity. Many Parties also support the creation of a window dedicated to the REDD+ in the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and others have also suggested imposing a tax on international aviation and maritime transport. The Parties underline that the sources should be additional.

124. FCCC/TP/2012/3

125. FCCC/AWGLCA/2012/MISC.3/Add.3

In terms of preparing modalities and procedures for financing the full implementation of results-based actions, some Parties underline the relevance of improving the understanding of "performance centred on the results". Along the same lines, the European Union (EU) and some countries like Switzerland and India wish to continue to the work on defining the terms used before preparing modalities and procedures for financing results-based actions. The EU proposes that the results of REDD+ activities (i.e. emission reductions or sequestrations) be examined by an independent assessment. Mexico proposes that the Parties participating in the REDD+ set up a national register to account for verified emission reductions and the carbon stock units to prevent the risk of double accounting of emissions.

A workshop was held on 30 August 2012 in Bangkok (Thailand) on these questions. Based on a technical document¹²⁶, the participants examined the modalities and procedures for financing REDD+ actions. Numerous Parties underlined the need to increase the level of ambition of emission reduction objectives to send a positive signal to the private sector¹²⁷. The developing countries nevertheless recalled that the role of the private sector in financing the REDD+ cannot replace either the financing obligations of Annex I Parties or public financing.

Under the AWG-LCA, the parties examined in Bangkok the conditions required to intensify and facilitate the financing, the questions requiring an in-depth review and the necessary signals in Doha to encourage financing for the full implementation of the REDD+. The discussions were productive on the necessary institutional arrangements, including:

- setting up a Board for the REDD+ mechanism,
- the registers,
- creating an assurance or reserve mechanism, and
- designating bodies for the examination and regulations of the REDD+.

Finally, numerous countries also underlined the importance of MRV for financing REDD+ (see Section 5.1). Progress in the REDD+ discussions will therefore also depend on the discussions under way in other groups.

Main methodologies relating to activities to reduce emissions from deforestation and degradation of forests (REDD) and the role of the conservation and sustainable management of forests and the increase of forest carbon stocks in developing countries (SBSTA):

126. FCCC/TP/2012/3

127. See: <http://unfccc.int/files/adaptation/application/pdf/wsinfsumredd.pdf>

The Parties decided in Copenhagen to resort to national and sub-national forest carbon inventory systems, provide they are incorporated into a national system¹²⁸. Developing countries were also asked identify the decisive factors in deforestation and degradation causing emissions and how to remedy them. The text adopted in Copenhagen also recommends the use of guidelines from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to estimate the emissions from land use activities, removals by sinks, forest carbon stocks and variations in forest areas in developing countries. The capacity building in terms of using the IPCC guidelines is facilitated by use of the REDD Internet platform¹²⁹.

The Cancún Agreements invite the SBSTA to set up a work programme to study the causes of deforestation and degradation and develop methodologies for monitoring, reporting and verifying the REDD+¹³⁰ activity emissions.

In Durban, the Parties adopted a Decision stating that the developing countries implementing REDD+ activities should communicate a regular summary in their national communications on how they comply with the guarantees¹³¹. The Decision states that the modalities for reference levels must be flexible, capable of change and based on the principles and modalities of the IPCC so that the Parties can adjust their historical reference level based on national policies and circumstances.

In Doha, the Parties should prepare the modalities for the development of forest monitoring systems, provide additional clarification to improve the transparency, comparability and exhaustiveness of information provided when disclosing safeguards, identify the factors of the deforestation and forest degradation, develop the modalities for the technical analysis of reference levels and reference emission levels and develop the MRV modalities of forest-related emissions and removals.

Forest monitoring systems:

The Parties must prepare a reliable, transparent national forest monitoring system to monitor and report on REDD+ activities. To achieve this, the countries can plan for monitoring and reporting at sub-national level as an interim measure, if appropriate, given the national situation.

The countries develop these monitoring systems according to general methodological guidelines decided at international level which they must quote. These modalities include mainly the parameters to be measured, such as the deforestation and degradation factors. Following a request from Bolivia, the systems could also take additional information into account connected with the joint benefits of the forest and the consideration of guarantees.

128. Decision 4/CP.15

129. See: http://unfccc.int/methods_science/redd/items/4531.php

130. Decision 1/CP.16 Annex II

131. Decision 12/CP.17

In Bonn, the Parties prepared a draft of general methodological guidelines which should be based on the most recent IPCC guidelines and which can be used to observe the changes in the forest cover¹³². There is disagreement over the parameters used for the measurements (i.e. whether they should also include parameters that assess compliance with guarantees and joint benefits). In Doha, the Parties should therefore state which information should figure in the forest monitoring systems.

Deforestation and degradation factors:

The Cancún Agreements encourage the Parties to identify and combat the deforestation and forest degradation factors¹³³. The identification of decisive factors in deforestation and forest degradation causing emissions mainly involves identifying the Land Use, Land Use Changes and Forestry activities (LULUCF) in developing countries, notably those connected to deforestation and degradation factors; nevertheless other deforestation and forest degradation factors still have to be identified. For LULUCF, the objectives are to identify the methodological barriers to accounting for the emissions and removals connected to these activities and to evaluate their potential mitigation. The Parties have raised the fact that priority should be given in Doha to identifying the means to take deforestation factors into consideration, including the national social and economic aspects in the developing countries¹³⁴.

Modalities for the technical analysis of reference levels and emission reference levels:

The Parties will consider the possibility of using the reference levels to evaluate the changes in the forest cover and carbon stocks. This involves setting up a national reference level for emissions for forests and/or, if necessary, reference levels for forests on a sub-national scale as a temporary measure,

The modalities for reference levels must be flexible, capable of change and based on the principles and modalities of the IPCC so that the Parties can adjust their historical reference level based on national policies and circumstances.

The Parties must develop modalities for the technical analysis of reference levels and emission reference levels. The aim of the technical assessment is to verify whether the Parties have provided full and transparent information in compliance with the COP guidelines. Several questions should be explored, mainly the composition of the team of experts, whether this team will be independent, the links between the team of experts and the UNFCCC, the guidelines for the analysis and what will be its scope.

132. FCCC/SBSTA/2012/L.9/Rev.1

133. Paragraph 68, Decision 1/CP.16

134. FCCC/SBSTA/2012/L.9/Rev.1

Additional clarifications on the guarantees:

An information system¹³⁵ will be set up on how the stated guarantees in the Cancún Agreements are taken into account and respected while REDD+ activities are being carried out¹³⁶. The developing countries implementing REDD+ activities should communicate a regular summary in their national communications on how they comply with the guarantees¹³⁷.

In Doha, the Parties must¹³⁸:

- reflect on the time frame and the intervals for presenting summaries on information on how the guarantees¹³⁹ are taken into account and respected; and
- examine the need to formulate new principles to ensure the transparency, coherence, exhaustiveness and relevance of summaries presented.

MRV modalities:

The Cancún Agreements request the SBSTA to prepare the MRV modalities for the performance of the implementation of REDD+ activities. The MRV should be compatible with the MRV modalities for the nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMA) of developing countries on¹⁴⁰:

- emissions and removals connected to forests;
- forest carbon stocks and variations in forest carbon stocks;
- surface area of the forests resulting from the implementation of REDD+ activities.

In Bonn, the Parties mainly reiterated the components agreed during past decisions, underlining that the REDD+ MRV directives must be based on the most recent IPCC guidelines and must allow changes over time based on data quality and relevance¹⁴¹. They must also be based on national circumstances. The Parties do not however manage to agree on the possibility of applying the principle of conservation and the notion of completeness.

Among the points of agreement, the Parties underline that the information should be communicated in the biennial reports, granting flexibility to the LDC and the SIDS.

135. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Decision 12/CP.17

136. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Decision 12/CP.17

137. Decision 12/CP.17

138. FCCC/SBSTA/2012/L.9/Rev.1

139. Referred to in the appendix to Decision 1/CP.16

140. Paragraph 71 of Decision 1/CP.16

141. FCCC/SBSTA/2012/L.9/Rev.1

Among the points of disagreement, certain parties wish to set up an interim technical analysis system for MRV modalities until the rules of the ICA process have been established. Certain developed countries favour an international emission and removal reduction verification system being set up for Phase III of the REDD+. This system could go beyond the ICA process, mainly by requiring the verification by an independent third party or through an entity spearheaded by the Convention.

The developing countries propose creating an MRV system for financing made available for the REDD+ and which would be spearheaded by a committee formed of equal numbers of experts from both developing and the developed countries.

Certain developing countries are attempting to obtain a decision on free access to the best satellite data available. Bolivia is also seeking agreement on developing amplified MRV modalities to take the joint benefits of the REDD+ into account.

REDD-Plus related issues

- What financing mechanisms should be used for Phase III? How can financing be ensured for the post-2012 period so that the countries can implement the REDD+?
- What should the modalities be for developing forest monitoring systems? Should the Parties provide additional clarification to improve the transparency, comparability and exhaustiveness of the information provided when disclosing safeguards? How can the deforestation and forest degradation factors be identified? What should be the modalities for the technical analysis of reference levels and emission reference levels? What should be the MRV modalities of forest-linked emissions and removals?

3.2.4 Cooperative sectoral approaches and actions specific to a given sector

The aim of sectoral approaches is to enhance the mitigation actions of Parties in specific sectors, such as agriculture, transport and energy. The stumbling blocks cover the voluntary or otherwise nature of cooperative sectoral approaches and sector-specific actions, the scale of application (should they be applied at national, regional or international scale?), the general framework of sectoral approaches (which multilateral general framework for the implementation of these actions?) and the sectors to which these approaches must be applied (e.g. agriculture, international transport, energy, etc.).

Under the AWG-LCA, the negotiations cover the formulation of a general framework with a view to adopting a decision on this question in Doha. The discussions on the emissions from fuel used for international aviation and maritime transport are dealt with in both the AWG-LCA and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Tech-

nological Advice (SBSTA). It was decided in Durban that the work programme on agriculture would be studied by the SBSTA with a view to adoption a decision at the COP18 in Doha.

Formulation of a general framework to pursue the work and the emissions from fuel used for international aviation and maritime transport (AWG-LCA)

In Durban, the Parties decided to continue to examine a general framework for the cooperative sectoral approaches and specific actions with a view to adopting a decision on this question at the COP18¹⁴². The negotiations focus on the path to follow to continue the work towards a general framework and on the question of reducing emissions from international aviation and maritime transport.

In terms of the general framework for the cooperative sectoral approaches and specific actions, the Parties expressed their wish to move this issue forward in a multilateral framework and restated the importance of sectoral approaches and actions¹⁴³. The viewpoints diverge on the formulation of a general framework that would apply to all the sectors listed in Article 4.1(c) of the Convention (reduction of emissions in the sectors in question). The Parties have underlined that such a framework should not hold back the investments and growth in these sectors. Similarly, the Parties are wondering whether these approaches should be voluntary and whether they should be applied at national, regional or international level.

Emissions from fuel used for international aviation and maritime transport have been dealt with under the UNFCCC since the first meeting of the COP in Berlin in 1995. International bunker fuels were discussed subsequently in the AWG-LCA, in the context of sub-paragraph 1b(iv) of the Bali Action Plan under "sectoral approaches and actions".

Particular attention is paid to the impacts of mitigation actions in the air and maritime transport sectors on the economies of developing countries, as certain Parties wish to avoid unilateral commercial actions that would reduce exports from developing countries and impose major costs on their airlines. The developing countries are therefore seeking reassurance that the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities is respected for all actions relating to bunker fuels.

Numerous developed countries have interpreted the sectoral approaches as having to give rise to GHG emission reduction objectives in the sectors listed in Article 4.1(c) of the Convention (reduction of emissions in the sectors in question). Some developing countries are therefore asking that the revenues from mitigation actions in the aviation and maritime transport sectors, in the form of taxes, for example, benefit the

142. Paragraphs 74 and 78 of Decision 2/CP.17

143. See: http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg-lca/application/pdf/20120524_sectors.pdf

most vulnerable countries. The Cook Islands notably have proposed financing adaptation and mitigation actions of developing countries, especially in SIDS and LDC, from this potential source of financing¹⁴⁴.

In Bonn, the Parties recognised the roles of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) and underlined the importance of the UNFCCC to send a "signal" to these bodies on reducing these emissions¹⁴⁵.

In Bangkok, the Parties attempted to identify the options on the general framework, but there are still diverging views. The options regarding bunker fuels should be streamlined. The Parties will therefore continue to discuss these issues in Doha with a view to adopting a decision on them.

Emissions from fuel used for international air and maritime transport (SBSTA)

GHG emissions from international aviation and maritime transport (or "bunker fuels") are presently excluded when calculating quantified commitments of the Annex B Parties to the Kyoto Protocol¹⁴⁶. These emissions are thus not subject to reduction actions, even though they are constantly increasing. According to the scenario moderated by IPCC, the global share of GHG emissions from bunker fuels will increase from 1.8% to 3.6% in 2050, with the aviation sector responsible for the majority of this increase¹⁴⁷. The Kyoto Protocol stipulates that developed countries are responsible for emissions from bunker fuels and that this effort should be made under the aegis of the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organisation (IMO)¹⁴⁸. However, one of the main problems lies in clarifying to which country the responsibility for emissions falls, given their cross-border nature.

Since 2009, during SBSTA sessions, ICAO and IMO have provided information on work within their respective organisations on emissions attributable to fuels used in international maritime and air transport. Most of the non-Annex I Parties have expressed reserves about the work by the IMO on developing a legally-binding

144. FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/MISC.5, p.2

145. See: http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg-lca/application/pdf/20120524_sectors.pdf

146. Nevertheless, international aviation and maritime transport emissions must be reported in the national GHG emission inventories, although separately from total national emissions, in accordance with the IPCC guidelines and the UNFCCC reporting guidelines on annual inventories (FCCC/SBSTA/2004/8).

147. Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, 2007. An additional problem in the aviation sector is that it also contributes to emissions of NOx and other gases.

148. By virtue of Article 2.2 of the Protocol.

instrument that would govern GHG emissions in maritime transport,¹⁴⁹ invoking compliance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibility which is at the heart of the Convention. They note that failure to comply with this principle by all market mechanisms of these sectors would result in an increase in trading costs for these countries and would have negative impacts on trade¹⁵⁰. On the other hand, the Annex I Parties appreciate the work of the IMO and ICAO.

The issue here is which is the most appropriate forum to rule on these fuels. The Parties continue to have highly diverging views. Some developing countries consider that the reduction commitments should only target the developed countries and be taken following a Decision of the Convention and its subsidiary bodies, whilst the developed countries believe that ICAO and IMO are the best placed to regulate the emissions from all their members¹⁵¹.

In its draft conclusion, the SBSTA invited the ICAO and IMO Secretariats to continue to inform them on relevant work on this question during future sessions¹⁵².

Agricultural questions (SBSTA)

In Durban, the Parties decided to launch a work programme on the question of agriculture within the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA)¹⁵³. The Parties must determine the questions that merit being dealt with by this work programme. As the work of this group only started in Bonn, the draft conclusion simply advises that the Parties exchanged views on this issue and that they wish to continue to do so at the next session¹⁵⁴.

The main issues addressed by the Parties during this initial work session include¹⁵⁵:

- The main cross-cutting issues, like food safety, considered highly important by the developing countries;
- Facilitating the sharing of information on the question of agriculture and climate change;
- Describing the relevant science and technologies;
- Improving agricultural productivity and resilience.

149. See: <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/sbsta/eng/misc09.pdf>

150. FCCC/SBSTA/2011/MISC.9

151. FCCC/SBSTA/2012/MISC.7

152. FCCC/SBSTA/2012/L.14

153. Paragraph 75 of Decision 2/CP.17

154. FCCC/SBSTA/2012/L.19

155. FCCC/AWGLCA/2011/CRP.22

Issues relating to cooperative sectoral approaches and actions specific to a given sector

- Should the cooperative sectoral approaches and the actions specific to a given sector be voluntary and meet reduction objectives? Should they be applied nationally, regionally or internationally? What should be the general framework for implementing these actions? Which sectors?
- What roles should ICAO and IMO play in the mitigation of emissions from fuels used for international aviation and maritime transport? Can the regulation of these emissions constitute a source of revenues to face up to climate change? Should these sources benefit the developing countries? To what extent and how must the principle of common but differentiated responsibility be taken into account in regulating these emissions?
- What must be the issues addressed by the work programme on agriculture?

3.2.5 The various approaches designed to improve the cost/effectiveness ratio of mitigation actions, including the markets

The Cancún Agreements provide for setting up a new market mechanism¹⁵⁶. To improve the cost/effectiveness ratio and promote mitigation actions, whilst bearing in mind the different circumstances dictating the evolution of the developed and the developing countries, the Parties decided in Durban that the various approaches, including the possibilities of recourse to the markets, should¹⁵⁷:

- comply with standards that deliver real, permanent, additional and verified mitigation outcomes;
- avoid double counting of effort;
- achieve a net decrease and/or avoidance of greenhouse gas emissions.

The COP17 also requested the AWG-LCA to continue working on the various approaches by launching two work programmes to:

- Prepare a general framework for the various approaches, including the possibilities of using markets¹⁵⁸; and
- Prepare modalities and procedures for the new market mechanism¹⁵⁹.

156. Paragraph 80 of Decision 1/CP.16

157. Paragraph 79 of Decision 2/CP.17

158. Paragraph 80 of Decision 2/CP.17

159. Paragraph 84 of Decision 2/CP.17

Preparing a framework for the various approaches, including the possibilities of using markets (AWG-LCA)

The work programme launched under the AWG-LCA to consider a framework for the various approaches is targeting the adoption of a Decision during the COP18. In Bonn and Bangkok, the Parties addressed this issue in session workshops¹⁶⁰ and discussions under the AWG-LCA¹⁶¹.

The main issue is the level of transparency and compatibility of principles that should be established by the UNFCCC to construct a credible system and manage any risks (like double counting)¹⁶². Their scope is still uncertain (e.g. national, regional, bilateral, etc.). In addition, the countries discussed a space dedicated to studying and preparing non-market-based mechanisms within the general framework.

The Parties are studying the principles of the framework and the tools to render it operational. In terms of the principles and objectives of the framework, the ASISID considers that it should define the relations between approaches by the UNFCCC and others and the market and non-market approaches, offer real mitigation advantages and not allow the countries to wriggle out of their obligations under the Convention¹⁶³. These countries wish to see the principles of complementarity and benefit sharing as part of the framework and highlight the potential of non-market mechanisms. New Zealand believes that the framework could identify the various approaches and/or coordinate the efforts. It does not feel that the framework should compete with the UNFCCC nor duplicate its functions¹⁶⁴. In addition, the Parties underline the importance of a harmonised approach within the Convention.

In terms of the tools to render the framework operational, the issues focus on how to ensure the environmental integrity of activities, the processes or models that must be applied for the approval or rejection of activities and whether they should be centralised or directed and administered by the countries. The Parties underline the need to avoid double counting of emission units, but have not managed to agree on how this could be done and the entity that would be in charge. Some developed countries, like the United States, Japan and New Zealand, consider that, given the various national approaches currently implemented, carbon units should be accounted for based on their movement between the countries¹⁶⁵. Certain developing countries, like Grenada and China, consider that the Parties should firstly define what must be accounted for and then what would be eligible for use in achieving emission reduction

160. See: http://unfccc.int/meetings/bonn_may_2012/workshop/6661.php

161. See: http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg-lca/application/pdf/20120524_va.pdf

162. *Ibid.*

163. IISD, 2012e

164. IISD, 2012b

165. FCCC/AWGLCA/2012/MISC.4 and Add.1

objectives. Japan wishes that the bilateral mechanisms be recognised. New Zealand is proposing the temporary use of a declaration template, which would offer the Parties a platform for stating publicly the units they use and the methodology applied and which would demonstrate how these units represent genuine verifiable emission reductions¹⁶⁶.

Other issues must be resolved to reach a decision on this matter including the limiting and complementarity of these mechanisms with developed country mitigation actions. Some developing countries, Bolivia for example¹⁶⁷, would like to restrict the use of market mechanisms by the developed countries so that they do not replace their national mitigation actions within these countries and do not constitute a chance to compensate their emissions at less cost. The majority of developed countries are nevertheless against introducing a limit on the use of compensatory credits generated through emission reduction projects to maintain compliance with their GHG emission reduction commitments. In fact, they view market mechanisms as a way of increasing the commitment level of the private sector and involving the developing countries by sharing emission reduction costs more¹⁶⁸.

In addition, certain countries, like Bolivia, believe it is essential that the non-market-based approaches are also envisaged to include ecosystem services¹⁶⁹. Bolivia has underlined the economic, environmental and social inefficiency of market-based approaches.

Recourse to a market mechanism with a view to complying with emission reduction objectives

The Durban Decision defined a new market mechanism operating under the guidance and authority of the COP, to improve the cost/effectiveness ratio and to promote mitigation actions whilst bearing in mind the different circumstances of developed and developing countries¹⁷⁰. In addition, subject to conditions to be prepared, this new market mechanism could assist the developed countries to comply with part of their mitigation objectives or their commitments under the Convention. An AWG-LCA work programme has been established to prepare the modalities and procedures for this market mechanisms in order to obtain a Decision of the COP18. The Parties initially addressed this issue in session workshops^{171, 172} and discussions under the AWG-LCA¹⁷³.

166. FCCC/TP/2012/4

167. FCCC/AWGLCA/2012/MISC.1/Add.2

168. FCCC/TP/2012/4

169. FCCC/AWGLCA/2012/MISC.4 and Add.1

170. Provided for in Decision 1/CP.16, para. 80

171. See: http://unfccc.int/meetings/bonn_may_2012/workshop/6662.php

172. See: http://unfccc.int/meetings/bangkok_aug_2012/workshop/7024.php

173. See: http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg-lca/application/pdf/20120524_va.pdf

For certain Parties, the Durban Decision states that the use of the market mechanism is subject to common conditions, rules and processes that have to be defined¹⁷⁴. There are several possible approaches for the new market mechanism, including project approaches and sectoral approaches. Japan would like to see the new market mechanisms allowing a wide range of approaches.

In the modalities and procedures of the new market-based mechanism, the European Union (EU) wishes the new market mechanism to be a catalyst of ambition for all the countries and that its implementation is down to the host country. The EU favours sector approaches. According to the EU, the mechanism should¹⁷⁵:

- be subject to a set of common rules by virtue of the UNFCCC;
- avoid double counting of emissions;
- promote environmental integrity;
- provide a new source of financing.

Among the other defenders of sector approaches, the Coalition for Rainforest Nations wishes the REDD+ to constitute a new market mechanism. However, Bolivia has expressed its "deep concern" over the REDD+ market mechanism, noting the lack of transparency and integrity measures. The ASISID has stated that the new market mechanism should focus on the sectors requirement major emission reductions such as industry, energy and transport and has underlined the need to open up possibilities for the participation of developing countries.

The Parties are also discussing the creation of a new sectoral market mechanism that would encourage the voluntary participation of developing countries in mitigating emissions. South Korea¹⁷⁶ supports the institution of an accreditation mechanism based on nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMA) implemented by non-Annex I developing countries. The developing country would use this mechanism to fix an emission cap below the emission level corresponding to the business as usual scenario. Any drop in emissions beyond this cap would be rewarded by the granting of a unit. Thus, this mechanism could be used by developing countries to obtain credits or units by implementing national measures in a given sector and selling them to Annex I Parties which would use them for compliance purposes.

China proposes a project-based mechanism comparable to the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) which¹⁷⁷:

174. *Ibid.*

175. FCCC/ AWGLCA/2012/MISC.6 and Add.1 and 2; FCCC/AWGLCA/2012/MISC.7

176. See: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/lca/application/pdf/repubic_of_korea_submission.pdf

177. FCCC/ AWGLCA/2012/MISC.6 and Add.1 and 2; FCCC/AWGLCA/2012/MISC.7

- improves the cost-effectiveness ratio of emission reductions;
- is subject to participation eligibility requirements imposed for the developed countries;
- is additional to national efforts;
- avoids double counting;
- does not introduce emission reduction commitments for the developing countries.

In terms of the challenges in implementing it, several Parties believe that the aim of the new mechanisms would be to supplement and not replace existing mechanisms such as the CDM¹⁷⁸. Several countries, including Japan, wish to keep the CDM provided it is improved. A large number of LDC have often deplored the multitude of barriers blocking their participation in the CDM.

Other outstanding issues include the participation of developing countries in the new mechanism, the role of the private sector, the means of dealing with leaks, equity and incentives for the private sector. Bolivia proposes a non-market-based mechanism, the climate justice mechanism, which would operate on the principle of equity¹⁷⁹.

Issues relating to approaches designed to improve the cost/effectiveness ratio of mitigation actions, including the markets

- Which standards should be used as a basis for constructing a credible system for the various approaches (e.g. domestic/regional markets outside the Convention) that manage any risks like double accounting? What place is there for non-market-based approaches?
- What role, modalities and procedures should the new market mechanism have? How could the new market mechanism rely on the existing mechanisms? What lessons could it learn from existing mechanisms?
- What should be the scope and objectives of market mechanisms in the context of mitigation? Should recourse to market mechanisms by developed countries be limited, to comply with emission reduction objectives?
- What type of mechanism should be considered? In which sectors? Which countries?

178. See: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/lca/application/pdf/note_by_the_facilitator-item_3.2.5.pdf

179. FCCC/TP/2012/4

3.3 Enhanced action for adaptation

Adaptation is critical, given the challenges of climate change in meeting objectives of sustainable development and combating poverty in developing countries. The Bali Action Plan recognises the need to enhance actions for adaptation, mainly through increased financial resources, investments and technologies designed to support adaptation¹⁸⁰.

The Bali process culminated in the adoption in Cancún of the Cancún Adaptation Framework, which states that mitigation and adaptation should be given equal importance (see Box 2)¹⁸¹. The aim of the Adaptation Framework is to enhance the adaptation action undertaken to reduce the vulnerability and increase the resilience of developing countries, taking into account the pressing and immediate needs of particularly vulnerable countries. This Framework provides for setting up an Adaptation Committee to promote the implementation of an enhanced adaptation action coherently under the Convention.

In Durban, the COP17 adopted a decision on the composition, details and procedures relating to the Adaptation Committee, including the establishment of links with other institutional systems. The Parties also made progress on the implementation of adaptation measures, mainly under the Nairobi Work Programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation (NWP), national adaptation plans (NAP), on-going implementation of the Work Programme on loss and damage and support for adaptation measures, through financing, technology transfer and capacity building (see Section 3.5).

In Doha, the Parties should identify the issues for the continuing negotiations under the AWG-LCA. In addition, the Parties should clarify how to implement NAP within the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI). The Parties will also focus on the review of the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund, the issues surrounding the least developed countries (LDC) and the national adaptation programmes for action (NAPA) and the implementation of the NWP within the SBSTA. Lastly, the Parties will continue to implement the Work Programme on loss and damage within the SBSTA.

3.3.1 Identification of the path to follow for the negotiations on adaptation within the AWG-LCA

Thanks to the progress made in Cancún and Durban, the Adaptation Committee is now going to take over several of the UNFCCC sites in adaptation (see Box 6).

180. Decision 1/CP.13.

181. Decision 1/CP.16 FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, p.4

BOX 6. ADAPTATION COMMITTEE

Authority:

- Refers to the Conference of the Parties for the outcome of its efforts to improve global coordination of adaptation measures.
- Operates under the authority of the Conference of the Parties, to which it reports.

Composition:

has a total of sixteen members, including:

- two members from each of the United Nations five regional groups,
- one member from the least developed countries (LDC),
- one member from a Small Island Developing State (SIDS),
- two members from Annex I Parties and
- two members from non-Annex I Parties.

Functions:

Helps to implement the enhanced action for adaptation "coherently" under the Convention by:

- Providing technical assistance and advice to the Parties;
- Exchanging relevant information, knowledge, experience and good practices;
- Encouraging the synergies and by boosting the relations between the organisations and national, regional and international centres and networks;
- Providing information and recommendations based on good adaptation practices so that the Conference of the Parties can examine them when giving guidance on the means of encouraging the implementation of adaptation measures, mainly as financial resources, technologies and capacity building;
- Examining the information communicated by the Parties on monitoring the review of adaptation measures and on the support provided and received.

As provided for by the Durban Decision, the AWG-LCA will complete its mandate in Doha¹⁸². A certain number of Parties are concerned, as under the AWG-LCA, while the objective is to work towards finalising its work in accordance with the Durban Decision¹⁸³, no clear process or forum has been allocated to continue the discussions which have taken place on adaptation within the AWG-LCA¹⁸⁴. The Parties

182. Decision 1/CP.17

183. Decision 1/CP.17

184. FCCC/AWGLCA/2012/CRP.2

acknowledge the progress made so far by the AWG-LCA in resolving adaptation issues. In this context, the Parties have been invited to identify the AWG-LCA components that are not covered sufficiently by other competent bodies.

In Bonn, the parties identified a certain number of outstanding issues relating to adaptation. Nevertheless, the Parties do not agree on the nature of these issues and how to deal with them. Outstanding issues identified by the Parties include¹⁸⁵:

- The adaptation financing methods (for the period 2013-2020: suitability, predictability, transparency and responsibility);
- The interactions between the suitability and the implementation methods (finance, technology and capacity building);
- The needs for other institutional arrangements;
- The Work Programme on economic diversification;
- The NAP financing and support process for countries that are not LDC;
- The regional support centres for adaptation;
- The assessment and reduction of risks and the assessment of vulnerability;
- The monitoring and assessment of adaptation actions;
- The role of the Convention as a catalyst.

For the majority of developed countries, all the aspects of the Bali Action Plan adaptation pillar are already taken into account by the bodies and/or programmes, for example the Adaptation Committee, the Work Programme on loss and damage, the national adaptation plan process, etc. These countries consider that the institutional issues and the participation of regional centres are dealt with sufficiently by the various bodies and programmes. They feel that future adaptation efforts should therefore concentrate on what is already in place to ensure a coherent approach for adaptation under the Convention. These countries therefore see no need for additional work within the AWG-LCA.

A large number of developing countries and the LDC believe that several adaptation components in the Bali Action Plan have not yet been addressed sufficiently and require more work under the AWG-LCA. The parties have identified these components in particular:

- the national adaptation plans for countries that are not LDC;
- the economic diversification of countries;

185. See: http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg-lca/application/pdf/20120524_adaptation.pdf

- the role of regional centres;
- adaptation implementation and support, including through financing, technology and capacity building.

Lastly, certain Parties fear that the work on adaptation will be scattered through too many different bodies and programmes¹⁸⁶. These Parties wish the AWG-LCA to represent a holistic framework to avoid upsetting the balance between mitigation and adaptation set up under the Bali Action Plan.

In Bangkok, the Parties continued to identify the questions requiring additional work, including¹⁸⁷:

- how adaptation is implemented,
- the financing by 2013-2015,
- the links between adaptation and financing,
- the national adaptation plans for countries that are not LDC and
- the role of the Convention as a catalyst.

Views continue to diverge on whether the AWG-LCA should continue to deal with these questions and whether additional decisions are necessary.

For Doha, the Parties will concentrate on the need to continue the work on certain adaptation issues that are not already dealt with by bodies or programmes and, if appropriate, they should rule on setting up other arrangements to create a discussion space.

3.3.2 The issues concerning the least developed countries (LDC) (SBSTA)

The Durban Conference defined the next stages for the Work Programme for the least developed countries and the implementation of national adaptation programmes for action (NAPA). It is useful to recall that only the LDC can access financing for the NAPA. The COP17 requested the LDC Expert Group (LDCEG) to provide more detailed information on each component in the Work Programme for LDC so that all the information necessary for the negotiations on the LDC Fund scheduled during the 36th session of the SBSTA is available¹⁸⁸. As at 17 January 2012, 47 NAPA had been submitted to the UNFCCC Secretariat. Since December 2011, the LDCEG has supported 52 projects and programmes in 42 LDC. The implementation of 33 NAPA projects has already commenced.

186. For example, the Adaptation Committee, the Work Programme on loss and damage, the national adaptation plan process, etc.

187. IISD, 2012f

188. Decision 9/CP.17

In Bonn, the SBSTA recommended to the GEF, the LDC Fund manager, to:

- clarify the access to the Fund for developing and implementing the NAPA;
- support the development of programme approaches;
- rationalise the fund's project cycles;
- improve the information on the project development process.

The SBSTA will formulate its recommendations to the COP18 in Doha.

3.3.3 Support for the execution of national adaptation plans (NAP) (SBSTA)

The NAP aim to building up the adaptation capacities of developing countries, mainly the poorest and most vulnerable countries, by allowing them to assess and reduce their vulnerability to the impacts of climate change. Unlike the national adaptation plan for action (NAPA), which helps to identify and prioritise urgent adaptation needs in the short term, NAP are broader and cross-cutting, as they meet needs in medium and long term, are integrated into development plans and are made up of multiple tools used by a country in its planning process.

In Durban, the Parties recognised that the NAP preparation process must facilitate action initiated and managed by the countries¹⁸⁹. The COP adopted guidelines and initial modalities for NAP implementation by the LDC. The Parties also agreed to prepare a global support programme for the LDC processes to facilitate the provision of financial and technical resources to the LDC through the Fund for the least developed countries. This Decision also created a process to review how the countries not belonging to the LDC group could also benefit from support in preparing national adaptation plans. In addition, the Durban Decision provides for setting up a list of developed countries providing financing support for developing country NAP and what form this support will take. Note that the NAP is a voluntary process. The UNFCCC Secretariat and the LDCEG will be responsible for running workshops and organising other activities intended to give the LDC the means of preparing their national adaptation programmes.

On this issue, the Parties recognise the close links between the NAP and the NAPA¹⁹⁰. They also recognise that the NAP must be flexible in the preparation. The stumbling blocks are how to supervise the technical and financial support for NAP. Some countries would like the GEF to be mandated explicitly to supervise NAP preparation and implementation. Other Parties would prefer that the GEF contributes

189. Decision 5/CP.17

190. FCCC/SBI/2012/MISC.1, FCCC/SBI/2012/MISC.2, FCCC/SBI/2012/MISC.2/Add.1, FCCC/SBI/2012/MISC.3

to preparing and implementing NAP. The Parties raise the possibility that the Green Fund considers financing NAP when it sets up its operating modalities, mainly those with direct access.

In Doha, the SBSTA should clarify the financial means that will be made available to produce NAP thanks to the SBSTA summary report on the support provided to the NAP process for the LDC¹⁹¹. This report summarises the observations covering the NAP process, the activities that could support it and the institutional modalities. The report also summarises the observations on the approach to follow to provide this support and the taking into account and integration of the NAP process in the existing development and adaptation plans. The Parties should also clarify the modalities to be used for the developing countries that are not LDC in preparing national adaptation plans and state the technical support and institutional arrangements necessary for preparing NAP.

3.3.4 Implementation of the Nairobi work programme on the impacts of climate change and the vulnerability and adaptation to this change (SBSTA)

The aim of the Nairobi work programme on the impact of climate change and vulnerability and adaptation to this change (NWP) is to help the Parties, especially developing countries, to understand better the impacts of climate change and their vulnerability to this change, as well as to make informed decisions on the adaptation actions and measures. Although the programme started in 2005, the NWP activities commenced in 2007. The activities are structured around nine work themes, namely:

- methods and tools;
- data and observations;
- climate modelling, scenarios and downscaling;
- climate-related risks and extreme events;
- socio-economic information;
- adaptation planning and practices;
- research;
- technologies for adaptation;
- economic diversification.

191. FCCC/SBI/2012/8

When requested by the SBSTA, regular workshops and expert meetings are organised on specific work themes supporting the NWP activities. In addition, the Parties and relevant organisations are involved in the programme by providing information or viewpoints on the nine work themes. This information is available via the NWP Internet interface¹⁹² to facilitate discussions and publicise the various adaptation practices (both sectoral and regional) and a platform to encourage private sector initiatives.

In Durban, under the NWP, the Parties discussed the vulnerability of certain stakeholders in taking advantage of the knowledge and expertise of partner organisations, the coherence of the adaptation action under the Convention and possible synergies between the NWP and the Adaptation Committee. The COP17 in Durban requested the SBSTA to reconsider the NWP fields of activity during its 38th session, with a view to presenting the COP19 in 2013 with recommendations on implementation measures to support the achievements of the NWP objectives in the best possible way¹⁹³. It also asked the SBSTA to examine, at its 39th session, relevant information and advice on the scientific, technical and socio-economic aspects on the impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change arising from the implementation of the NWP.

The COP17 approved new activities under the NWP on the question of water and ecosystem approaches of adaptation which will be the subject of workshops and the launch of a database of private sector initiatives in adaptation¹⁹⁴. The COP17 also demanded that case studies be compiled on the national adaptation planning processes, as well as continuing to prepare adaptation information tools and encouraging the on-going involvement of stakeholders. The SBSTA-38 will assess how the NWP can support the scientific and technical projects under the Cancún Adaptation Framework.

As part of its efforts to promote the benefits and commercial advantage of adaptation strategies in the eyes of the private sector, the UNFCCC Secretariat also launched, during the Durban Conference, a database of climate change adaptation activities initiated by private companies and perfectly worthwhile¹⁹⁵.

In Bonn, the Parties simply recalled that during its 38th session, the SBSTA will have to prepare recommendations for the COP19 on the future work themes of the Nairobi Work Programme. This issue is therefore not especially significant for the COP18 in Doha, but the NWP will be a major issue for the COP19 in 2013.

192. Web interface: http://unfccc.int/adaptation/sbsta_agenda_item_adaptation/items/3633.php

193. Decision 6/CP.17

194. Ibid.

195. Decision 6/CP.17

3.3.5 Work programme on the loss and damage (SBSTA)

The question of loss and damage has often cause controversy within the UNFCCC as the developed countries frequently prefer to avoid any discussion likely to involve their responsibility.

Under Decision 1/CP.16, the COP decided to establish a work programme to consider approaches for dealing with loss and damage from the impacts of climate change in the developing countries which are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change, within the Cancun Adaptation Framework¹⁹⁶. The most vulnerable countries are supposed to benefit ultimately through this programme from improved protection against loss and damage caused by extreme meteorological phenomena linked to climate change. The Parties agreed to cover the following topics when implementing the work programme¹⁹⁷:

- assessing the risks of loss and damages linked to the negative impacts of climate change;
- analysing the approaches to manage these risks, including impacts linked to extreme weather events and slow-onset events, taking experience at all levels into account; and
- determining the role of the Convention in strengthening the implementation of approaches to deal with loss and damage from the adverse effects of climate change.

The Parties meeting in Durban agreed on a list of activities to be undertaken by the Work Programme on loss and damage¹⁹⁸. These activities include, for 2012, two series of workshops and technical reports on adaptation:

- firstly, in terms of the risk assessment of loss and damage from the adverse effects of climate change;
- secondly, in terms of the possible strategies to face up to this risk.

The COP18 in Doha should decide on the approaches to face up to the loss and damage, including setting up a loss and damage insurance mechanism. The activities listed above are intended to generate an adequate knowledge base to advise the Decision of the COP about loss and damage in Doha.

196. Paragraphs 26-29 of Decision 1/CP.16

197. See: http://unfccc.int/adaptation/Cancun_adaptation_framework/loss_and_damage/items/6056.php

198. Decision 7/CP.17

In Bonn, the parties welcomed the conclusions of the report of the Expert Group meeting in Tokyo on 26-28 March 2012 to address loss and damage. This first meeting of experts focused on the risk assessment of loss and damage from the adverse effects of climate change. The meeting identified a few common areas and issues to encourage the work on the loss and damage by virtue of the Convention, including¹⁹⁹:

- Identify the priorities of countries;
- Capitalise on the support from relevant organisations;
- Ensure a space for discussing links with the work in progress and outside the Convention;
- Keep a holistic viewpoint;
- Recognise the multiple factors.

The Parties also highlighted the difficulty in analyse the loss and damage from climate change and the need for additional resources to execute the Work Programme²⁰⁰. Other regional meetings of experts will be held at the end of 2012 for Africa, Asia, South America and the Small Island Developing States to examine various possible approaches to face up to the risk of loss and damage.

The developing countries propose the development of a climate risk insurance institution as risk management is a major concern for the Parties. The AOSIS, supported by Bangladesh, also supports the creation of an international mechanism on loss and damage at the COP18²⁰¹. Conversely, the United States prefer risk reduction activities initiated by the countries²⁰².

In its draft conclusion, the SBSTA²⁰³:

- noted the remaining work to be undertaken under the Work Programme. It further noted a number of points relevant to assessing the risk of loss and damage, especially: the range of approaches for this assessment, the gaps in the risk assessment and the access, sharing and use of data. The SBSTA also noted that technical and institutional capacity building would assist the developing countries in assessing the risks of loss and damage;
- noted the need to adopt a holistic approach;
- recalled that the COP17 had requested the Secretariat to organise four expert meetings; and
- requested its chairman to convene an information pre-session meeting to facilitate the conclusion of work.

199. FCCC/SBI/2012/INF.3

200. FCCC/TP/2012/1

201. IISD, 2012b, p.24

202. FCCC/SBI/2011/MISC.1, FCCC/SBI/2011/INF.13, FCCC/SBI/2011/MISC.8

203. FCCC/SBI/2012/L.12

3.3.6 Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund

The Adaptation Fund established under the Kyoto Protocol provides sources of financing to adaptation projects and programmes in the developing countries. It is the only fund connected to the Protocol rather than the Convention and which is intended to reduce the vulnerability of communities and facilitate adaptation. It has been a topic of prolonged disagreement between the Parties. It has had all the components to become fully operational since 2008²⁰⁴. It launched the project selection procedures in 2010 and 25 countries had obtained financing for projects in August 2012²⁰⁵.

The Parties agreed at the CMP in Durban to start the review of the Adaptation Fund and its interim arrangements in Durban. This review is targeting:

- The institutional arrangements;
- The interim fiduciary;
- The access and availability of Adaptation Fund financing, including its permanence.

In Durban, the Parties studied the report from the Adaptation Fund Board (AFB)²⁰⁶. They noted the progress made in setting up the Fund. The CMP7 adopted a decision requesting the SBSTA to analyse the results of the review of the Fund and its interim arrangements during its 36th sessions and proposing to complete its initial review by the CMP8.

Several Parties have underlined their anxiety over the reduction in funds following the fall in CER prices²⁰⁷. Indeed, there has been talk of increasing the CER contribution to the Adaptation Fund (currently 2%) and of requiring Annex B Parties to transfer some of their assigned amount units (AAU) and their removal units (RMU) to the Adaptation Fund. The rather low price of these units is therefore a cause for concern, for it will reduce resources for the Adaptation Fund.

In Doha, the Parties should therefore complete the initial review of the Adaptation Fund. The draft conclusion underlines the viewpoints of the Adaptation Fund Board on the interim arrangements and the efforts of the Board to accredit the national installation agencies to facilitate direct access to the Fund²⁰⁸. The SBSTA has invited the Board to present in detail the administration costs of the Fund in order to compare its costs with those proposed by the GEF and the World Bank as interim fiduciaries. The Parties will be able to examine this report in Doha²⁰⁹.

204. Decision 1/CMP.4

205. See: http://www.adaptation-fund.org/funded_projects

206. FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/6, FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/6/Add.1

207. FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/MISC.1

208. FCCC/SBI/2012/L.13

209. FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/6, FCCC/KP/CMP/2011/6/Add.1

Adaptation-related issues

- Should work continue on certain adaptation issues that are not already dealt with by organisations or programmes? If appropriate, what are these issues and what should be the discussion forum to deal with them?
- The GEF must clarify the access to financing to develop and implement the NAPA, support the development of programme approaches, rationalise the fund's project cycles and improve the information on the project development process.
- What financial means can be made available to produce NAP? Which modalities should developing countries that are not LDC use to prepare NAP? What technical support and institutional arrangements are necessary to prepare NAP?
- Should an international mechanism be created to deal with loss and damage? What should this mechanism be? How can the risk of loss or damage be assessed?
- The SBSTA is studying the administration costs of the Fund in order to compare its costs with those proposed by the GEF and the World Bank as interim fiduciaries.

3.4 Technology development and transfer to support mitigation and adaptation actions

The relevance of the question of technology development and transfer comes mainly from the tremendous technological challenge posed by the need to reduce GHG emissions and the importance of technology transfers to encourage implementation of mitigation and adaptation actions in developing countries. Several countries have underlined the need to increase the development and transfer of technologies to the developing countries, but the intellectual property rights are a major obstacle to this. The Parties are therefore continuing the debates on questions relating to intellectual property rights.

In Cancún, the Parties set up a technology mechanism that includes:

- a Technology Executive Committee (TEC) that mainly targets the needs assessment. It can make recommendations to the COP and it acts as a catalyst and promoter of technological cooperation;
- a Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN), mainly for advising countries and facilitating coordination between the national and regional technological development networks.

In Durban, the Parties adopted the modalities and procedures and established the activities of the TEC. In Doha, the Parties should determine the TEC's work plan and the institutional linkages between the TEC and the other relevant institutions,

especially the CTCN. Lastly, the Parties should provide recommendations to improve the implementation of the Poznań strategic technology transfer programme.

In addition, in Durban the Parties adopted the terms of reference for the CTCN. This has to set out its activities so that it can provide a flexible response to the needs of developing countries in order to adapt to the technological needs of developing countries and the requirements of the international climate change regime. It must prepare its modalities and procedures and report to the COP through subsidiary bodies at their 38th session for decision at the COP19. In Doha, under the SBSTA, the Parties should select the host country for the CTCN to make the technology mechanism fully operational.

3.4.1 Enhanced action in technology development and transfer to support mitigation and adaptation actions (AWG-LCA)

Within the AWG-LCA, the issues for Doha relate to the intellectual property rights, the linkage between the technology mechanism and the financial mechanism and the additional functions of the Climate Technology Centre and Network (CTCN) and the Technology Executive Committee (TEC).

Intellectual property rights is the thorniest point in negotiations on technological cooperation. The G-77/China has stated several times that the costs related to these rights are an obstacle to technology transfer and various developing countries have requested a dispensation from intellectual property rights for technologies with low GHG emissions²¹⁰. Nevertheless, the majority of developed countries oppose any modification to the current regime for intellectual property rights, in the belief that their protection is fundamental in the development of new technologies.

The main stumbling block for Doha on intellectual property rights is identifying a discussion forum. Certain Parties believe that the TEC should be given the role of dealing with issues relating to intellectual property rights, for one of its functions is to recommend measures to eliminate the obstacles to technology development and transfer. The TEC held a themed dialogue on this question during its meeting on 28-29 May 2012²¹¹. Other Parties do not see intellectual property rights as an obstacle for technology transfer, but they are crucial for technology development. These Parties consider that the CTCN could respond to certain practical questions about intellectual property rights when performing its functions. Other Parties, like the United States and Singapore, are of the opinion that the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) should be the designa-

210. Murphy et al., 2009, p.8. http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/lca/application/pdf/2011-06-16_G-77-china_text_on_ctc-n-1700-1.pdf

211. See: http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg-lca/application/pdf/20120524_tt.pdf

ted forums for discussing the question of intellectual property rights, not the NFCCC. Lastly, certain Parties, like the G-77/China, believe that there should be a place for discussing intellectual property rights by virtue of the Convention once they are deemed relevant for technology development and transfer. The possibility of sending a signal to the WIPO and WTO on the need to review the intellectual property licence for technologies combating climate change was also highlighted.

The issue surrounding the identification of additional CTCN and TEC functions focuses on whether the current discussions should continue on the matter. The developing countries underline that the AWG-LCA mandate combined with the Bali Action Plan²¹² is far from completed, whilst certain Parties are of the opinion that priority should be given to implementing results already agreed, like, the TEC and CTCN. This is hardly the moment to envisage other functions for the TEC and CTCN that would overload the recently-created institutions; the TEC has just started its work and the CTCN is not yet operational. A proposal on the additional specific functions of the TEC and CTCN was nevertheless presented during the discussion:

- The TEC examines the questions about intellectual property rights that are raised during discussions on technology development and transfer;
- The CTCN provides²¹³ advice and support, including capacity building, on running the technological assessment of new and emerging technologies.

The issue at stake over the linkage between the technological mechanism and the financial mechanism focuses on the financing of the technological mechanism. Most developing countries underline that it is crucially important to enhance the linkages and are concerned by the continuing difficulty of knowing how and to what extent the technological mechanism will be financed. Some developed countries note that the COP in Durban has already asked the GCF Board to define better the linkages between the GCF and the other competent Convention bodies. They note that the discussions within the CTCN are considering the possibility of inviting a representative of the financial mechanism to sit on the Board.

The other questions raised by the Parties include the promotion of the transfer of publicly-financed technologies and how the results of the TEC could be used efficiently to inform and support the UNFCCC process.

In Bangkok, the Parties identified the outstanding questions, such as²¹⁴:

- the relationship between the CTCN and the TEC;
- any additional functions for both bodies; and
- the intellectual property rights.

212. Paragraph 1 (d) (i) and 1 (d) (iv) of Decision 1/CP.13

213. In accordance with Decision 1/CP.16, sub-paragraphs 128 (e) and 123 (a) (i):

214. IISD, 2012f

The Parties agree on the need to examine these questions further, but disagreement is still rife on how and when.

The Parties should therefore rule on these questions in Doha or define appropriate discussion forums to continue studying these issues.

3.4.2 Development and transfer of technologies, interaction modalities and rolling work plan of the Technology Executive Committee for 2012-2013 (SBI and SBSTA)

In Durban, the COP noted that the TEC intended to expand its rolling work plan for 2012-2013 and asked that this work plan be presented in the Committee's report to its subsidiary bodies in Doha (SB-37)²¹⁵. The Parties also adopted the operating modalities and internal regulations for the TEC²¹⁶. The TEC must state its linkages with other relevant institutional systems under and outside the Convention²¹⁷.

The TEC met for the second time on 15-17 February 2012 in Bonn (Germany). It prepared a report presenting the TEC work plan for 2012-2013 and its interaction modalities with other relevant institutional systems²¹⁸. Agreement was reached on the following points:

- the TEC work plan for 2012-2013;
- the modalities of linkages with other institutional systems within and outside the Convention; and
- the participation of its six members (three members from Annex I Parties and three from non-Annex I Parties) appointed to the assessment panel responsible for selecting the CTCN host entity.

The TEC also commenced mobilising the active participation of relevant stakeholders in its work.

In Bonn, the SBI-36 and the SBSTA-36 welcomed favourably the report presented by the TEC containing its work plan on the proposed inter-institutional linkages and invited the TEC to activate the implementation²¹⁹. Apart from implementing administrative procedures stipulated by the Durban decisions (e.g. appointment of a committee that will decide on the location of the TEC), the work plan contains the following objectives in particular:

215. Decision 4/CP.17
216. Decision 4/CP.17
217. FCCC /SBI/2012/L.20
218. FCCC/SB/2012/1
219. FCCC/SBSTA/2012/L.12

These
main
the

- Establish an inventory of relevant work by institutions actively involved in technological cooperation;
- Examine the technological needs of various sources;
- Organise themed dialogues to initiate collaboration with other initiatives;
- Undertake the preparation of one or more technical documents;
- Set up an information platform for the TEC under the information exchange centre on technology transfer;
- Recommend, if appropriate, guidance on priority policies and programmes for technology development and transfer;
- Organise a themed dialogue on research, development and demonstration.

The Parties find the linkages with other relevant institutional arrangements within and outside the Convention "too general". They are therefore seeking more specific references on the linkages. In Bonn, the SBI and the SBSTA prepared draft conclusions for adoption in Doha. This draft²²⁰:

- notes the structured TEC work plan on the activities assigned in Durban: short-term activities to begin in 2012 and medium-term activities to begin in 2013;
- invites the TEC to develop further its initial ideas on modalities on linkages with the other relevant institutional arrangements under and outside the Convention; and
- notes that the TEC will consult with the relevant institutional once they become operational and will report on the outcome of these consultations at the next session.

3.4.3 Questions relating to the Climate Technology Centre and Network: choice of host entity and constitution of the Advisory Board (SBSTA)

To render the technological mechanism fully operational in 2012, the COP17 in Durban adopted the terms of reference for the CTCN and decided to launch the selection process for its host organisation²²¹. The entities wishing to welcome the CTCN have had a chance to submit their proposals on the UNFCCC site²²². An assessment group comprising three members representing Annex I Parties under the Convention and three representing non-Annex I Parties have produced an assessment report based on these proposals²²³.

220. FCCC/SBSTA/2012/L.12 and FCCC/SBI/2012/L.20

221. Paragraph 133 of Decision 2/CP.17

222. Short-listed proposals for hosting Climate Technology

223. FCCC/SBI/2012/INF.4

In Bonn, the Parties examine the details of the negotiation process and the candidates retained, underlining the need for a transparent process²²⁴. The SBI has prepared a draft conclusion²²⁵ that presents the three entities on the short list for hosting the Centre. They are, in order of qualification:

- UNEP;
- GEF;
- the private company Det Norske Veritas (DNV).

The SBI is asking the Secretariat to launch discussions quickly on the key components of the headquarters agreement with the candidate heading the list and, if necessary, with the other candidates lying second and third at the same time. Once these administrative criteria have been settled, the SBI should recommend the entity at the top of the list (UNEP) during its next session in Doha.

3.4.4 Poznań strategic programme on technology transfer

During the COP14, the Parties adopted the Poznań strategic programme on technology transfer proposed by the Global Environment Facility (GEF) to assist developing countries to face up to their need for environmentally-sound technologies²²⁶. The GEF then had to report on progress made in implementing the programme's activities. The GEF submitted a report on 29 February 2012²²⁷. The report underlines that 36 developing countries have received GEF support in assessing their technological needs²²⁸.

In Durban, the Parties invited the GEF to continue to provide financial support to other developing countries, if the occasion arose, to produce or update their assessments for technological needs²²⁹. The Parties also underline the need to seek a balance in the support provided to mitigation projects and the support provided to adaptation projects in the long-term execution of the programme and have debated how to encourage more adaptation projects.

In Bonn, in May 2012, the SBSTA noted the GEF report and proposed a draft conclusion for adoption in Doha²³⁰ that:

224. IISD, 2012b.

225. FCCC/SBI/2012/L.18

226. Decision 2/CP.14

227. FCCC /SBI/2012/9- Annex

228. *Ibid.*

229. Decision 11/CP.17

230. FCCC/SBI/2012/L.19

- notes the support provided by the GEF in executing pilot technology transfer projects under the programme;
- invites the GEF to balance adaptation and mitigation projects better in the long-term execution of the Poznań strategic programme, including redoubling efforts to inform and raise awareness on the possibilities of financing projects linked to adaptation technologies;
- underlines the need to continue to implement the part of the Poznań strategic programme aiming at intensifying investment more in environmentally-friendly technologies in developing countries²³¹ to fall in line with the operational implementation and the activities of the Climate Technology Centre and Network.

Issues relating to technology development and transfer

- How can technologies and expertise leading to reduction of GHG emissions protected by intellectual property rights be promoted and how can access to them be facilitated for developing countries? What role does the technology mechanism play in financing technology development and transfer and in managing issues relating to the intellectual property rights? What are the most appropriate discussion forums for intellectual property rights?
- Should current discussions on the CTCN and the TEC functions be continued?
- How should the technology mechanism be financed?
- How can the modalities on the linkages with other relevant institutional arrangements within and outside the Convention be prevented from being too general?
- How can a balance be achieved between the support provided for mitigation projects and the support for adaptation projects in the long-term execution of the Poznań strategic programme? What are the most propitious methodologies for encouraging adaptation projects more?

3.5 Enhanced action on the provision of financial resources and investment to support action (AWG-LCA)

According to the principles of historical responsibility, the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and of polluter-payer, the Convention and the Protocol provide for financial aid to developing countries, especially for the most vulnerable countries. The Annex I Parties, including most developed countries, must provide financial resources to help developing countries to implement the Convention.

231. Provided for in sub-paragraph a of paragraph 23 of document FCCC/SBI/2012/9

The outcome of the AWG-LCA work is expected to lead to enhanced action regarding the provision of financial resources and investment to support mitigation and adaptation actions and technological cooperation. This question has featured extensively in the discussions of the AWG-LCA since the Bali Conference, mainly on adaptation, mitigation, technology and capacity building. Whereas the developing countries wish to make sure that they have easy access to adequate financing, the developed countries insist on transparent use of the financing.

An important stage was crossed with the creation of a Standing Committee through the Cancún Agreements to assist the COP in the operationalisation of the Convention's financial mechanism and the rationalisation of the climate financing. Similarly, the Cancún Agreements also created the Green Climate Fund (GCF)²³², designated as an operational entity for the Convention's financial mechanism.

Thanks to the operationalisation of the GFC in Durban based on recommendations from the Transitional Committee²³³, the Parties are now turning their attention to its administrative questions. The institutional questions will also feature extensively in Doha, especially the relationship between the Green Climate Fund and the COP and the role of the Standing Committee.

Moreover, to ensure the capitalisation of the GCF and the long-term financing, the Parties are facing numerous issues of substance, like the relay between early financing and long-term financing and the mobilisation of the long-term financing.

3.5.1 Administrative issues of the Green Climate Fund (GCF)

The GCF Board, which is its policymaking body, is responsible for settling certain administrative questions by Doha. However, the work of the GCF Board has been slightly delayed during 2012 due to disagreement between certain countries and regional groups on its composition. The first meeting of the GCF Board on 23-25 August 2012 in Geneva (Switzerland) examine the Board's work plan and launch the work to make the Fund operational.

In 2012, the GCF Board carried out the selection process that had been launched in Durban to select the host country for the GCF²³⁴. To date there are six candidate countries: Germany, Mexico, Namibia, Poland, South Korea and Switzerland. The Board met a second time on 18-20 October at Songdo in the Republic of Korea to forward a decision to the COP18 in Doha on the GFC host country and the choice of its administrator.

232. Decision 1/CP.16

233. Decision 3/CP.17, setting up the Green Climate Fund.

234. Decision 3/CP.17, Setting up the Green Climate Fund: Annex: Instrument governing the Green Climate Fund, para. 22.

The Board should then focus on the operationalisation of the GCF as quickly as possible, including among other things the adoption of modalities of access to financing and of the Board decision. These modalities are in fact necessary so that the Board can decide on granting financing based on financing requests. The Board should also ensure a balanced distribution of the Green Climate Fund resources between the adaptation activities and the mitigation activities.

The GCF should also design a transparent tacit approval procedure to be applied via national authorities designated by each recipient country²³⁵. These entities are responsible for recommending financing proposals to the Board under climate-related national strategies and plans. The tacit approval procedure aims to guarantee coherence with respect to the national climate strategies and plans and leave the initiative to the countries.

3.5.2 Relationship between the Green Climate Fund and the Conference of the Parties

The Parties were requested to decide by Doha on the arrangements between the GCF and the COP to ensure that it can report to the Conference of the Parties and operate according to its guidelines²³⁶. The Durban Decision²³⁷ provides for the GCF to receive guidelines from the COP, mainly on financing programme policies and priorities and eligibility criteria for financing requests. The practical modalities of this relationship and the accountability²³⁸ should therefore be clarified.

Little progress was made in Bonn given the diverging viewpoints of countries over whether all the countries should discuss this issue within the AWG-LCA or simply the Board representatives within the GCF Board. For example, the European Union is of the opinion that the AWG-LCA is not the appropriate forum²³⁹.

In Bangkok, there was continuing disagreement on whether other AWG-LCA decisions were necessary and how and where the questions of financing could be considered.

3.5.3 Standing Committee work programme

The Standing Committee was created by the Cancún Agreements to assist the COP in managing the Convention's financial mechanism, particularly to improve the coherence, mobilisation and coordination of the financing²⁴⁰.

235. Decision 3/CP.17, Setting up the Green Climate Fund, para. 7.

236. Decision 3/CP.17, Setting up the Green Climate Fund, para. 3.

237. Decision 3/CP.17, Setting up the Green Climate Fund, para. 4.

238. The GCF should, for example, refer to the COP in terms of compliance with the principles and provisions of the Convention and any guidelines that the COP may give it.

239. IISD, 2012b, p. 12.

240. Paragraph 112 of the Cancún Agreements.

In Durban, the Parties set out further the functions of the Standing Committee²⁴¹ which consist of:

- Organising a forum for the communication and continued exchange of information among bodies and entities dealing with climate change finance in order to promote linkages and coherence;
- Maintaining linkages with the Subsidiary Body for Implementation and the thematic bodies of the Convention;
- Providing to the Conference of the Parties draft guidance for the operating entities of the financial mechanism of the Convention, with a view to improving the consistency and practicality of such guidance;
- Making recommendations on how to improve the coherence, effectiveness and efficiency of the operating entities of the financial mechanism;
- Preparing a biennial assessment, overview of climate finance flows.

Based on these responsibilities, the Standing Committee is expected to prepare a work programme that will be submitted to the COP18 for approval²⁴². The discussions on this work programme only took place late in the year as the Standing Committee met for the first time on 6-8 September in Bangkok (Thailand)²⁴³.

The discussions on the work programme are a chance to agree on the scope and limitations of the functions of this committee. For example, the developing countries favour an extended and increased role for the committee. Thus, Ecuador is in favour of a preminent role for this Committee in terms of compliance with measurability, reportability and verifiability (MRV) requirements of the financial support and is calling for the creation of a financial support register²⁴⁴. The developed countries would, however, prefer the Committee to have a restricted role in the MRV.

It is also expected that the role of monitoring the issue of funds mainly through the biennial assessment of financial flows (which will be carried out by the Standing Committee) will prove to be complex given the lack of comparability of methodologies used to report on the support provided and received. The Committee may therefore have to formulate recommendations during the future adoption of common methodologies. The Parties should also decide whether the Standing Committee will have part to play in assessing whether the financing meets the criteria laid down in the

241. Decision 2/CP.17 Results of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action, para. 121.

242. Decision 2/CP.17 Results of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action, para. 123.

243. See: http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/standing_committee/items/6881.php

244. FCCC/AWGLCA/2012/CRP.1

Cancún Agreements (i.e. "increased, new, additional, sufficient and predictable" financial resources²⁴⁵).

3.5.4 The relay between early financing and long-term financing

At the COP15 in Copenhagen, the developed countries committed to providing new and additional financial resources of 30 billion US dollars for 2010-2012 in compliance with a balanced distribution between mitigation and adaptation. This collective financial commitment is better known as "early financing". The Cancún COP noted this commitment and reaffirmed that financing of adaptation would be a priority for the most vulnerable developing countries, such as the least developed countries (LDC), the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and African countries. Furthermore, the COP invited the developed countries to take stock of the financing granted and how the developing countries could access these resources²⁴⁶.

An Internet site has also been set up to report the amounts pledged so that the commitments announced by these countries can be monitored^{247, 248}.

In addition, the Cancún Agreements state that increased, new, additional, predictable and adequate financing must be made available to developing countries, especially the LDC, through a combination of public and private sources. This long-term financing should be provided early in 2013 to the tune of US\$100 billion per year between now and 2020²⁴⁹.

The early finance will be nearing completion at the end of 2012²⁵⁰. Numerous developing countries, such as the G-77/China and the African Group, fear a gap between the end of the early financing and the start of the long-term financing.

Several countries have put forward options to plug this possible gap. These countries think it is just as important to close the financial gap as it is to close the mitigation ambition gap. This issue is just as fundamental so that the institutions created in Durban do not remain "empty shells" and that the Bali Action Plan is respected.

245. Decision 1/CP.16

246. The submissions from Parties in May 2011 are available here: (http://unfccc.int/cooperation_support/financial_mechanism/fast_start_finance/items/5646.php). To access a World Resources Institute analysis of promised commitments by Annex I Parties announced during 2011, see: http://pdf.wri.org/climate_finance_pledges_2011-05-09.pdf

247. See: <http://www.faststartfinance.org/content/contributing-countries>.

248. See: <http://unfccc.int/pls/apex/f?p=116:13:2652855594527884>

249. See: <http://Cancun.unfccc.int/financial-technology-and-capacity-building-support/new-long-term-funding-arrangements/#c294>

250. For a list of contributions under the early financing, see: <http://unfccc.int/pls/apex/f?p=116:2:367786169977706::NO::>

Some countries, like Colombia and Barbados, have suggested that the Parties adopt a medium-term target on the model of pledges made under the early financing. Bangladesh has proposed an annual assessment approach to ensure the necessary change in scale to close a potential gap between 2012 and 2020. The United States feels that medium-term financing targets would require medium-term mitigation commitments by developing countries in return.

Although the developed countries keep on guaranteeing that there is no gap, the discussions testify to the need for the developing countries to obtain clear signals on how the US\$100 billion are going to be achieved and mobilised. The developing countries are also concerned over financing transparency, including early financing. They believe that many lessons must be learnt from the experience of granting early financing, mainly in terms of compliance with the "new and additional" financing characteristics and transparency.

3.5.5 Mobilisation of long-term financing

To ensure that the financial institutions set up in Durban are operational as quickly as possible, mainly through the capitalisation of the GCF, Durban set up a work programme on long-term financing through workshops²⁵¹. A first workshop was held on 9-11 July in Bonn (Germany). This programme catalyses numerous issues relating to the mobilisation of the long-term financing that are also discussed under the AWG-LCA. Two workshops were held on this issue during 2012. A first workshop was held on 9-11 July 2012 in Bonn, Germany and focused on the increased mobilisation of the financing to combat climate change²⁵². A second workshop was held on 1-3 October in Cape Town, South Africa on the same issue²⁵³.

These issues mainly cover the need to clarify the sources of financing. While the developed countries believe that private sources should play a significant role, the developing countries consider that the public sources should constitute the greater share of financing given their more predictable nature. Ecuador believes that leverage effect financing (e.g. the private financing portion mobilised through public co-financing) should not be counted as being part of climate financing²⁵⁴.

How to ensure that these financial resources will be "increased, new, additional, sufficient and predictable"²⁵⁵ is also part of discussions on mobilisation, as the criteria used to assess these characteristics will have an impact on achieving the target of

251. See: http://unfccc.int/cooperation_support/financial_mechanism/long-term_finance/items/6814.php

252. See: http://unfccc.int/cooperation_support/financial_mechanism/long-term_finance/items/6963.php

253. See: http://unfccc.int/cooperation_support/financial_mechanism/long-term_finance/items/6814.php

254. FCCC/AWGLCA/2012/CRP.1

255. Decision 1/CP.16

US\$100 billion. The transparency of financing through measurability, reportability and verifiability processes is therefore crucial (see Section 5.1).

In addition, certain developing countries, like the African Group, believe it is just as important to determine whether the US\$100 billion are adequate compared with the needs²⁵⁶. These countries believe it is necessary to review the magnitude of the target of US\$100 billion based on developing country needs. A project is in progress to assess the financial needs for the mitigation and adaptation of developing countries (NEEDS project)²⁵⁷.

As all these issues are part of the long-term financing programme, certain countries hesitate continuing to discuss long-term financing under the formal negotiations of the AWG-LCA. Although the outcome of this work programme will be communicated in Doha, certain Parties have raised doubts over using technical results from the programme in the context of formal negotiations.

Issues relating to enhanced action on the provision of financial resources and investment

- What host country and what administrator for the GCF?
- What relationship between the Green Climate Fund and the COP What is the most appropriate discussion forum for this issues between the AWG-LCA and the GFC Board?
- What role for the Standing Committee?
- How can a potential financing gap between the end of the early financing (end 2012) and the financing of US\$100 billion between now and 2020 to be provided early in 2013 be avoided? Could an interim target give a clear signal that the financing will be mobilised on time?
- What should be the role of private financing sources?
- How can the transparency of the long-term financing and that it is "increased, new, additional, sufficient and predictable" be ensured?
- Is the sum of US\$100 billion adequate compared with the needs of developing countries for mitigation and adaptation?
- Should long-term financing still be discussed under the AWG-LCA while a work programme deals with this issue? How can the outcome of the long-term financing programme be exploited under formal negotiations?

256. FCCC/SBI/2012/CRP.2

257. NEEDS aims to identify the key sectors where mitigation and adaptation measures have been identified by the developing countries and to assess the financial needs for their implementation. Ultimately, the project is intended to raise country awareness of instruments used to mobilise the necessary financing for the selected mitigation and adaptation measures. See: http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/items/5630.php

3.6 Review: complementary definition of its scope and preparation of its modalities

In Copenhagen, the countries also undertook to enhance their long-term co-operative action to combat climate change, given the scientific opinion whereby the rise in the global temperature should be limited to 2°C²⁵⁸.

The Cancún Agreements provided for the possibility of revising the objective of limiting the temperature rise to adopt, if appropriate, an objective of 1.5°C instead of the 2°C put forward in Copenhagen²⁵⁹. Numerous developing countries stipulate a limitation in the rise in temperatures of 1.5°C, even 1°C, as they consider that the limitation of 2°C will have devastating consequences, especially for the SIDS and the least developed countries (LDC). These consequences would include among other things rising sea levels, coral bleaching, coastal erosion, unpredictable rainfall, the increase and reappearance of climate-related illnesses and increasingly frequent impacts caused by violent meteorological phenomena²⁶⁰.

Similarly, the Parties agreed to carry out a review of 2013 to 2015 to assess the progress made towards achieving the Convention's objective²⁶¹ and thus be able to determine whether more ambitious mitigation measures are necessary. In Durban, the COP17 agreed that the Parties would continue to study the scope of the review, mainly its definition, for a decision by the COP18 in Doha²⁶². The review should be inspired by principles of equity, common by differentiated responsibilities and respective capacities and take account, especially of:

- The best available scientific knowledge, including the assessment reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC);
- Observed impacts of climate change;
- An assessment of the overall aggregate effect of the steps taken by Parties in order to achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention;
- Consideration of strengthening the long-term global goal, referencing various matters presented by the science, including in relation to temperature rise of 1.5°C.

The Parties also agreed in Durban that the review should focus on the information received from various sources, mainly:

258. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1

259. Paragraphs 4 and 138 to 140 of Decision 1/CP.16

260. See: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/lca/application/pdf/aosis_sv.pdf

261. Decision 2/CP.17 VII

262. *Ibid.*

- The assessment and special reports and technical papers of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change;
- Submissions from Parties, national communications, first biennial update reports from developing country Parties and biennial reports from developed country Parties, national inventories, reports on international consultation and analysis, international assessment and review and other relevant reports from Parties and processes under the Convention;
- Other relevant reports from United Nations agencies and other international organisations, including reports on emission projections, technology development, access, transfer and deployment and reports on gross domestic product, including GDP projections;
- Scientific information on the observed impacts of climate change, including that from reports coordinated by relevant regional and sub-regional agencies.

The review will be led jointly by the SBI and the SBSTA and should consist of several phases, including information gathering and compilation, technical assessment through the organisation of workshops, technical studies and the preparation of synthesis reports²⁶³. In Doha, the Parties should state the modalities for examining the information mentioned above, the scope of the review and the general guidelines for carrying it out by expert assessment of information. The Parties believe that the review of information must be efficient and transparent and that it must help to minimise the costs²⁶⁴.

Two options are envisaged for the scope of the review: either limiting the scope of the review to what was agreed in Cancún, in other words the adequate nature of the long-term global objective and the overall progress made in achieving it²⁶⁵ or extending the scope of the review to an assessment of the implementation of the Convention. Some Parties, like the African Group, supported by China and Brazil, believe that the review should include an assessment of the availability of means to implement the Convention for the developing countries (financing, technology and capacity building)²⁶⁶. Other Parties, like ASISID, Singapore and the EU, wish to see the review start quickly and believe that the scope is defined by the information submitted for review²⁶⁷. Some propose an assessment limited to the information to be assessed for the first review (mentioned above), followed by a broader review for the rest. Another option would be to carry out an initial limited review including an option to broaden it if necessary.

263. Decision 2/CP.17 VII

264. See: http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg-lca/application/pdf/20120524_review.pdf

265. Paragraph 138 of Decision 1/CP.16

266. See: http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg-lca/application/pdf/20120524_review.pdf

267. IISD, 2012b.

The Parties are examining several options for the modalities for the review of information by the experts²⁶⁸:

- ASISID and Norway support the creation of an expert group in Doha to provide technical support to the subsidiary bodies or to give advice on the review. They underline the guiding role such a body could play;
- Canada, supported by the United States and Australia, suggests creating a joint SBI-SBSTA contact group to ensure a transparent and exhaustive process guided by the Parties. On this point, the developing countries stress that additional funds will be necessary for the participation of more developing country experts in the contact group meetings.

In terms of the general guidelines for carrying out the review by experts, the Parties propose:

- Organising meetings or workshops during or immediately after the sessions of subsidiary bodies;
- Avoiding activities between the negotiation sessions due to their high cost;
- Not limiting the number of meetings;
- Avoiding the duplication of work;
- Limiting the use of experts for the information-gathering phase;
- Intensifying the technical assistance to 2014, when most of the information will be available. Thus, during the period 2013-2014, most of the work could be carried out in negotiation sessions. Activities between the negotiation sessions could be necessary from 2014 onwards;
- Ensuring adequate participation by developing countries in the intersession workshops.

For the next stages, the Parties propose:

- Organising a session workshop during the SB-38 in 2013 to establish the review based on the IPCC Special Report on renewable energy and climate change mitigation and on managing the risks of extreme events and disasters;
- Inviting the Parties to submit their views on the reasons and advantages of various options for conducting the review;
- Asking the Secretariat to produce a technical document on the link between science and decision-making.

268. See: http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg-lca/application/pdf/20120524_review.pdf

Review-related issues

- Should the scope of the review be limited to what was agreed in Cancún or extended to an assessment of the implementation of the Convention?
- Should a new body be created to provide technical support to the subsidiary bodies and/or provide advice for the review, or is it preferable to create a joint SBI/SBSTA contact group?
- What should the general guidelines be for conducting the review by experts?
- What are the next steps?

4. ISSUES RELATED TO THE KYOTO PROTOCOL

This section reviews the issues of the Kyoto Protocol theme by theme, including those dealt with under the Ad Hoc Working Group on the further commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) and those dealt with under the subsidiary bodies. The AWG-KP is mandated to reach a main agreement on the greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction targets of Annex I Parties for a second commitment period and on how to achieve them²⁶⁹.

This section will therefore study the issues relating to the AWG-KP, including the new commitments of Annex I Parties (Section 4.1) and the measures dealt with under the auspices of subsidiary bodies: the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA). The section will address the issues of the clean development mechanism (CDM) (Section 4.2) and of the Land Use, Land Use Changes and Forestry (LULUCF) sector (Section 4.3).

4.1 Examination of new commitments of Annex I Parties (AWG-KP)

It was agreed that the AWG-KP would submit a draft text of amendments to the 5th Conference of the Parties sitting as a Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP5) in Copenhagen concerning the greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction commitments by the Annex I Parties, as provided in Article 3.9 of the Kyoto Protocol²⁷⁰. In Copenhagen and then in Cancún, the marked differences of opinion over the scale of GHG emission reduction targets impeded reaching consensus on a draft amendment to the Kyoto Protocol. The mandate of the AWG-KP was therefore renewed in Cancún for the adoption of a decision by the CMP as quickly as possible and sufficiently early to avoid any gap between the first and second commitment periods of the Kyoto Protocol²⁷¹.

In Durban, the Parties renewed the Kyoto Protocol for a second commitment period. However, the mitigation targets, the stakeholders and the duration of the second period were not defined²⁷².

269. FCCC/KP/AWG/2007/5, para. 22 c)

270. *Ibid.*

271. Decision 1/CMP.6

272. Decision 1/CMP.7

For Doha, the Parties must communicate information on their quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives (QELRO) for the second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol²⁷³ so that the CMP8 in Doha can adopt them as amendments to Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol²⁷⁴.

In addition, the Parties should assess the impacts of carrying over assigned amount units (AAU) to the second commitment period on the magnitude of emission reductions targeted by the Annex I Parties over the said period. The CMP has also asked the AWG-KP to recommend appropriate measures to take account of these impacts and submit them in time for examination in Doha, with a view to adopting the final version of the text of proposed amendments to be made to the Kyoto Protocol and its Annexes²⁷⁵.

The AWG-KP should have finalised its work during its 17th session in Bonn in order to be in a position to submit the work requested to the CMP8 in Doha. The discussions in Bonn during the AWG-KP-17 led to an in-depth understanding of questions of substance on the commitments of Parties wishing to participate in the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. Nevertheless, the Parties did not manage to agree on the QELRO, the carryover of AAU and the amendments and duration of the second commitment period. As there is still a great deal of work to be done, an extraordinary session was therefore organised in Bangkok in August 2012 to finalise the discussions on these issues under the AWG-KP in time for Doha. As these discussions could not be finalised, the Parties will therefore meet again under the AWG-KP in Doha.

This section will therefore study the conversion of targets of Annex I Parties into QELRO, the carryover of assigned amount units (AAU) and the amendments and duration of the second commitment period.

4.1.1 The conversion of Annex I Parties' targets into QELRO (quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives) for the second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol.

In Poznań, in 2008, the Parties agreed on the form that the new commitments of the Annex I Parties would take for the next commitment period, namely QELRO²⁷⁶. Certain Annex I Parties put forward proposals for individual reductions in 2009, mainly as reduction percentages over a reference year, to be achieved by 2020.

273. Paragraph 5 of Decision 1/CMP.7

274. Paragraph 6 of Decision 1/CMP.7

275. This issue is dealt with under the AWG-KP: FCCC/KP/A WG/2012/1

276. *Ibid.*

Under the AWG-KP, the Parties should now convert these objectives into emission reduction commitments for the second commitment period starting in 2013 and find a way to achieve an ambitious global emission reduction objective that maintains global warming below 2°C.

Converting the emission reduction objectives into QELRO

Until now, several Parties have evoked individual and collective objectives using different references and some have also attached conditions to their targets. For example, the European Union proposes increasing its target from 20% to 30% on condition that developed and the most advanced developing countries commit to suitable mitigation actions to limit the temperature rise to 2°C (see Table 2). The Parties are not unanimous on this "bottom-up" and "conditional" approach, which takes the form of the setting of individual objectives by the developed countries. Certain non-Annex I Parties would prefer a top-down approach, i.e. an approach whereby a global objective will be set and then distributed among the Parties. This would allow a global emission reduction objective to be set for the Annex I Parties based on scientific information from the IPCC (i.e. reduction of 25% to 40% compared with 1990 by 2020) and GHG emission reductions to be distributed among these Parties according to their respective capacities.

In Durban, the Annex I Parties stated their intention to convert their targets into QELRO for the second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol. If a second commitment period is to be adopted immediately at the end of the first commitment period, all intended participating Parties to the Protocol must have submitted their QELRO in Doha, with a view to implementing the second commitment period from 1 January 2013. And yet, the formula for defining the QELRO for the second period has not been identified and most of these targets are conditional on adopting rules which have not yet been adopted such as those relating to the carryover of AAU (see sub-section on the AAU carryover). Similarly, QELRO comparability and ambition are major issues for Doha.

During the negotiations in Bonn and Bangkok, the Parties submitted QELRO and explained the methodology used to convert the objectives into QELRO, including the choice of reference year, the assumed emission pathway and the length of the commitment period²⁷⁷. All the Annex I Parties that intend to participate in the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol have provided information on their quantified objectives except for Monaco and Ukraine (see Table 2). In addition, all the Parties submitting information have announced figures or ranges of figures for their QELRO, except for New Zealand and Australia²⁷⁸. The G-77/China has expressed

277. See: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/kp/application/pdf/awgkp_sog_compilation.pdf

278. FCCC/ KP/AWG/2012/MISC.1 and Add.1

fears given that some Annex I Parties have not submitted information on their QELRO for the second commitment period, as this could threaten the implementation of the second period of the Protocol from January 2013 onwards.

The question has also been raised over the consequences to which countries which have not agreed to make commitments for the second period are exposed. The group of LDC requires that Annex I Parties which have not confirmed their participation in the second commitment period of the Protocol cannot continue to participate in the Protocol's flexibility mechanisms. In Bangkok, the Parties studied whether access to the Kyoto mechanisms should be possible for only the countries applying the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, the countries which have submitted their quantified objectives, the countries that have indicated whether they will join the second commitment period, all the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol or all the Parties to the Convention.

Lastly, the comparability of QELRO is a particularly important issue for developing countries, which would like to increase the ambition of current targets. The AOSIS countries would like clear, unconditional QERLO expressed in a single figure and for a five-year commitment period. The ASISID presented an estimation of QELRO that all Annex B Parties should take for a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol (KP2) of five years (see the data in red in Table 2)²⁷⁹.

279. See section: AOSIS Proposed amendments to Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol.
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/kp/application/pdf/awgkp_sog_compilation.pdf

TABLE 2.
QELRO PROPOSED BY THE PARTIES^{280, 281}

Annex I Parties	QELRO ²⁸² Period 2008 - 2012 (compared with the base year or the period)	QELRO 2013-2017 or 2020 (compared with the base year or the period)	QELRO recommended by AOSIS For the 2013- 2017 period	Reference year	GHG reduction target for 2020 (compared with the reference year)
Australia	108 %	Australia is prepa- red to envisage submitting infor- mation on its QELRO.	93%		
Belarus		92 %	65%	1990	8 %
Canada	94 %		On 8 June 2011, Canada indicated that it did not intend to participate in the second period of the Kyoto Protocol ²⁸³ .		
Croatia	95 %	80 %	81 %		20% to 30% on condition that developed and the most advanced developing countries commit to suitable mitigation actions to limit the tempera- ture rise to 2°C.
European Union and its member States	92 %	80 %	81 %	1990	20% to 30% on condition that developed and the most advanced developing countries commit to suitable mitigation actions to limit the tempera- ture rise to 2°C.

Issues related to the Kyoto Protocol

Annex I Parties	QELRO ²⁸² Period 2008 - 2012 (compared with the base year or the period)	QELRO 2013-2017 or 2020 (compared with the base year or the period)	QELRO recommended by AOSIS For the 2013- 2017 period	Reference year	GHG reduction target for 2020 (compared with the reference year)
Iceland	110 %	80 %	81 %		
Japan	94 %	On 10 December 2010, Japan indicated that it would not have an obligation for the second period of the Kyoto Protocol ²⁸⁴ .			
Kazakhstan	Has proposed an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol to come under Annex B to the Protocol for the first commitment period.			1990	15 %
Liechtenstein	92 %	84 %- 78 %	81 %	1990	20% to 30% on condition that developed and the most advanced developing countries commit to suitable mitigation actions.
Monaco	92 %		81 %	1990	30% - Objective of becoming carbon neutral by 2050 through flexibility mechanisms.
Norway	101 %	84 % – 81 %	81 %	1990	30% to 40% depending on the willingness of the large emitting countries to reach an agreement on emission reduction ranges compliant with the limitation objective of 2°C and the continuation of the flexibility mechanisms.
New Zealand	100 %	New Zealand is prepared to envisage submitting information on its QELRO.			

Annex I Parties	QELRO ²⁸² Period 2008 - 2012 (compared with the base year or the period)	QELRO 2013-2017 or 2020 (compared with the base year or the period)	QELRO recommended by AOSIS For the 2013- 2017 period	Reference year	GHG reduction target for 2020 (compared with the reference year)
Russia	100 %	On 8 December 2010, Russia indicated that it would not take QELRO or reduction objective for the second period of the Kyoto Protocol ²⁸⁵ .			
Switzerland	92 %	84,2 % – 77,7 %	81 %	1990	20% to 30% provided that the other developed countries make similar commitments and that the most advanced developing countries contribute to the mitigation effort according to their responsibilities and respective capacities.
Ukraine	100 %		46 %		20 %
United States	Has not ratified the Kyoto Protocol.				

280. See: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/kp/application/pdf/awgkp_sog_compilation.pdf

281. See: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/kp/application/pdf/tableqlrds_fromparties_for_website_posting_17aug2012_cln.pdf

282. The reduction commitments are expressed as a percentage of permitted emissions compared with the reference year, normally 1990 for the three "natural" gases (CO₂, CH₄ and N₂O) and 1995 for the CFC replacement gases that are covered by the Protocol. Any country with a percentage higher than 100% has been approved for an increase in emissions.

283. See: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/kp/application/pdf/awgkp_sog_compilation.pdf pp. 6 and 7

284. http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/kp/application/pdf/awgkp_sog_compilation.pdf pp. 6 and 7

285. http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/kp/application/pdf/awgkp_sog_compilation.pdf pp. 6 and 7

Raise the ambition of QELRO

The AWG-KP agreed in 2007 on the need for the Annex I Parties to reduce their emissions by 25% to 40% below 1990 levels by 2020²⁸⁶. The Parties wish to align with the fourth report from the third working group of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Nevertheless, the targets announced by the Parties do not achieve these objectives. The scale of GHG emission reductions of Annex I Parties forms the crux of the AWG-KP discussions. In Doha, the discussions will focus on the means and conditions necessary to raise the ambition level, the implications of using offsets from market mechanisms and the implications for the environmental integrity of the Protocol.

These issues relate to the duration of the second commitment period. Certain Parties are concerned that an eight-year commitment period, rather than five years, would block the ambition at a low level (see sub-section on the duration of the commitment period).

The European Union has formulated two proposals to raise the ambition of QELRO:

- The first focuses on establishing a review of the QERLO ambition level of Parties that coincides with the 2013-2015 review planned by virtue of the Convention²⁸⁷. For the Environmental Integrity Group, this mid-term assessment of QELRO to improve the level of ambition should be carried out in accordance with the scientific recommendations of the IPCC.
- The second proposal is for a simplified procedure to modify Annex B to the Protocol so that the Parties can improve their ambition level.

Brazil has thus presented a proposal on the review of QELRO to enhance the commitments by virtue of the Protocol²⁸⁸. The proposal stipulates that the Annex I Parties can, at any time, reinforce their QELRO and ensure the immediate effect of this revision by:

- renouncing part of their AAU;
- transferring these units to a cancellation account established for this purpose in the national register;
- communicating this transfer to the Secretariat.

286. FCCC/KP/AWG/2007/L. 4

287. See: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/kp/application/pdf/awgkp_eu_ppt.pdf

288. See: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/kp/application/pdf/awgkp_brazil_presentation.pdf

FCCC/KP/AWG/2012/MISC.1

The ambition of QELRO also raises the question of the use of market mechanisms, as the permissive use of units from these mechanisms in the accounting of compliance of countries with their objectives could falsify the actual reduction in emissions of countries (for example, given the risks of double counting or the damage to the environmental integrity). Therefore, although numerous countries wish to be able to use the units from the Convention's brand new market mechanism under the accounting of the Kyoto Protocol, the ASISID has stated that the units from the new market mechanism can only be used if their environmental integrity has been examined carefully.

In Bangkok, the Parties stated that they shared a common goal of raising the ambition level, but views continue to diverge on how and when to do this. The Parties insisted on the need for ministerial discussions on the ambition and the review before Doha.

4.1.2 The carryover of assigned amount units (AAU) to the second commitment period

This issue is dealt with principally under the AWG-KP, but the SBSTA is responsible for determining the form of the AAU reserve for the second commitment period.

The implications of the carryover of AAU to the second commitment period (AWG-KP)

For many of the Parties, the conversion of commitments into QELRO depends on the definition of the applicable rules, especially those of the AAU carryover. According to UNEP, a second commitment period establishing rules to prevent a net increase in emissions from "flexible" accounting of emissions due to LULUCF and the use of AAU would make it possible to achieve an emission level of 49 GtCO₂eq in 2020 and would thus reduce the gap to be filled to 5 Gt CO₂eq. This accounts for about 60% of the road to be travelled to achieve the objective of 2°C²⁸⁹. In Durban, the Parties decided that there should be a mandatory requirement for the Annex I Parties, for the second period of the Kyoto Protocol, to account for emissions from forest management. In addition, they decided that the AWG-KP should assess the implications of carrying over assigned amount units (AAU) to the second commitment period²⁹⁰.

This assessment raise numerous questions over how to calculate the carryover of AAU. A certain number of countries, like Russia, Ukraine and Poland, have substantial surpluses of AAU. At the end of 2012, a rise of 13 billion AAU could be carried

289. UNEP, 2010

290. See: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/ad_hoc_working_groups/kp/application/pdf/carryover_quantitative_illustrative_examples_for_website_posting_17aug2012.pdf

over to the commitment period. It is almost three times the annual emissions of the European Union or twice that of the United States. This surplus could therefore threaten the viability and effectiveness of international climate policy regimes. Thus, for the carryover of AAU, several countries prefer an average of several years to avoid the variability of emissions from one year to the next. The LDC prefer to limit the carryover to a specific percentage or a set amount to be able to use the higher of the two. This option would allow them more flexibility to deal with variations in emissions especially from forestry.

The African Group, ASISID and Brazil have also formulated proposals on how to calculate the AAU carryover. The African Group proposal suggests, among other things, that the surplus AAU are carried over but must be placed in a special reserve, provided mainly that the Party in question is participating in the second commitment period. In addition, the proposal allows the Parties to trade 2% of the reserve annually, with 1% of revenues to be dedicated to mitigation and 1% of AAU transferred to the Adaptation Fund²⁹¹. The African Group believes that this proposal grants a "fair reward" for achieving objectives, maintains environmental integrity and is sufficiently flexible to meet the demand of countries with special needs.

The ASISID proposals states that the total amount of AAU, certified emission reductions and emission reduction units approved for carryover and carried over from the previous commitment period is considered as a reserve surplus of a Party for the previous period²⁹². It also provides for a Party being able to use all the units carried over up to a specified quantity after the end of the next commitment period.

The Brazilian proposal contains various paragraphs that state, among other things, that if the emissions of an Annex I Party for the first commitment period are less than the number of assigned units, the difference could be carried over to the second commitment period²⁹³.

In Bangkok, the G77-China formulated a new proposal on the carryover of surplus AAU, in which the carryover ceiling would be set at 2.5% of units of the second commitment period.

In Doha, the Parties should therefore adopt the applicable rules for the carryover of AAU to the second commitment period. The option of not limiting the carryover is also on the table.

Review of the form of the reserve of the second commitment period (SBI)

Each Annex I Party holds an AAU reserve in its national register for the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. The Parties that are participating in a

291. FCCC/KP/AWG/2012/MISC.1

292. *Ibid.*

293. *Ibid.*

second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol are focusing on revising rules surrounding the placing of AAU in their national reserve. This issue is dealt with under the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) which has prepared a draft decision for adoption in Doha²⁹⁴. This draft is still full of square brackets and several options as to the number of units that can be placed in the reserve compared with the total number of units assigned to a Party. In Bonn, the Parties proposed several options to guarantee that the participants in the second period of the Kyoto Protocol keep a proportion of AAU in their reserve at all times. The issue covers the correct operation of emissions trading by keeping a proportion of AAU in the reserve at all times. The options vary, but the Parties seem to agree that this proportion should be between 70% and 100%.

4.1.3 Continuity between the two commitment periods and the duration of the second commitment period

One issue for Doha is how to ensure continuity between the first and second commitment periods. Discussions will focus on options for the provisional application of amendments to the Protocol whilst awaiting their entry into force. Note that the continuity of two commitment periods implies that the amendments made to the Kyoto Protocol would enter into force before 1 January 2013. To achieve this, three quarters of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (143) must have ratified the amendments before 3 October 2012. To compensate for a gap between the two commitment periods, the ASISID and some LDC suggest that the amendments to the Protocol adopted in Doha are legally binding for the Parties from 1 January 2013 via a provisional application whilst awaiting their entry into force.

Numerous Parties underline the need for greater clarity on the legal questions and the positions of Parties to ensure "seamless continuity" of the Protocol beyond 2012. The Parties acknowledged in Bonn that "a large amount" of work still had to be done to ensure a satisfactory outcome in Doha.

The Durban Decision provides for two options for the commitment periods:

- either a five-year period (a second period from 2013 to 2017);
- or an eight-year period (a second period from 2013 to 2020).

The developed countries prefer the second option, whereas most developing countries opt for the first, as it could mean revised objectives after five years. The African Group and numerous LDC underline the need to introduce a five-year commitment period to avoid blocking the ambition at a low level for eight years and to respond to the conclusions of the Fifth Assessment Report from the Intergovernmental

294. The draft decision is available in the annex to document FCC/SBI/2012/L.11

Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), expected in September 2014. However, some emerging countries prefer the first option because a shorter period also means a risk of the developing countries of having targets imposed on them after five years²⁹⁵.

Most developed countries, including the Environmental Integrity Group and the EU, are looking for an eight-year duration for the second commitment period to ensure a transition to the agreement that the Durban Platform has to produce. The Coordination Group underlines, for example, that a second commitment period alone "cannot help us to avoid dangerous climate change" and that it "will only represent part of a more global picture". The EU underlines the importance of the transition and the continuity of rules, institutions and mechanisms.

In Bangkok, the Parties studied the various proposals for Doha on the second period, including: a preamble; the adoption of amendments; a paragraph inviting the Parties to ratify; the provisional application; the additional language relating to the legal continuity; the operational and technical continuity; revisions of previous CMP decisions; and other proposals like those welcoming unilateral declarations. Numerous Parties have underlined that some of the proposed elements are complementary and non-exclusive.

Main issues of the GHG emission reductions to be achieved by Annex I Parties, individually, jointly and in aggregate

- How can it be guaranteed that the targets of Annex I Parties will be converted in time into QELRO for the second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol to avoid a vacuum between the commitment periods? How should QELRO be defined? How can QELRO comparability be guaranteed?
- What are the means and conditions for raising the QELRO ambition level? What are the implications of using offsets from market mechanisms for the environmental integrity of the Protocol?
- How should the carryover of AAU to the second commitment period be calculated? What proportion of AAU should the Parties participating in the second period of the Kyoto Protocol keep in their national register?
- How long should the second commitment period last and what are the options for the provisional application of amendments to the Protocol to ensure its continuity whilst awaiting their entry into force?

²⁹⁵. Müller, B., 2011.

4.2 Issues relating to the Clean Development Mechanism

Under the current Kyoto Protocol rules, the Parties subject to emission reduction targets can purchase units from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the Joint Implementation (JI) to meet their obligations. The debate over the flexibility mechanisms focus principally on the potential improvements to the CDM. There is talk of including carbon capture and geological storage. Some modifications are also being considered, such as the impact on the potential inclusion of lands with forests in exhaustion under the CDM afforestation and reforestation activities and the institutional procedures, mechanisms and arrangements for appeals against the decisions of the CDM Executive Board.

4.2.1 The inclusion of carbon capture and storage in geological formations as an activity under the CDM (SBSTA)

Carbon capture and storage (CCS) in geological formations are processes whereby carbon dioxide (CO₂) is extracted from combustion fumes emitted by industrial plants before being transported and stored in a geological formation²⁹⁶. The aim of this storage is to enclose the CO₂ underground, in oil-bearing or natural gas fields, unworkable layers of fossil coal or deep saline formations.

Recognising CO₂ capture and storage as a CDM activity has been on the agenda since the CMP1 in 2005. Since Bali, the Parties have discussed a variety of questions about the risks of this practice in the SBSTA sessions, such as the long-term responsibility of storage sites and monitoring reservoirs, the risk level and uncertainties surrounding CO₂ leakages found in the reservoirs and the criteria to be applied to select suitable storage sites, given the risk of GHG releases²⁷⁷.

In Cancun, the inclusion of CO₂ capture and storage in geological formations was made eligible within the framework of the CDM²⁹⁸. In Durban, the Parties prepared the modalities and procedures for the inclusion of carbon dioxide emission capture and storage in geological formations as a CDM project. The Parties provided for the revision of these modalities in at least five years, without retroactivity for CDM projects already registered.

296. IPCC, 2005.

297. The full list of questions calling for information to be communicated by the Parties can be found in Decision 1/CMP.2, paragraph 21. For a summary of information sent to the Secretariat by the parties and accredited organisations, see <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2008/sbsta/eng/inf01.pdf>

298. Decision 7/CMP.6

The Parties must now consider the eligibility of CCS projects in the CDM when CO₂ is being transported from one country to another with a view to recommending a decision to the CMP8. In addition, the Parties should decide whether to establish a global reserve of certified emission reductions for the CCS projects for adoption by the CMP8. The Secretariat must prepare a technical document on establishing a global reserve of certified emissions for the CCS projects and on the issues of cross-border projects and the relevant legislation to facilitate the adoption of a decision by the CMP8 in Doha²⁹⁹.

4.2.2 Impacts of the potential inclusion of lands with forests in exhaustion under afforestation and reforestation activities of the CDM (SBSTA)

The eligibility of afforestation and reforestation (A/R) activities under the CDM depends on satisfying precise criteria concerning the lands where the project is to take place. To date, any A/R project on forest lands as at 31 December 1989, in the meaning of the definition adopted by each of the host countries, is excluded from the CDM³⁰⁰.

Following a request from the Parties, the Executive Board of the CDM has been considering since 2008 the possibility of admitting projects taking place on lands containing forests as of 31 December 1989 through the CDM, but whose forests are exhausted. The Executive Board noted that the definition of A/R activities eligible under the CDM would have to be modified for these activities to become eligible³⁰¹. The reforestation activities of the lands that were not forested or land with forests in exhaustion as of 31 December 1989 should be added³⁰².

In Cancun, the SBSTA asked the Parties for their observations of CDM activities, taking into account reforestation of land with forests in exhaustion. In Durban, the SBSTA agreed to continue to examine this question and underlined the need to clarify in Doha the definition of land with forests in exhaustion. The Parties should therefore clarify in Doha the definition of land with forests in exhaustion³⁰³.

This definition should establish how a promoter of a CDM project can prove that the forest is being exhausted. It has been proposed that eligible lands are those where it can be proved that they were converted into non-forest land in five years by means of a final harvest³⁰⁴. The advantage of classifying these lands as forestation and refo-

299. FCCC/SBST A/2012/L.8

300. Decision 16/CMP.1

301. Decision 16/CMP.1. Annexe Section D

302. FCCC/KP/CMP/2009/16

303. FCCC/SBSTA/2012/L.10

304. FCCC/SBSTA/2012/MISC.10

restoration activities means maintaining both the vegetation cover and the integrity of the soil. However, a negative externality of the practice, mainly raised by several non-governmental organisations, is that forest lands could be exhausted deliberately so that carbon credits can be claimed for the reforestation activities.

4.2.3 Procedures, mechanisms and institutional arrangements for appealing the decisions of the CDM Executive Board (SBSTA)

In Cancún, the CMP6 entrusted the SBSTA with making recommendations on institutional procedures, mechanisms and arrangements for appeals against the CDM Executive Board decisions³⁰⁵. The SBSTA should use the recommendations of the Executive Board³⁰⁶ as a basis for determining the procedures and mechanisms for appealing against the decisions of the Board³⁰⁷.

In Bonn, the parties continued their discussions on the draft decision prepared in Durban, without however reaching agreement on the key issues³⁰⁸. The disputed questions mainly affect the scope of the mechanism³⁰⁹. The Parties should determine whether it will be possible to appeal against positive decisions of the CDM Executive Board, such as the approval of requests to register projects or the issuing of CER, or where the appeal procedures will simply involve the negative decisions, such as the rejection of registration requests. A decision still has to be made as to whether the bodies not involved in the projects in question could appeal against certain CDM decisions. For example, a broad definition of categories of intervening parties with the right to appeal could include people or communities affected by the project, as well as relevant civil society groups.

In addition, the plan is that the committee responsible for assessing the appeal should be made up of legal experts and CDM experts, but its exact composition has yet to be decided. The Parties propose that a chairperson or chairpersons be charged with selecting members from a list of experts.

Main issues with the Kyoto Protocol flexibility mechanisms

- Should CCS projects that include transporting CO₂ from one country to another be eligible under the CDM? Should a global certified emissions reserve be established for the CCS projects?

305. Decision 3/CMP.6

306. FCCC/KP/CMP/2010/10 Annex II

307. Paragraph 42 of Decision 2/CMP.5

308. FCCC/SBI/2011/17

309. FCCC/SBI/2012/L.8

- What should land with forests in exhaustion be defined? How can the negative externalities of the mechanism be prevented?
- What should be the scope of the appeal mechanism? Will it be possible to appeal against positive decisions approving registration requests for projects or issuing CER by the CDM Executive Board? Will the bodies not involved in the projects in question be able to appeal against certain CDM decisions?

4.3 The questions relating to the Land Use, Land Use Changes and Forestry activities (LULUCF) under the Kyoto Protocol and the Clean Development Mechanism (SBSTA)

Enjoying a huge potential for mitigation, the Land Use, Land Use changes and Forestry (LULUCF) sector currently has a special regime. This was outlined by the Marrakesh Accords (2001) which followed the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. The regime for this sector was then specified in Milan (2003). To avoid repeating the situation where GHG emission reduction targets were decided before the LULUCF regime was determined, a large number of Annex I Parties wished the rules for this sector to be fixed before or at the same time as the adoption of new reduction objectives.

According to the modalities used to account for emissions by sources and removals by sinks in the LULUCF sector, the targets of Annex I Parties will be more or less difficult to achieve. These rules have been a major stumbling block between the Parties for several years. In addition, the Parties are discussing the eligibility of LULUCF activities related to carbon sequestration under project-based mechanisms like the CDM.

4.3.1 Modalities of accounting for emissions by sources and removals by sinks in the LULUCF sector

In terms of the accounting modalities for emissions by sources and removals by sinks in the LULUCF sector, the Parties are focusing on the possibility of applying a cap on emissions and removals in the LULUCF sector and of looking into ways of considering emissions caused by events which are beyond a Party's control (commonly referred to as "force majeure")³¹⁰.

³¹⁰. Decision 6/CMP.3 page 22

In Durban, the Parties adopted the definitions, modalities, rules and guidelines relating to the LULUCF for the second commitment period. Clarity on these points will assist the Annex I Parties to state their emission reduction ambition level for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol.

The Durban Decision stipulates that there should be a mandatory requirement for Annex I Parties, for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, to account for emissions from forest management³¹¹. Accounting for emissions from forest management, which was voluntary during the Protocol's first commitment period, will be mandatory during the second commitment period. Accounting for emissions caused by natural disturbance events will remain optional, but the countries that accounted for them during the first period will continue to do so for the second.

The reference levels applicable for forest management have also been set to be consistent with the inclusion of carbon reservoirs and the provisions for natural disturbances³¹². The Parties have agreed on a cap corresponding to 3.5% of AAU (excluding the LULUCF activities) on the credits a Party can obtain for forest management activity. Lastly, a flexible accounting approach has been agreed.

In Durban, the Parties launched a LULUCF work programme for the accounting of emissions by sources and for that of removals by sinks to report to the CMP-9 in 2014. Its purpose is to explore the accounting of emissions and resulting removals more fully.

In Doha, the Parties should continue their work on identifying how to improve the exhaustiveness of accounting for emissions caused by forests, either per activity or per land use³¹³.

4.3.2 Eligibility of LULUCF activities related to carbon capture for project-based mechanisms

Given the many related social and environmental advantages and their extensive mitigation potential, some LULUCF activities linked to carbon capture have featured in discussions on their eligibility for project-based mechanisms, including the CDM, such as the restoration of marshes, carbon capture in soils from less ploughing or the

311. Decision 2/CMP.7

312. The reference levels applicable to forest management have been set taking the following elements into account: a) removals or emissions resulting from forest management as they appear from greenhouse gas inventories and relevant historical data; b) structure by age class; c) forest management activities already undertaken; d) planned forest management activities on the assumption of an unchanged policy; e) treatment continuity where forest management was dealt with during the first commitment period; and f) need to exclude removals in accordance with paragraph 1 of Decision 16/CMP.1.

313. Submissions: 10 September 2012.

use of "biochar" (charcoal produced from the biomass). In the first commitment period, the only eligible carbon capture activities are afforestation and reforestation.

In Durban, the Parties launched work programmes under the SBSTA:

- A work programme to examine and, if appropriate, prepare and recommend modalities and procedures for the potential use of additional lands, changes in use and forestry activities by virtue of the clean development mechanism for consideration of the draft decision at the CMP9;
- A work programme to examine and, if appropriate, prepare and recommend modalities and procedures for the alternative approaches to respond to the risk of non-permanence³¹⁴ under the clean development mechanism for consideration of the draft decision at the CMP9;
- A work programme to prepare and recommend modalities and procedures to apply the concept of additionality for consideration of the draft decision at the CMP9.

These issues will not be decided in Doha, but the Parties could already address the inclusion of new forestry activities as CDM projects. In addition, the Parties are invited to study the development of new mechanisms to take account of the non-permanence of CER in forestry CDM projects³¹⁵.

The main issues relating to the LULUCF under the Kyoto Protocol and the CDM

- How can the exhaustiveness of accounting for emissions caused by forest be further improved?
- What new forestry activities should be included as CDM projects?
- Should LULUCF activities related to carbon capture for project-based mechanisms be made eligible? If appropriate, what would be the modalities and procedures?
- Should the decisions on the LULUCF definitions, modalities, rules and guidelines be revised?

314. Permanence (what becomes of a carbon credit if the wood on which it is based has burned?) : risk of non-permanence: the definition of permanence is clarified, namely a sequestration of one hundred years.

315. Submissions: 10 September 2012.

5. CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES

The cross-cutting issues relate to both the Kyoto Protocol and the Convention, such as the response measures (Section 5.2) and capacity building (Section 5.3), or cover several negotiation issues such as measuring, reporting and verifying (MRV) (Section 5.1), research and systematic observation (Section 5.4) and gender (Section 5.5).

5.1 Measuring, reporting and verifying requirements (MRV)

To improve the transparency of mitigation actions and the international support provided and received, the Bali Action Plan acknowledged in 2007 the need for these actions and the support to be "measurable, reportable and verifiable" (MRV)³¹⁶. The MRV requirements refer to a process during which factual information is provided, examined and verified to monitor how the Parties are complying with their voluntary commitments (developing countries) or carrying out their obligations (developed countries)³¹⁷. Following the Bali Action Plan, the Parties agreed that the MRV requirements should apply to:

- mitigation commitments of developed countries;
- mitigation actions by developing countries;
- provision and use of support to develop mitigation actions by developing countries.

The MRV are a cross-cutting component used to monitor individual and collective progress of Parties to achieve the objective of the Convention³¹⁸. They play a special role in the link between the developing country action and the support for these actions, for they boost mutual trust between the countries and transparency in the actions by countries.

316. Paragraphs 1 (b) (i) and (ii) of the Bali Plan

317. Measuring means the actual physical measurement. The reporting of data is a chance for the other players to assess the activities of Parties thanks to data that seek to be the most reliable and transparent possible, in accordance with a specific reporting format. Verification means that the stated data are checked independently for greater exactness.

318. Mucci, M., 2012

In Cancún, the main parameters of MRV rules for GHG emissions of countries, their actions and the financing were established but significant details still have to be defined. A certain amount of progress was made in Durban on the MRV processes.

In Durban, the Parties adopted the guidelines for reporting and verifying actions of countries through biennial reports for the developed countries and biennial update reports for the developing countries³¹⁹. The verification modalities of these reports, by international assessment and review (IAR) for the developed countries and international consultation and analysis (ICA) for the developing countries, were also adopted in Durban. In addition, the Parties launched the nationally appropriate mitigation action (NAMA) register for developing countries. This register will allow reporting of information on voluntary mitigation actions by the developing countries and provide a platform for matching the measures seeking international support and the financing available.

This section studies in succession the issues of the operationalisation of MRV of mitigation commitments by developed countries, the MRV of actions by developing countries and the MRV of the climate financing.

5.1.1 The MRV of mitigation commitments by developed countries

To comply with the MRV requirements, the developed countries must submit national communications to report on progress made in implementing the Convention (submitted and reviewed every four years) and annual GHG inventories which are examined every year to take account of changes in their emissions.

In Cancún, the Parties agreed on the need to improve the information presented in the national communications, such as progress towards the mitigation objectives, financial and technological support and capacity building granted to developing countries through the submission of biennial reports. Since Durban, the developed countries must also submit biennial reports every two years to determine the effectiveness of the mitigation policies and measures they have adopted. These improvements will assist in increasing their transparency and facilitate the comparison of mitigation efforts undertaken by various countries.

The Cancún Agreements also provide for comparing the efforts of developed countries and verifying whether they are complying with their quantified emission reduction objectives. In Durban, the Parties adopted the modalities and procedures for the international assessment and review (IAR) process set up by the COP16 to "promote comparability and increase trust"³²⁰.

319. Decision 2/CP.17

320. Decision 2/CP.17 Annex II

The issues for Doha focus on the national communications of Annex I Parties and the establishment of a common reporting format for biennial reports that should state the level of detail for preparing biennial reports and how the comparability of efforts will be measured. In addition, the Parties should move forward on revising guidelines for the review of biennial reports and national communications, including the review of national inventories, to be in a position to adopt the revised guidelines at the COP19.

Issues relating to national communications from Annex I Parties (SBI)

National communications are submitted in the form of a report in which a national government accounts for the progress made in implementing the Convention. The SBI is responsible for compiling and summarising the information contained in the fifth national communications in order to take account of the state of presentations and verify the transparency and comparability of these communications.

The Annex I Parties had to submit their fifth national communication to the Secretariat by 1 January 2010³²¹. Of the 41 Annex I Parties, forty had submitted their fifth national communications as at 10 January 2010³²². Sixteen Parties submitted them before the date and 24 afterwards.

The fifth national communications of Annex I Parties to the Convention³²³ reveal that, in the period 1990-2008, the total aggregated emissions for these Parties had dropped by 6% and by 10.7% if LULUCF is included³²⁴.

- For the countries with economies in transition (see Sheet 6), the GHG emissions excluding and including the LULUCF dropped by 36.7% and 49.7% respectively.
- For the non-transition countries, the GHG emissions excluding and including the LULUCF increased by 8% and 8.4% respectively.

In Doha, the Parties will examine the fifth national communications of Annex I Parties to the Convention and the compilation and summary of additional information contained in these communications.

In terms of examining the presentations of fifth national communications, the issue is how to ensure that the Parties comply with the agreed deadlines for the submission of communications. In terms of compiling and summarising additional

321. Decision 10/CP.13

322. Turkey is the only country not to have submitted its fifth national communication. See http://unfccc.int/national_reports/annex_i_natcom/submitted_natcom/items/4903.php.

323. Except Turkey

324. FCCC/SBI/2012/INF.6, FCCC/SBI/2011/INF.1 & Add. 1-2 and FCCC/SBI/2011/INF.2

information contained in these communications, the issue is to enhance the exhaustiveness, comparability and level of detail of information communicated³²⁵. Certain countries would like the national communications of Annex I Parties to contain more detail on the reduction of emissions and fear that the emissions of certain countries that are not countries with economies in transition are "camouflaged" by the drop in their emissions.

In Durban, the SBI should submit a draft decision for adoption by the CMP-8. The draft decision prepared in Bonn on compiling and summarising additional information contained in the first national communications requests the Annex I Parties to continue their reporting efforts and to include the necessary additional information in their sixth national communications³²⁶. The SBI will also table a draft decision on the state of presentations and the review of communications that asks the Annex I Parties to submit their future national communications to the Secretariat in compliance with the deadlines set by the Parties³²⁷.

Work programme on the revision of guidelines for the examination of biennial reports and national communications, including the examination of national inventories of developed countries (SBSTA)

In Durban, the Parties decided that the IAR process for biennial reports and national communications, including the examination of national inventories of developed countries, would consist of³²⁸:

- a technical review of biennial reports, where appropriate in conjunction with the annual greenhouse gas (GHG) inventories, and national communications of developed country Parties, which will result in an individual review report for each developed country;
- a multilateral assessment of progress made in reducing emissions.

The overall objectives of the IAR process are to examine the progress made in reducing emissions and assess the support provided to the developing countries. It will be take place under the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI). The IAR will be carried out every two years for the biennial reports. The first verification will commence in March 2014. The modalities and procedures will be revised based on the experience acquired during the first round of IAR, at the latest in 2016. To carry out this

325. FCCC/SBI/2012/L.16

326. FCCC/SBI/2012/L.15/Add.1

In accordance with the guidelines for the reporting of additional information to be provided under paragraph 2 of Article 7 of the Kyoto Protocol.

327. FCCC/SBI/2012/L.16/Add.1, Decisions 9/CP.16 and 2/CP.17

328. Decision 2/CP.17 Annex II

review, a work programme has been initiated under the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) with a view to terminating the work at the COP19³²⁹.

The Parties should then state whether the IAR could culminate in an examination of maintaining developed countries' compliance with GHG reduction obligations, which is not currently the case. They should also state the usefulness of the IAR in assessing progress in achieving objectives. The Parties should define the planned time frames for the activities envisaged and the main components in revising guidelines for the review. The Parties agree on the need to provide for a rational, effective and practical review process that is not too much of a burden for the Parties or the Secretariat. The G-77/China is concerned by the slowness of progress on the guidelines for reviewing biennial reports, national communications and annual inventories of developed countries³³⁰.

In Bonn, the SBSTA requested the Secretariat to prepare a technical document summarising the current review process under the Convention and the experience acquired by the Secretariat in coordinating review of national communications and annual greenhouse gas inventories of Annex I Parties for the SBSTA-37³³¹. This report will assist the Parties in grasping the key issues on which they should decide.

Work programme on a common presentation framework for the "UNFCCC guidelines for drawing up biennial reports of developed country Parties" (SBSTA)

In Durban, the Parties adopted guidelines that should be used to prepare the first biennial reports³³². Decision 2/CP.17 states that the developed countries will present their first biennial reports to the Secretariat on 1 January 2014. The second and subsequent reports should be presented two years after the date on which a full national communication is expected (2016 and 2020). The Annex I Parties are also invited to submit their sixth national communication for 1 January 2014³³³. In Durban, the Parties also decided to introduce a work programme under the SBSTA to develop a common presentation framework for the biennial reports of developed countries in order to adopt this format at the COP18 in Doha.

In Bonn, in May 2012, the SBSTA commenced the review of the work programme for developing a common tabular format for electronic reporting of information in accordance with the biennial reporting guidelines for developed countries adopted in Durban³³⁴ with a view to the adoption of the format by the COP18.

329. FCCC/SBSTA/2012/L.13

330. IISD, 2012a.

331. FCCC/SBSTA/2012/L.13

332. Annex I to Decision 2/CP.17 "UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country Parties"

333. Decision 2/CP.17

334. Annex I to Decision 2/CP.17

Certain Parties wish to determine which information should feature in the table, whilst others do not wish to renegotiate the type of information and the level of detail to be included in the reports as they feel these questions were resolved when guidelines were adopted in Durban³³⁵. These Parties prefer to concentrate on the structure of information to be presented and mainly on whether a report in a common tabular format for electronic reporting of information is the most appropriate way of accounting for national arrangements³³⁶. Certain Parties see the use of tables as providing a clear, transparent structure for communication information.

In Bonn, the SBSTA asked the Secretariat to organise a workshop on the common tabular format in October 2012³³⁷.

5.1.2 The MRV of mitigation actions by developing countries

The Cancún Agreements state that the nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMA) supported internationally will be subject to the international MRV requirements, whilst the NAMA supported nationally will be subject to the national MRV requirements. In order to expand the information supplied in the national communications about mitigation actions and their effects and the support received, the Cancún Agreements request the developing countries to submit biennial update reports to complete and update the information contained in the national communications. Today, the national communications and biennial update reports (BUR) are the main reports used for reporting on NAMA.

Since Cancún, the countries have been working on the operationalisation of processes contributing to the MRV of NAMA, made up of the national communications, the BUR and an international consultation and analysis process (ICA). The national communications must henceforth be submitted every four years. To achieve this, the developing countries receive technical support from the Consultative Group of Experts (CGE) on national communications of non-Annex I Parties, whose mandate must be discussed further in Doha, in addition to financial support.

In Durban, the Parties adopted the guidelines for BUR of developing countries. The first biennial update reports should be submitted by December 2014 then every two years, except for the LDC and the SIDS. The Durban Decision also stipulates that, by using the guidelines, the developing countries should take account of their development priorities, objectives, capacities and national circumstances. The guidelines should be used as a basis for providing advice to the operational entity of the financial mechanism regarding the financing of the preparation of biennial update reports. Increased support must be granted by the developed countries for the preparation of biennial reports and to update them based on integral financing of agreed costs.

335. Annex I to Decision 2/CP.17

336. See: http://unfccc.int/documentation/submissions_from_parties/items/5901.php

337. FCCC/SBSTA/2012/L.11

The ICA is a verification process. It aims to increase the transparency and effects of mitigation actions by developing countries. In Durban, the Parties also adopted the modalities and guidelines for the ICA process³³⁸. The first ICA will take place in the six months following the submission of the first biennial update reports. The ICA take place at the same intervals as the biennial update reports. Subsequently, the ICA will take place according to respective capacities and national circumstances and will be especially flexible for the SIDS and the LDC³³⁹. The developed countries must provide new financial resources to cover the integral cost agreed so that the reports required by the ICA can be presented. The modalities and procedures will be revised based on the experience acquired by the implementation of the first ICA, at the latest in 2017.

In Doha, the Parties will study the mandate of the CGE (Section 1.1.2.1) and should provide guidance to the Global Environment Facility (GEF) to ensure the provision of financial resources to cover the costs incurred in preparing national communications. In addition, they should define the composition, modalities and procedures of the ICA team of technical experts. The SBSTA should prepare the guidelines for the national MRV of NAMA supported nationally.

The mandate of the Consultative Group of Experts on national communications for non-Annex I Parties (CGE)

In June 2012, 142 of the 150 non-Annex I Parties had submitted their initial national communication and 74 of them had also submitted their second communication³⁴⁰. Mexico, Uruguay and Korea have submitted their third national communication. Only Mexico has submitted its fourth national communication (in 2009).

The COP established the CGE on the national communications to support the countries in the process of preparing the developing countries' national communications³⁴¹. In 2012, the Parties underlined the progress made in implementing the CGE work programme³⁴². The CGE duration and mandate will be examined in Doha. The SBSTA has prepared a draft decision³⁴³.

The issues focus on the need to provide resources for the CGE work programme and to prolong the Group's mandate. The Parties are dithering over the length of the extension period of the mandate (until 2015, 2016 or 2017) and over whether this

338. Decision 2/CP.17 Annex IV

339. The SIDS and the LDC can undergo an ICA as a group of Parties, at their discretion.

340. See: http://unfccc.int/national_reports/non-annex_i_natcom/submitted_natcom/items/653.php

341. Decision 8/CP.5

342. FCCC/SBI/2012/2, FCCC/SBI/2012/12-14 and FCCC/SBI/2012/MISC.0.6

343. FCCC/SBI/2012/L.22

group should become a permanent expert group within the Convention. In terms of the expert group mandate, the countries are wondering whether this group should provide technical support or support in preparing national communications only or also in preparing BUR and whether this support should also consist of capacity building.

The developing countries would like the CGE work programme to continue, that it be extended to the BUR and that it include capacity building activities such as regional workshops organised by the CGE.

Additional guidance for the GEF on the provision of financial resources to cover all costs incurred to prepare national communications of non-Annex I Parties (SBI)

In Bali, the G-77/China and the Small Island Developing States (SISD) oppose the application of the GEF resource allocation framework (RAF) to the national communications of non-Annex I Parties as they feel it is lacking flexibility. The Parties decided to give the GEF additional directives on this question and asked, among other things, that the GEF provide sufficient financial resources to compensate fully for costs incurred for the national communications in the developing countries^{344, 345}.

This demand was reiterated during the COP14 and COP15 and the GEF provided information responding to these guidelines. In its report on the 5th replenishment cycle (2010), the GEF reiterated its commitment to supporting the preparation of national communications and envisaged an increase in financial resources and technical support, mainly through providing analysis tools and training. The GEF notes that the non-Annex I Parties frequently come up against questions connected to emission data and factors³⁴⁶. The GEF has also provided information on the implications of new ways of allocating resources to finance national communications from non-Annex I Parties - the System for Transparent Allocation of Resources (STAR) (see Box 7)³⁴⁷.

344. By virtue of Article 12.1 of the Convention.

345. Decision 7/CP.13

346. GEF, 2010d.

347. FCCC/SBI/2010/10

BOX 7.

THE GEF RESOURCE ALLOCATION FRAMEWORK (RAF) AND SYSTEM FOR TRANSPARENT ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES (STAR)

In 2005, the GEF Council adopted the Resource Allocation Framework (RAF)³⁴⁸ to make the allocation of its resources more predictable and transparent. The RAF has been operational since the 4th GEF replenishment cycle in July 2006 and is applied to projects relating to biodiversity and climate change.

The GEF specifies the amount of financial resources an eligible country can expect to receive at the beginning of each four-year replenishment period. This is subject to a mid-term review. Each eligible country receives a minimum allocation of US\$1 million and a maximum equivalent to 15% of available resources. The GEF uses two indicators to determine the exact amount allocated to each country within this envelope, i.e.:

- the GEF **potentiality index**, which measures the potential of a given country to generate environmental benefits on a world scale; and
- the GEF **result index**, which evaluates a country's capacity, policies and practices in order to determine its potential to execute the GEF projects successfully.

As the DAR was deemed inflexible and was criticised for its lack of predictability, it was replaced by the System for Transparent Allocation of Resources (STAR) when the 5th GEF replenishment cycle was set up in July 2010 (GEF-5)³⁴⁹. STAR is now the mechanism used by the GEF to determine the amount of resources a given country can claim during the period covered by a GEF resource replenishment. The STAR has been in force since July 2010 for the GEF-5 period. It applies to biodiversity, climate change and land degradation.

Under STAR, all countries are granted an allocation in each of these areas to prepare projects. These individual allocations may not be less than US\$2 million in the area of climate change.

An index based on the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is added to the two existing indicators to determine the exact amount allocated to each country. This index is weighted so that allocations to countries at the bottom of the per capita GDP table are increased by about 12% (compared with the allocation if the index did not exist) and reduced by 6% for countries at the top of the table.

STAR is also an improvement over the DAR by eliminating the "50% rule", which prohibited the countries from using more than 50% of their indicative allocation during the first two years of the GEF-4³⁵⁰.

348. GEF, 2005.

349. For more information on STAR, see: http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/publication/GEF_STAR_FR.pdf

350. GEF, 2010d.

The issue for Doha is the financing available for the national communications of non-Annex I Parties and the biennial update reports. Certain developing countries are concerned over the integral financing of agreed costs³⁵¹.

In Bonn, in May 2012, the Parties noted information provided by the GEF on the financial support provided and GEF guidance on the financial policies of biennial update reports submitted by the developing countries³⁵². In addition, the SBSTA recommends, among other things, that the COP18 asks the GEF to make available support to developing countries for the preparation of their biennial update reports and encourages the GEF to continue to ensure that sufficient financial resources are provided to meet the agreed full costs incurred by developing countries in order to meet their communication obligations³⁵³.

Identification of technical experts for the international consultation and analysis (ICA) (SBI)

In Durban, the COP17 invited the Parties to express their views on the composition, modalities and procedures of the team of technical experts for the international consultation and analysis (ICA)³⁵⁴. In 2012, the SBI noted the need for an efficient, profitable and practical ICA process that is not too much of a burden for the Parties and the Secretariat. In Doha, the Parties should finalise the draft conclusions prepared by the SBI during 2012³⁵⁵.

The Parties underline the need to harmonise the review process for national communications and biennial update reports from developing countries in order to generate an efficient system, mainly in terms of cost³⁵⁶. The stumbling blocks are the need to link this question to the provision of financial resources and to the capacity building for the implementation of this process. Certain developing countries are finding it difficult to meet the MRV requirements of the Convention. Another issue is the body of experts that will perform the ICA. While several developing countries would like the CGE to carry out the ICA on condition of capacity building for experts, several developed countries wish the ICA to be performed by experts on the UNFCCC list. The group of LDC wish a strong body to undertake the ICA of biennial update reports. The G-77/China underlines the need to carry out the ICA in a non-intrusive and non-punitive manner, as it is not a compliance process³⁵⁷.

351. FCCC/SBI/2012/INF.7 and FCCC/SBI/2012/MISC.7

352. <http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/document/GEF%20Policy%20Guidelines%20for%20the%20financing%20of%20Biennial%20update%20reports%20for%20Non-Annex%20Parties.pdf>

353. FCCC/SBI/2012/L.23

354. Paragraph 1 of Decision 2/CP.17, Annex IV

355. FCCC/SBI/2012/L.21

356. FCCC/SBI/2012/MISC.8

357. FCCC/SBI/2012/MISC.6

Defining the general guidelines on measuring, notifying and verifying nationally appropriate mitigating actions undertaken by the developing countries and supported nationally (SBSTA)

The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) is, in accordance with paragraph 37 of Decision 2/CP.17, in charge of preparing general guidelines on measuring, notifying and verifying nationally appropriate mitigating actions undertaken by the developing countries³⁵⁸. These guidelines will aim to guide the developing countries in the MRV process of NAMA that they undertake. They aim to provide the countries with a common base for measuring, reporting and verifying the NAMA supported nationally and to ensure the transparency of these actions. The discussions on this issue have not made much progress, mainly because there is no precise deadline for adopting a decision.

In Doha, during the 37th session of the SBSTA, the Parties should define the next steps in preparing general guidelines on measuring, notifying and verifying nationally appropriate mitigating actions undertaken by the developing countries. The SBSTA is therefore expected to suggest to the COP-18 that discussions continue on this issue after Doha.

5.1.3 Climate financing MRV

The climate financing MRV, or support MRV, is seen as a pledge of transparency thanks to this financing and as a means of obtaining a comprehensible view of financial flows, especially in order to assess their effectiveness in combating climate change. Several countries consider the financing MRV as an important exercise in accountability and trust that makes it possible to assess compliance with the financing commitments of the countries and how they are handed out³⁵⁹.

For example, through solid financing MRV, the developed countries can obtain international recognition for their support and the developing countries can obtain the assurance that the money pledged is indeed allocated. In addition, increased transparency can help the governments and the other stakeholders to assess the magnitude and the type of support provided, identify the trends and outline the possible gaps in certain sectors or regions³⁶⁰.

The question of the transparency of climate financing has appeared in various contexts in negotiations under the Convention. It is also addressed under discussions on the MRV of mitigation actions of developed and developing countries, on the Standing Committee (see Section 3.5), on the register (see Section 3.2) and on early financing (see Section 3.5)³⁶¹.

358. FCCC/SBSTA/2012/L.15

359. WRI, 2011a

360. See: <http://insights.wri.org/news/2012/01/transparency-climate-finance-did-durban-show-us-money>

361. *Ibid.*

A large number of Parties agree that the current reporting systems do not meet the requirements concerning information about financing³⁶². The countries currently have to submit a national communication every four years and biennial reports every two years. The reporting methodologies are not harmonised, which makes it difficult to:

- identify whether the financing is indeed "new and additional";
- compare the financing received and granted due to the absence of common points, calendar differences, exchange rate variations and deadlines;
- provide separate, detailed categories for the mitigation and adaptation projects.

However, since Durban, the biennial reports from the Annex I Parties can be used as a basis for establishing a climate financing verification system³⁶³. The Parties have provided more detail on the information that the developed countries should include in their biennial reports on the granting of climate financing.

The Parties have also provided more details on the information that the developing countries should submit to the Secretariat for the register on the support available for the NAMA (see Section 3.2). In addition, the Durban results recall that the developed countries should provide the developing countries with financial support for the preparation of their biennial reports and the participation in the ICA process.

Financing MRV for the reports of developed countries

The guidelines adopted in Doha on the biennial reports of developed countries represent significant progress on this issue. The biennial reports should include information on the assistance given to developing countries in the form of financial resources, technologies and capacity building³⁶⁴. The guidelines state that the Parties should distinguish between the assistance given for the mitigation and adaptation activities, indicate the capacity building components of these activities, if appropriate.

The Parties did not adopt a common financing submission format in Durban, which restricts the possibilities of comparison and transparency of information provided by virtue of its guidelines³⁶⁵. In Doha, discussions should progress on improving the common reporting framework under the SBSTA for financial, technical and capacity-building assistance in order to strengthen the transparency of the information provided on the support. Such information is in fact crucial as the additionality of the support compared with the public development aid will be assessed on this basis (see Section 3.5).

362. WRI, 2010

363. Annex I to Decision 2/CP.17 "UNFCCC biennial reporting guidelines for developed country Parties"

364. *Ibid.*

365. WRI, 2010

The SBSTA should develop reporting methods for financial information with a view to recommending a decision on this question to the COP20. The issue covers the selection of indicators to quantify the support as "climate support". While the developed countries would like to use the indicators of the Development Aid Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic cooperation and Development (OECD), the developing countries call for the definition of criteria specific to the UNFCCC.

Early climate financing MRV

Under the discussions on financing within the AWG-LCA (see Section 3.5), a certain number of Parties have underlined the lack of transparency regarding early climate financing. The Durban Decisions do not provide guidelines on the level of detail of information to be included in the financial reports on early financing of developed countries. The Parties can improve the transparency of their reports independently. According to the World Resources Institute (WRI), the additional information could focus on several components, especially^{366, 367}:

- the scale of the financing;
- the method used to determine that the financing is new and additional;
- the financing channels, for example the financing allocated through multilateral development banks (MDB);
- the specific political objectives for which the support has been granted (including when the political objectives are multiple or cross-cutting);
- the specific beneficiaries and the geographical distribution;
- the status of the financing (spent or promised);
- the type of financing (subsidy, loan).

Financing MRV for the reports of developing countries

In Cancún, the Parties decided to expand the information provided in the national communications of developing countries on the support received³⁶⁸. In addition, the biennial update reports must contain an update on the mitigation support received.

The guidelines adopted in Durban for establishing BUR state that the developing countries should provide updated information on the constraints and gaps and on the needs for financial resources, technical means and capacity building, the financial resources, technology transfer and the technical support received³⁶⁹.

366. WRI, 2011a

367. Stasio, K., 2011

368. Paragraph 60 of Decision 1/CP.16

369. Decision 2/CP.17 Annex III

Nevertheless, the Durban Decisions have not determined the information that must figure in the reports on the receipt of climate financing. The issue is to tie in the information communicated better between the developed countries and the developing countries. The majority of the Parties underline the need for the beneficiary countries to provide information about the financing received, especially about the use and outcome of this financing. It is agreed that this would promote trust between the beneficiary countries and the contributing countries. The countries propose that the contributing countries and the beneficiary countries use the same form, also known as the "common reporting format", in the reports communicated (e.g. national communications, biennial reports), in order to allow higher comparability between the financing received and granted³⁷⁰.

The relevant institutions for applying the climate financing MRV

The Durban Decisions make provision for the transparency of the climate financing in both the functions of the Standing Committee (see Section 3.5) and of the Adaptation Committee (see Section 3.3). In Doha, the Parties should clarify the roles of these committees for the climate financing MRV and to ensure the coordination and coherence with the institutions under the work programme of the Standing Committee that will be submitted to the COP18 for approval and under the implementation of the Adaptation Committee (see Box 7).

In addition, a major share of the international climate financing is channelled through the multilateral institutions. For example, 56% of the EU early financing (since November 2011) has been channelled through multilateral institutions³⁷¹. Nevertheless, detailed, precise and comparable information on this financing is not available as the multilateral institutions do not send this information to the UNFCCC. To facilitate the implementation of MRV, the reports of multilateral development banks could, for example, be communicated to the UNFCCC for consideration during the IAR and ICA processes³⁷².

The main issues concerning MRV

Developed countries' MRV

- How can compliance with deadlines for the submission of sixth national communications from developed countries be ensured? How can the exhaustiveness, comparability and level of detail of information communicated in these communications be enhanced?

370. WRI, 2011a

371. Stasio, K. et al., 2011

372. *Ibid.*

- Could the revision of IAR guidelines culminate in an examination of maintaining developed countries' compliance with GHG reduction obligations? What should be the main components of the guidelines revision that could be used to assess progress in achieving objectives?
- Is the common tabular reporting method the most appropriate for accounting for national arrangements? Is it important to determine which information should figure in the table or to consider that these questions have already been resolved by adopting guidelines in Durban and to concentrate on the structure of information to be presented?

Developing countries' MRV

- What should be the duration and mandate of the CGE and how should resources be provided for the CGE work programme? Should the CGE provide support for the preparation of BUR and build up capacities?
- How can the integral financing for the national communications of non-Annex I Parties and the biennial update reports be guaranteed?
- Should the team of technical experts for the ICA be composed of the CGE or experts from the UNFCCC list?
- How should general guidelines on the MRV of NAMA be prepared?

Climate financing MRV:

- How can the common reporting frameworks of reports from developed countries for the support be improved to enhance the transparency of information transmitted?
- How can the transparency of reports on early financing be improved?
- Should a common reporting format be used for the reports on financing received, its use and outcome?
- How can the roles of institutions be clarified in the monitoring and review of climate financing to ensure the coordination and coherence with the institutions and the MRV processes?

5.2 Response measures

The response measures basically cover the GHG emission reduction actions, but they also include actions to mitigate the problem of climate change at source, such as those encouraging the development of clean technologies. These measures are likely to have an adverse effect on certain economic sectors - oil, for example. In this respect, the Annex I Parties to the Convention are required to fulfil their commitments by

reducing the adverse social, environmental and economic consequences of climate change and/or response measures for developing countries, especially the most vulnerable countries^{373, 374}.

The Convention states that the Parties take into consideration in the implementation of their commitments the specific needs and concerns of developing countries resulting from the impact of the implementation of response measures³⁷⁵. The Kyoto Protocol invites the Parties to attempt to minimise the negative economic, social and environmental impacts on the other Parties, especially for the developing countries³⁷⁶.

In Durban, the CMP7 decided to broaden the understanding of potential consequences of response measures, more especially through national communications, national and international institutions involved and the work by the UNFCCC bodies. In addition, a Forum on the response measures was created. The response measures are therefore dealt with under the Convention and under the Forum that is held by the subsidiary bodies.

5.2.1 Economic and social consequences of response measures under the AWG-LCA

The COP17 in Durban established a Forum to implement the work programme on the impact of the implementation of response measures that will be run jointly by the SBSTA and the SBI³⁷⁷. The AWG-LCA deals with the role of this Forum and the issue of response measures taken unilaterally by a country (unilateral measures) to combat climate change.

The Parties have different opinions on determining whether the work on the response measures should continue. A certain number of Parties, including India, believe that the AWG-LCA has not yet fully taken into account the response measures under the Bali Action Plan³⁷⁸. These Parties are calling for the creation of a group to examine unresolved questions relating to the response measures with clear timetables³⁷⁹. Most developed countries stress that such a space already exists thanks to the Forum and that the examination of response measures has been completed within the AWG-LCA³⁸⁰.

373. By virtue of Article 3.14 of the Kyoto Protocol.

374. The targeted developing countries and the most vulnerable countries are designated in Articles 4.8 and 4.9 of the Convention, respectively.

375. Article 4.8 of the Convention.

376. Articles 2.3 and 3.14 of the Kyoto Protocol.

377. Decision 8/CP.17

378. Paragraph 1 (b) (vi) of the Bali Action Plan.

379. FCCC/AWGLCA/2011/CRP.39

380. See: http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg-lca/application/pdf/20120524_rm.pdf

As for the role of the Forum, the stumbling block is whether it is a place for broadening the discussions or for dealing with all the response measure issues and for making decisions. Some Parties have supported the idea that the Forum implements a specific work programme and does not provide the space required for the policy decisions. Certain Parties have stressed that the Forum is the central place for continuing the discussions on the response measures. These Parties believe that any question on the response measures could be raised by the Parties under the Forum if they wished.

In terms of the unilateral measures, certain Parties, like Saudi Arabia, China, Kuwait, Venezuela, Argentina and India, consider that these measures are taken with the principal objective of combating climate change and that the UNFCCC is therefore the appropriate forum for dealing with these unilateral measures. Other Parties, like the EU, Singapore, Mexico, Australia and the United States, have stressed that the questions relating to the unilateral trade measures must not be dealt with by the UNFCCC process but by the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the more competent body on these questions, given the risks of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination or disguised trade restriction constituted by these measures.

In Bangkok, the Parties wondered whether the text should be ready for a decision in Doha and over the identification of the most relevant body to deal with the question of unilateral measures.

5.2.2 The SBI and SBSTA operationalise the modalities and main themes of the work programme of the Forum on response measures

The Forum set up under the SBSTA and SBI is aiming to reach a work programme on the response measures³⁸¹. The COP17 adopted the modalities of the operationalisation of the work programme and organising the Forum on the response measures in Durban³⁸².

The Durban Decision created a permanent Forum for discussing how to reduce the negative impacts of climate change on the countries and for reducing the adverse effects of response measures as much as possible. The discussions throughout the Forum's first year in existence have focused on the operationalisation of modalities and themes for the Forum's work programme.

A first meeting was scheduled during the Bonn intersession in May 2012. The G77/China has called for the preparation of a set of clear modalities for implementing the Forum and the work programme, including: the allocation of specific tasks and activities for the rest of the year and a 2013 timetable for examining specific needs

381. Paragraph 93 of Decision 1/CP.16

382. Decision 8/CP.17

and concerns of developing countries³⁸³. Australia considers that the work should basically cover the main points of convergence on the questions to be addressed in the work programme.

In Bonn, the Parties prepared a draft decision containing a work plan to guide the work of the Forum³⁸⁴. The main work themes are:

- Sharing information and expertise;
- Impact analysis;
- Enhancement of knowledge on the transition process towards a low-carbon economy;
- Sharing experience and discussions on the opportunities for economic transformation and diversification;
- Economic modelling and socio-economic trends;
- Just transition of the workforce and creation of decent jobs;
- Cooperation on the response strategies.

Response measure issues

- Should discussions continue within the AWG-LCA? Is the Forum a place for broadening the discussions or a place for addressing all response measure issues and for taking decisions?
- Should all the unilateral measures be dealt with within the Convention or can the unilateral trade measures be dealt with in specialised forums, like that of the WTO?
- What should be the modalities and main themes of the work programme of the Forum on response measures?

5.3 Capacity building

Capacity-building in developing countries is mentioned in several paragraphs in the Bali Action Plan dealing with mitigation, adaptation, technology development and transfer and financing³⁸⁵. Capacity building aims to develop the ability of a nation "to assess and resolve the crucial problems posed by political choices and the application of various development formulae, by assessing at their fair value the

383. IISD, 2012b.

384. FCCC/SBSTA/2012/L.18-FCCC/SBI/2012/L.25

385. In paragraphs 1b)ii), 1c)i) and 1e)vi) respectively.

possibilities and the limitations of their repercussions on the environment along with the needs that the population of a given country perceives as being theirs"³⁸⁶.

Capacity-building activities are intended to help developing countries and countries with economies in transition to participate fully in the application of the Convention and the processes resulting from the Protocol³⁸⁷. This is a cross-cutting subject to which several of the COP and CRP decisions refer³⁸⁸. The Marrakech Accords in 2010 established two frameworks for capacity building: Framework for capacity building in developing countries³⁸⁹ and the Framework for capacity building in countries with economies in transition³⁹⁰. During the CMP1 in 2005, the Parties decided that these frameworks would apply equally to the capacity-building activities under the Kyoto Protocol³⁹¹.

To improve the monitoring and examination of the effectiveness of capacity-building activities, the Parties set up in Durban the "Durban Forum for the in-depth review of capacity building"³⁹². This institutional device aims to facilitate the sharing of experiences of Parties and all players involved in the capacity building of developing countries (mainly under mitigation and adaptation measures). It will allow the exchange of lessons learnt and good practices regarding the activities set up in the developing countries. Similarly, this Forum will be used to determine how the monitoring and examination of the effectiveness of capacity-building activities can be improved.

Capacity building is addressed in several discussion forums within the UNFCCC. The AWG-LCA has the mandate to enhance the capacity-building action whilst the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) implements the Framework for capacity building in countries with economies in transition under the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol. In addition, the SBI implements Article 6 of the Convention on education, training and awareness-raising.

386. Definition of the United Nations Environment and Development Conference in 1992.

387. By virtue, in particular, of Article 4.5 of the Convention and Article 10 (e) of the Kyoto Protocol.

388. For example, capacity-building activities are very closely linked with the financing mechanisms. Capacity building is especially at the heart of the Global Environment Facility projects.

389. Decision 2/CP.7

390. Decision 3/CP.7

391. Decision 29/CMP.1 and Decision 30/CMP.1

392. Decision 2/CP.17, Section VI

5.3.1 Enhanced capacity-building action under the AWG-LCA

In Durban, the Parties set up the Durban Forum to discuss capacity building in depth in order to make it easier to monitor and review its effectiveness. The SBI is responsible for organising the sessions of this Forum every year. Similarly, the Parties agreed in Durban that the financial resources for enhanced capacity building in the developing countries should be provided by the Annex I Parties to the Convention and by the other Parties when able to do so³⁹³. These financial resources could be provided through financial mechanisms or through various bilateral or regional agreements and other multilateral channels.

Under the AWG-LCA, the discussions are henceforth focusing on the relevance of it continuing to deal with capacity building. Some Parties, like the United States, the EU and other developed countries, believe that there is no need for the AWG-LCA to consider capacity building, as the agreement reached in Durban on creating the Durban Forum on capacity building has answered the questions of substance raised previously by the Parties on this issue³⁹⁴. These Parties believe that the Durban Forum, which met for the first time in Bonn in May 2012, is a valid platform for informative presentations and structured discussions. They believe that these discussions highlight the cross-cutting nature of capacity building in a variety of themed domains, opening the way to redoubling efforts in implementing capacity building. These Parties recognise that a specific section of the Durban Forum, dedicated to monitoring and examining the effectiveness of capacity building, has highlighted the complexity of preparing relevant indicators for capacity building³⁹⁵. Nevertheless, it believes that should it be necessary to examine this or other questions in greater depth, this could be done by the SBI.

However, certain Parties, like the Philippines, whilst confirming the wealth of information that emerged during the first meeting of the Durban Forum, believe that this discussion framework does not allow a valid assessment of the capacity-building service, as it does not include defined indicators. Consequently, for these countries, the identification of performance indicators for monitoring and assessing capacity building is a question that must still be considered under the AWG-LCA. In addition, certain Parties like the G77/China wish the AWG-LCA to deal with the question of setting up an institutional framework and a financial mechanism responsible for ensuring the implementation of fifteen priority areas for capacity building³⁹⁶.

393. Decision 2/CP.17, Section VI

394. See: http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg-lca/application/pdf/20120524_cb.pdf

395. *Ibid.*

396. Listed in Decision 2/CP.7

5.3.2 The SBI implements capacity building under the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol

In Durban, it was decided that the Durban Forum would meet every year within the SBI, during its session, and would be a one-day event involving the Parties along with the experts and competent professionals. The outcome of these discussions will allow the SBSTA to undertake annual monitoring and periodic in-depth reviews of capacity-building implementation in the developing countries.

The Durban Conference also concluded the second in-depth review of the implementation of the Framework for capacity building in developing countries carried out under the SBI. The Decision of the COP17 and the CMP7 invites the Parties to improve the Framework for capacity building in developing countries at system, institutional and individual level³⁹⁷. The third in-depth review of the implementation of the Framework for capacity building in developing countries will commence at the 42nd session of the SBI and end at the COP22. In support of the third in-depth review under the SBI, the Parties are henceforth analysing the progress and effectiveness of the application of the Framework for capacity building in countries with economies in transition under the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol.

The SBI studies the report of the first meeting of the Durban Forum on capacity building

The Durban Forum met for the first time during the 36th session of the SBI on 14-25 May 2012. In Doha, the Parties will examine the summary report of the first meeting of the Durban Forum to operationalise the modalities and themes for the Forum's work programme³⁹⁸.

During the Forum last May, the participants and presenters underlined the need to create a snowball effect, whereby the capacity-building actions become larger and more effective. In terms of the action initiated by the countries, the participants highlighted the importance of implementing projects where they are the most appropriate geographically, by and for the local communities. The monitoring and review issue was marked by a long debate on the effectiveness of quantitative versus qualitative indicators when monitoring and reviewing capacity-building projects³⁹⁹.

397. Consultations, integration of needs in the national development strategies, plans and budgets, coordination, South-South and triangular networking

398. To find out more about the Forum: http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/capacity_building/items/6802.php

399. http://unfccc.int/cooperation_and_support/capacity_building/items/6802.php

The SBI analyses the progress and effectiveness of the application of the framework for capacity building in countries with economies in transition intended to support the third in-depth review

The Conference of the Parties adopted the Framework for capacity building in countries with economies in transition in its Decision 3/CP.7^{400, 401}. In this Decision, the COP gave the framework immediate effect. The developed countries must provide financial and technical support to the purposes of this implementation. Twelve priority domains were defined for this purpose⁴⁰². The CMP1 decided that the Framework for capacity building in transition countries could also apply for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol⁴⁰³.

The SBI-30 decided to produce the application report on the implementation of capacity-building activities in the countries with economies in transition during its 36th session⁴⁰⁴. The Secretariat prepared a synthesis report summarising the information on capacity-building activities undertaken in the countries in transition and listing the needs and gaps. It mainly deal with activities undertaken between 2007 and 2011⁴⁰⁵.

In Doha, the Parties will therefore produce the report on the state of progress of work on the capacity-building activities undertaken in the countries in transition and will study the achievement of the work programme objectives. The Parties have noted that most problems facing the countries in transition are dealt with in the synthesis report and that capacity building requires further work⁴⁰⁶.

In Bonn, a draft decision was prepared for adoption by the COP18/CMP8 that⁴⁰⁷:

- acknowledges that capacity building for countries with economies in transition is essential for them to comply with their obligations under the Convention;
- notes the decision to conclude the third review of the implementation of the Framework for capacity building in countries with economies in transition at the SBI-46;

400. Decision 3/CP.7.

401. In accordance with decision 2/CP.7, which requires an in-depth review of the implementation of the framework at the ninth session, then every five years.

402. Annex C to Decision 3/CP.7

403. Decision 30/CMP

404. Decisions 3/CP.7 and 30/CMP.1

405. FCCC/SBI/2012/10

406. FCCC/SBI/2012/MISC.5

407. FCCC/SBI/2012/L.4

- invites the parties and relevant organisations to submit to the Secretariat, by February 2016 at the latest, information on how they have implemented capacity-building activities;
- requests the Secretariat to prepare a synthesis report based on these submissions.

5.3.3 The SBI implements Article 6 of the Convention

The SBI implements Article 6 of the Convention on education, training and awareness-raising. The Parties wish to adopt a work programme on this question in Doha as a successor to the Nairobi Work Programme. The discussions are focusing on a draft text presented by the G-77/China on the recommendations to be examined for the Doha Work Programme and the role of the Secretariat and intergovernmental organisations⁴⁰⁸. The La Jeunesse and Climate Action Network NGOs and local governments and municipal authorities recommend that certain questions should be strengthened in the text, mainly the question of gender equality, local communities and the specific reporting requirements⁴⁰⁹.

The SBI has prepared a draft conclusion, in which it undertakes to continue examining this point in Doha, based on the draft text figuring in the Annex, whereby the Parties⁴¹⁰:

- decide to adopt the eight-year Doha Work Programme in accordance with Article 6 of the Convention, as contained in the appendix to this Decision;
- decide to review the work programme in 2020, with an intermediate review of progress in 2016;
- request the SBI to enhance the work on Article 6 of the Convention by organising an annual in-session dialogue.

The main issues for capacity development

- Should capacity building continue to be dealt with within the AWG-LCA or is the Durban Forum sufficient for dealing with questions of substance relating to this issue, especially the assessment indicators?
- Should new capacity-building mechanisms be created or should there be recourse to existing institutions? If new institutions were created, what would be their functions? What would their links be with the financial mechanism?

408. FCCC/SBI/2012/3 and FCCC/SBI/2011/7.

409. FCCC/SBI/2012/Misc.4

410. FCCC/SBI/2012/L.26

- The SBI examines the summary report of the first meeting of the Durban Forum to operationalise the modalities and themes for the Forum's work programme.
- The SBI produces the report on the state of progress of work and studying the achievement of the objectives of the work programme and the application of the framework for capacity building in countries with economies in transition intended to support the third in-depth review.
- The SBI defines the Doha Work Programme on Article 6 of the Convention.

5.4 Research and systematic observation

According to the Convention, the Parties have to encourage and support their co-operation, research work, systematic observation and the creation of data archives that allow for a better understanding of the phenomenon of climate change and the consequences of different response measures⁴¹¹. To achieve this, the SBSTA cooperates with, among others, the Global Climate Observing System (GCOS) and other partner bodies, such as the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO), the Committee of Earth Observation Satellites (CEOS) and the Global Terrestrial Observing System (GTOS). The SBSTA considers GCOS and GTOS execution plans on a regular basis.

The COP17 in Durban decided that the dialogue carried out on the research between the existing institutions and research programmes should continue and encouraged the Parties to use this dialogue as a forum and to take stock of progress in research since last year.

For its 36th session in Bonn, the SBSTA invited the Parties and the programmes and regional and international climate change research bodies to communicate data on the technical and scientific aspects of emissions by sources, removals by sinks and reservoirs of all the greenhouse gases, including emissions and removals linked to the coastal and marine ecosystems like the mangroves, intertidal salt marshes, wetlands and grasslands.

Based on these contributions, the Parties must identify the specific themes to be addressed by the dialogue on research. The Parties were unable to reach agreement on this issue⁴¹². The discussions will continue in Doha under the SBSTA-37 based on a draft decision that contains the following items⁴¹³:

- The Global Climate Observing System, in conjunction with the Secretariat, will prepare by early 2015 a third report to determine whether the systems in place

411. By virtue of Article 4.1 (g) and Article 5 of the Convention.

412. FCCC/SBSTA/2012/MISC.2 and Add.1 and 2, FCCC/SBSTA/2012/MISCs. 3-4

413. FCCC/SBSTA/2012/L.17

are adequate and to set out a new work plan to support the work of the Convention;

- This new work plan could in particular assist the Secretariat of the Global Climate Observing System to study the needs of observation in adaptation;
- The SBSTA pointed out that the Secretariat could play a more emphatic role in monitoring carbon flows.

The issues of research and systematic observation

- What themes should be addressed by the dialogue on research?

5.5 Gender in climate negotiations

When considering gender applied to climate change, it seems that not only do men and women contribute differently to the causes of climate change, but they also experience its effects differently and, when they have a choice, recommend different solutions for counteracting its consequences⁴¹⁴.

According to the UNDP, "gender is the social and cultural construction of feminine and masculine roles and relationships between men and women (...). Equality between men and women does not imply that men and women become identical, but that they have equal possibilities and chances in existence. The importance given to equality between men and women and to the empowerment of women does not presuppose a particular model of equality for all societies and cultures, but conveys the concern to give men and women equal chances to choose what should be understood by equality between men and women and to allow them to work on it in concerted fashion"⁴¹⁵.

Women are normally more vulnerable than men to the effects of climate change, for they form the majority of the world's poor. For example, natural disasters, on average, kill far more young women than men and this gap increases as the natural disasters intensify⁴¹⁶. Women are also affected disproportionately by climate change due to contextual inequalities like unequal access to resources and decision-making processes.

The UNFCCC and its Protocol, the Kyoto Protocol, does not include a reference to gender. The Parties addressed issues about gender within the negotiations during the COP13 in Bali in 2007. The Bali Action Plan opened up an entry point

414. World Bank, 2011.

415. See: http://www.pnud.org.ma/guide/concepts_cadre_travail/con-concepts-integration.html

416. Neumayer, E. and Plümper, T. (2007).

for the social issues and gender by putting the impact of climate change in the developing countries on the agenda. Since Bali, international NGO networks on gender and climate change have been set up to ensure that more attention is given to incorporating the consideration of gender in the issues. In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Finland has set up a fund to allow women in developing countries to be included in national delegations, which has improved the scope and visibility of women in the UNFCCC sessions. Thus, in 2009 (COP15), women accounted for 9% of heads of delegation and 27% of delegations, whilst in 2011 (COP17), women represented 14% of heads of delegation and 29% of delegations⁴¹⁷.

Thanks to the efforts by the delegations of Haiti, Finland, Ghana, Iceland, Malawi and Nepal, among others, an increasing number of references to gender have appeared in the negotiation texts. These references mainly assist in recognising the contribution and the special vulnerability of women, the need to achieve a balance of genders within the various committees and to take into account the aspects and considerations of gender in appropriate issues like capacity building, adaptation and technology transfer so that these actions are guided by gender-sensitive approaches and criteria. The Cancún Agreements recognise that gender and equality of the sexes are among effective mitigation and adaptation measures. There are eight gender references in seven section of the Cancún text and in the decisions of the results of the two UNFCCC subsidiary bodies, the SBI and the SBSTA.

Several Durban Decisions refer to women and to gender⁴¹⁸:

- the Decision on the guidelines for the national adaptation plans;
- the Decision on the Nairobi Work Programme;
- the Decision on the information systems on the reduction of emissions from deforestation and degradation of forests (REDD+);
- the Decision on the Green Climate Fund: for the first time, a climate financing mechanism provides for gender aspects, including in its objectives and its guiding principles, its operating modalities and in the composition of its Board and Secretariat⁴¹⁹;
- the Decision on the Adaptation Committee;
- the Decision on the Standing Committee for Financing;
- the Decision on the Climate Technology Centre and Network whose mandate includes taking into account considerations of gender to widen access to the climate

417. WEDO 2012

418. <http://www.wedo.org/wp-content/uploads/Gender-Equality-Language-in-Durban-Outcomes1.pdf>

419. <http://www.unwomen.org/2012/01/new-climate-agreement-increases-gender-equality-commitments/>

technologies. Gender sensitivity is for example taken into account in the selection process for a host body for the CTCN⁴²⁰.

In Doha, the Parties could consider incorporating gender into a large number of issues. In terms of the negotiations under the Durban Platform, the Women and Gender Constituency warns against "exacerbating gender inequalities" and calls for "the integration of human and social dimensions in the climate change negotiations". The Constituency has also called for a workshop on the justice of genders under the ADP⁴²¹ (Section 2). The Women and Gender Constituency underlines the need to consider gender equality for capacity building in the countries with economies in transition. In addition, it calls for a mandatory report on gender-sensitive capacity building for the 4th review of the implementation of the Framework for capacity building in countries with economies in transition (Section 5.2). The Parties are also considering the aspects of gender in the composition of the technology mechanism Advisory Board⁴²².

Under the SBI, the issues of gender integration are considered in the discussions on Article of the Convention on education, training and awareness-raising. The non-governmental organisations recommend that the gender-related questions are underlined further in the text on preparing a work programme on Article 6, mainly in terms of financing and participation⁴²³. The Women and Gender Constituency believes that only a reliable financing system can guarantee the efficient implementation of a work programme and that the active participation of women, young people and indigenous peoples is crucial if the work programme is going to combat climate change effectively⁴²⁴.

Within the SBSTA, Honduras, Dominican Republic, Guatemala and El Salvador would like the Nairobi Work Programme (NWP) to continue to expand and evolve and for its reform to include work with the indigenous peoples and local communities and leads to the integration of specific gender-related features⁴²⁵.

420. <http://www.unwomen.org/focus-areas/climate-change-and-the-environment/facts-and-figures/#edn21>

421. IISD, 2012b.

422. IISD, 2012b.

423. FCCC/SBI/2012/Misc.4

424. See: <http://www.gendercc.net/policy/conferences/road-to-doha.html>

425. IISD, 2012b.

EXPECTATIONS OF THE DOHA CONFERENCE

Following the progress made at the Cancún and Durban conferences, expectations are running especially high for the Doha Conference. The duration and modalities of the second period of the Kyoto Protocol should be decided, the Durban Platform architecture should be prepared and the mandates of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA) and the Ad Hoc Working Group on the further commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP) should come to an end in compliance with the spirit of the Bali Action Plan.

The negotiators are expected to pronounce on how to resolve the outstanding issues, such as the means to increase the ambition and compare mitigation commitments in countries to limit the global rise in temperature to 2°C and the issues over ensuring the granting of predictable and transparent financing to the developing countries. Regarding the end of the AWG-LCA mandate, there is still disagreement over identifying the outstanding issues so that this mandate can be closed in Doha, without for all that leaving components of the Bali Action Plan stranded. The expectation is therefore that a text reporting on the implementation of the Bali Action Plan within the AWG-LCA will be presented in Doha.

The transition to a second period of the Kyoto Protocol fuels more realistic expectations, although there are still several options on the modalities of this transition. As certain developed countries will not be involved in this second commitment period, it is likely that the targets for these countries are captured in an agreement under the AWG-LCA. In addition, the Parties will have to manage to reach agreement on the duration of this second period to stabilise the ambitious mitigation commitments whilst ensuring the transition to the agreement that has to be reached by the Durban Platform.

Under the Durban Platform, the Parties should agree on a climate regime in 2015 which should enter into force no later than 2020. Some hope that at this time numerous events will combine to encourage reaching a post-2020 agreement with legal force. China will then be preparing its next five-year plan and the United States could be in a better position to introduce new climate legislation in Congress. To maximise the chances of adopting this agreement in 2015, there must therefore be no delay in Doha that must provide the necessary impetus for such a success. Neverthe-

less, for a large number of Parties, the priority is not to start negotiating the agreement to be reached by the Durban Platform, but to close the work of the AWG-LCA and the AWG-KP successfully. The Parties are nevertheless expected to adopt in Doha the outline and the main stages of the Durban Platform.

The negotiators are going to have to be ingenious when taking up the challenge to achieve such an outcome. The Doha Conference seems to offer an opportunity to define the notion of equity to distinguish between the obligations of developed countries and developing countries in the new post-2020 agreement, so that the "universality of application" of the Durban Platform does not become the "uniformity of application". It is up to the Parties to determine how to harness this differentiation, if appropriate, mainly when choosing the approach to differentiating the commitments based on their type, timetable or any other way.

FACT SHEETS

Sheet 1.

Timeline of important milestones in the negotiations on climate change

	Important milestones	Negotiation terms
1990	<i>First IPCC evaluation report submitted</i>	
1992	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development - Rio de Janeiro	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
1994		Entry into force of the UNFCCC
1995	<i>Second IPCC evaluation report submitted</i>	
	COP1 - Berlin	Berlin Mandate
1996	COP2 - Geneva	
1997	COP3 - Kyoto	Kyoto Protocol
1998	COP4 - Buenos Aires	Buenos Aires Action Plan: timetable for implementation of the Protocol
1999	COP5 - Bonn	
2000	COP6 - The Hague	
2001	<i>Third IPCC evaluation report submitted</i>	
	COP6 resumed - Bonn COP7 - Marrakesh	Bonn Agreements: agreement on the implementation of the Protocol Marrakesh Accords: finalisation of technical details relating to the Kyoto Protocol
2002	World Summit on Sustainable Development - Johannesburg COP8 - New Delhi	Delhi Declaration
2003	COP9 - Milan	
2004	COP10 - Buenos Aires	Buenos Aires Work Programme: agreement on adaptation and response measures
2005	COP11 - Montreal CMP1 - Montreal	Entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol Formation of the AWG-KP
2006	COP12 - Nairobi CMP2 - Nairobi	Nairobi Work Programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change
2007	<i>Fourth IPCC evaluation report submitted</i>	
	COP13 - Bali CMP3 - Bali	Bali Road Map Formation of the AWG-LCA

	Important milestones	Negotiation terms
2008	COP14 - Poznań COP4 - Poznań	Poznań strategic programme for technology transfer
2009	COP15 - Copenhagen CMP5 - Copenhagen	Copenhagen Accord
2010	COP16 - Cancún CMP6 - Cancún	Cancún Agreements
2011	COP17 - Durban CMP7 - Durban	The Durban Platform

Sheet 2.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)

Ratification status: March 1994

Ratification status: 195 Parties⁴²⁶, including the European Economic Community⁴²⁷ (EEC)

Supreme decision-making body: Conference of the Parties (COP)

Main objective [Article 2]: "[...] stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner."

UNFCCC Annexes:

Annex I - List of 41 Parties, including the EEC: developed countries and countries with economies in transition;

Annex II - List of 24 Parties, including the EEC: wealthiest developed countries.

Commitment of the Parties:

- **All Parties:** for example, prepare a national greenhouse gas emission inventory, implement mitigation programmes and adaptation actions, offer cooperative support in technological research and dissemination and facilitate the education and awareness of the general public (Article 4.1).
- **Annex I Parties:** mainly, implement national policies to mitigate climate change and weaken emissions in the long term (Article 4.2).
- **Annex II Parties:** support developing countries financially, mainly by helping to prepare their national communications, to ease their adaptation to climate change and encourage access to technologies (Articles 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5).

Link to the Convention site: [www.unfccc.int](http://unfccc.int)

Link to the Convention text: www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/convfr.pdf.

426. As at 09 March 2012. See http://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/status_of_ratization/items/2631.php

427. As the European Union signed the Convention whilst it was still the European Economic Community (EEC), this name continues to be used officially in any formal dealings over the Convention.

Sheet 3.

Kyoto Protocol

Date of entry into force: 16 February 2005.

Ratification status: 192 Parties⁴²⁸, including the EEC; two Parties to the Convention have not ratified the Kyoto Protocol.

Supreme decision-making body: Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties (CMP).

Main objective: instigate quantified and legally-binding targets for limiting and reducing greenhouse gas emissions to boost the UNFCCC.

Protocol Annexes:

Annex A: List of the six greenhouse gases targeted by the Kyoto Protocol: carbon dioxide (CO₂), methane (CH₄), dinitrogen oxide (N₂O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFC), perfluorocarbons (PFC) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF₆).

Annex B: List of 39 Parties, included the EEC: developed countries and countries with economies in transition which have made quantified commitments to reducing or limiting greenhouse gas emissions and which correspond to the Parties in Annex I of the Convention⁴²⁹.

Commitment of the Parties:

- **Annex B Parties:**

- Limit or reduce the quantity of GHG emissions. This quantity is expressed, for the period 2008-2012, as a percentage of the 1990 emission level (Article 3)⁴³⁰;
- Implement national or regional policies and measures to fulfil compliance with quantified commitments to limit and reduce greenhouse gases (Articles 2 and 4). The Parties can fulfil their commitments through domestic measures and flexibility mechanisms;
- Publish an initial report giving the information required to implement the commitments, especially for the accounting of assigned amounts (Article 7);
- Publish a report demonstrating the progress made in achieving commitments (Article 3.2);
- Set up a national emissions inventory system based on methodologies approved by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Article 5);

- **All the Parties:** for example, prepare programmes to set in place the national inventory of greenhouse gas emissions, to mitigate and facilitate the adaptation to climate change, co-operate to support technology transfer, research and education and present in their national communications information on the actions undertaken to combat climate change (Article 10);

428. As at 9 March 2012. http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php

429. Belarus and Turkey are UNFCCC Annex I countries but do not adhere to Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol.

430. The reference year need not be 1990 for countries with economies in transition.

- **UNFCCC Annex II Parties:** Finance developing countries, mainly to help them set in place their national emissions inventory and encourage technology transfer (Article 11).

The COP17 adopted an agreement in principle to launch the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol which will start in 2013 and end in 2017 or 2020⁴³¹.

Link to the Protocol text: www.unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpfrench.pdf.

431. Decision 1/CMP.7

Sheet 4.

The Durban Platform

Context: The Conference of the Parties in Durban provided a new opportunity to discuss the structure of the climate regime. The discussion on the legal options for the long-term cooperative action attempted to reduce the gap between the two negotiating processes of the Bali Action Plan, i.e. one under the Convention for all countries and the other under the Kyoto Protocol focusing on the new commitments of Annex I Parties.

Supreme decision-making body: New subsidiary body called the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP)⁴³². This new working group commenced its work in 2012.

Objectives:

- "Prepare a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force, applicable to all the Parties", which should enter into force no later than 2020;
- Identify and explore the options to raise the ambition levels in line with the conclusions of the 5th IPCC Report;
- Prepare its work plan, including the mitigation, adaptation, financing, development and transfer of technologies, transparency of measures, support and capacity building.

Link to the Durban Platform text:

<http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cop17/09a01f.pdf>

432. Decision 1/CP.17

Sheet 5.

UNFCC structure and the role of the main decision-making bodies

The **Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP)**⁴³³ commenced its mandate in 2012 and aims "to prepare a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force, applicable to all the Parties" for 2015 which should enter into force in 2020.

The **Conference of the Parties (COP)**, the highest authority of the Convention, brings together those countries which, by signing and ratifying the United Nations Convention on Climate Change, have become parties to this Convention. As such, the COP aims to implement the ultimate Convention objective.

The **Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties (CMP)**⁴³⁴ is a totally separate legal entity from the COP and is the supreme decision-making body of the Kyoto Protocol. The CMP includes the sub-group of Parties to the Convention which have ratified the Kyoto Protocol. The Parties to the Protocol alone have the right to participate in decisions made by the CMP.

The **Bureau of the COP** and the **Bureau of the CMP** administers the intergovernmental process for the COP and for the CMP. The **UNFCCC Secretariat** coordinates and organises the meetings of the various bodies.

The **Global Environment Facility (GEF)** and the **Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)** are two partner organisations of the UNFCCC and play a key role in the process. The GEF has been in existence since 1991 and was named as the entity responsible for administering UNFCCC funds earmarked to help developing countries. The IPCC helps establish the scientific base by publishing climate change assessment reports every five years and specialist studies on specific topics. Table 7 describes the role of bodies created by virtue of the COP and the CMP.

433. Decision 1/CP.17

434. See Gagnon-Lebrun et al. 2005 for further information on how the CMP operates.


TABLE 3.
SUBSIDIARY AND SPECIALIST BODIES

Institution	Responsibilities
Subsidiary bodies common to the COP and CMP.	
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA)	Advises the COP and CMP on scientific and technical issues which are specific to or shared by them.
Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI)	Advises the COP and CMP on improving the effective application of the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol.
Specialist bodies created by virtue of the COP	
Consultative Group of Experts (CGE) on national communications of non-Annex I Parties	Assist the non-Annex I Parties in preparing their national communications.
Least Developed Countries Expert Group (LDCEG)	Advises the least developed countries on preparing and implementing adaptation plans, among other things.
Expert Group on Technology Transfer (EGTT)	Provides scientific and technical advice to advance the development and transfer of technologies.
Specialist body created by virtue of the COP	
Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA)	Spearheads the process allowing the integral, effective and on-going application of the Convention by concerted action by 2012 and beyond, with a view to adopting the decisions of the COP15.
Specialist body created by virtue of the ADP	
Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP)	Prepare a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force, applicable to all the Parties, which should enter into force no later than 2020.
Specialist bodies of the CMP	
CDM Executive Board	Ensures the effective implementation and correct operation of the clean development mechanism (CDM).
Supervisory Committee under Article 6	Spearheads the implementation of the Joint Implementation (JI) in the countries referred to in Annex I.
Compliance Committee	Is responsible for guaranteeing compliance with commitments and supports the Parties finding it difficult to comply with their obligations under the Kyoto Protocol. This committee includes a facilitative branch and an enforcement branch.
Ad Hoc Working Group on the further commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol (AWG-KP)	Supports the process for making commitments for the post-2012 period by Annex I Parties that are also Parties to the Kyoto Protocol.

Sheet 6.

The Parties to the Convention and the Protocol

**FIGURE 7 :
THE PARTIES INCLUDED IN ANNEX I (OCTOBER 2010)**



Notes:


1 Countries which have signed, but not ratified, the Kyoto Protocol.

2 Country included in Annex I of the Convention, but not Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol.

3 The European Community is itself a Party included in Annexes I and II of the UNFCCC.

4 As included in Annex I of the UNFCCC.

Name in bold: Member countries of the International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF).



Notes:

1. Country which has neither signed nor ratified the UNFCCC.

2. Apart from Bahrain, these countries are all members of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS).

Name in **bold**: Member (or associated member) country of the International Organization of La Francophonie (OIF).

Sheet 7.

The regional groups and the main negotiation coalitions

The climate change negotiations process revolves around regional groups and negotiation coalitions. The regional groups are derived from the official United Nations classification system, according to their **geographical situation**, whilst the negotiation coalitions are political alliances formed on the basis of **common interests**. During negotiations, the countries usually speak on their own behalf or on behalf of a negotiation coalition.

United Nations Regional Groups

The regional groups do not necessarily share the same interests in relation to the negotiations on climate change. The members of the Bureau are elected from regional groups and Small Island Developing States (SIDS).

The regional groups are Africa, Asia and the Pacific Region (including Japan), Eastern and Central Europe, **Latin America and the Caribbean (GRULAC, from the Spanish)** and the Western Europe and Others Group (WEOG). "The others" are Australia, Canada, the **United States**, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway and Switzerland.

The African Group

The African Group is the only regional group to function as a genuine negotiation coalition. It has 53 members, all of whom share a variety of causes for concern, such as **desertification, the lack of water resources, vulnerability to the impacts of climate change and the fight against poverty**. The Group currently makes joint statements, mainly on questions relating to adaptation, technology transfer, capacity building and financing.

Negotiation coalitions

AOSIS (Alliance of Small Island States)

AOSIS is an ad hoc lobbying group which gives a voice to the majority of Small Island Developing States (SIDS) during negotiations at the United Nations. The SIDS share their vulnerability to the impacts of climate change, especially the **rise in sea levels** which is threatening the very existence of several islands. AOSIS has 39 members and four observers. Most AOSIS countries also belong to the G-77/China and ten are among the Least Developed Countries (LDC)⁴³⁵. Bahrain is the only SIDS member of the United Nations which does not belong to AOSIS; conversely, the Cook Islands and Niue belong to AOSIS but are not SIDS members of the United Nations⁴³⁶.

Least Developed Countries (LDC)

The group of LDC comprises 49 countries among the least developed (33 in Africa, fifteen in Asia and one in the Caribbean). They defend their interests jointly within the United Nations, especially in relation to climate change. They share considerations about their vulnerability and their need for support in planning their adaptation. The UNFCCC also recognises the special needs of the LDC, which are the least capable of facing up to the impacts of climate change.

435. See: <http://www.sidsnet.org/aosis> et <http://www.unohrrls.org/en/ldc/related/62/>

436. See: <http://www.unohrrls.org/en/sids/44/>.

The Group of 77 and China (G-77/China)

The G-77/China comprises 130 developing countries and China. China is an associate member rather than a full member of the G-77. China cooperates closely with the G-77 over climate change-related issues; the group therefore takes its positions "on behalf of the G-77 and China"⁴³⁷. In particular, the G-77/China supports the economic interests of its members in miscellaneous questions within the United Nations. The G-77/China member countries can sometimes adopt diverging positions during the climate change negotiations, which they then defend via another negotiation coalition or regional group⁴³⁸.

European Union (EU)

The EU is a political and economic union of 27 member countries. It is represented by the European Community, which is a Party to the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol, but which has no voting right distinct from that of individual countries. **Despite some differences, they often adopt a common position and speak with a single voice during climate change negotiations.**

Umbrella Group

The Umbrella Group is a flexible coalition of developed countries which do not belong to the European Union and which has been formed in the context of climate change negotiations. It has emerged from the JUSSCANNZ⁴³⁹ group and is active in all the UN forums despite the group not always comprising the same countries. Although informal, the list normally includes Australia, Canada, the United States, Russia, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway and Ukraine (other countries are added periodically, depending on the topics addressed). The group has been focusing its activities since 2001 on information sharing rather than actual negotiation.

Coalition for Rainforest Nations

This coalition started to take shape in 2005 under the initiative of Papua New Guinea. Its goal is recognition of the efforts made by developing countries to slow down emissions caused by deforestation. This coalition includes 32 countries: **Bangladesh, Bolivia,** Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, Congo, Costa Rica, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Kenya, Lesotho, Malaysia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Thailand, Uganda, Uruguay and Vanuatu⁴⁴⁰.

Environmental Integrity Group

The Environmental Integrity Group was formed in 2002 by OECD members which did not agree with the positions adopted by the Umbrella Group, namely Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mexico and the Republic of Korea. Mexico and the Republic of Korea are the only two OECD members not included in Annex I. Member countries are frequently known

437. Yamin and Depledge, 2004.

438. See www.G-77.org

439. JUSSCANNZ is the acronym for "Japan, the USA, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway and New Zealand".

440. See: www.rainforestcoalition.org.

to negotiate on an individual basis given the huge differences in their national contexts⁴⁴¹. Otherwise, the group is normally coordinated by Switzerland.

Group of Countries of Central Asia and the Caucasus, Albania and Moldova (CACAM)

CACAM groups countries from Eastern and Central Europe and Central Asia, including Albania, Armenia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Moldova, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. There are also observers, such as Azerbaijan. These countries have created a coalition seeking recognition for their status as non-Annex I countries with economies in transition under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol⁴⁴². The reason is that the UNFCCC does not define the term "developing country" clearly and that these countries do not view themselves as developing countries despite their exclusion from Annex I of the Convention. The CACAM countries rarely take a common stance on other issues.

Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America (ALBA, from the Spanish)

ALBA was originally a political, social and economic organisation to promote cooperation in these areas between the socialist countries of Latin America and the Caribbean and offer an alternative to the Free Trade Area of the Americas advocated by the United States⁴⁴³. ALBA thus became a negotiation coalition in 2010, representing a hub of five countries: Venezuela, Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Antigua and Barbuda, joined occasionally by Dominica and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. This coalition bases its positions on a goal of restricting temperature rises to 1 to 1.5°C and on the principle whereby the developed countries must take a lead partner role in the global effort to combat climate change.

Cartagena Dialogue:

The Cartagena Dialogue is an informal group created during the COP16 in Cancún. It brings together forty industrialised and developing countries working with a view to establishing a comprehensive and legally-binding regime within the UNFCCC. The aim of the dialogue is to openly discuss the reasons behind each country's position and to explore the areas in which convergence and reinforcement of shared action could emerge. The members commit, nationally, to becoming or remaining low-carbon. Although the group remains very informal, its members already include countries from the European Union, LDC, the African Group, an informal coalition of Latin American countries comprising Panama, Peru, Chile, Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic, and AOSIS. Two members of the Umbrella Group, Australia and New Zealand, also signed the last declaration.

BASIC

BASIC is a group of countries made up of Brazil, South Africa, India and China. It was founded at a meeting held in November 2009 to define a common stance for the Copenhagen Conference (COP15, December 2009). After the meeting, BASIC published a series of positions considered to be non-negotiable by its members, in particular a second commitment period for developed countries by virtue of the Kyoto Protocol and scaled-up financing for the

441. Yamin, F. and Depledge, J., 2004.

442. *Ibid.*

443. See: <http://www.alianzabolivariana.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=258>.

mitigation and adaptation of developing countries. Since then, the group regularly meets in order to share their positions and to develop a shared strategy. As BASIC is made up of the most important emerging countries and large emitters, it now stands out as an indispensable actor in international climate negotiations.

Like Minded Group

The Like Minded Group is a spontaneous coalition of countries created during the Bonn Conference on climate change in May 2012. It is made up of several countries from the Arab world, India, China, several emerging Asian economies and certain active South American Parties, especially Venezuela, Bolivia and Cuba. Commonly called the Like Minded Group, this coalition is also found in other international forums, especially the World Trade Organisation. It is a group of States joining forces around a very strong central position. Although it is too early to analyse the group's political agenda, equity and respect for the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities seems to be the common link between them. Note that several large oil producers are found in this group.

Sheet 8.

Positions of main countries and negotiation coalitions on the post-2012.

Alliance of Small
Island States
(AOSIS)⁴⁴⁴

AOSIS believes that the goals of reduced GHG emissions are founded on stabilising the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide at 350 ppm and limiting average global warming to below 1.5°C. It estimates that global GHG emissions should reach their ceiling in 2015 and be reduced by 85% by 2050 compared with 1990 levels. AOSIS is asking that the Annex I Parties achieve a 45% drop in their emissions by 2015 and 90% by 2050 compared with 1990 levels.

AOSIS calls for promises to be transformed into quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives (QELRO). AOSIS is insisting that the work of the ADP covers the rise in pre-2020 ambitions, not just the post-2020 regime. In terms of national communications, the AOSIS members underline the need to extend the CGE mandate until at least 2016. They also underline the need to increase support for adaptation. Lastly, they are calling for the creation of an international mechanism regarding loss and damage for COP18.

Bolivarian Alliance
for the Peoples of our
America (ALBA,
from the Spanish)⁴⁴⁵

ALBA bases its position on the principles stated in the *World People's Declaration on Climate Change and the Rights of Mother Earth*⁴⁴⁶ of 22 April 2010, adopted during the conference of the same name held in Cochabamba, Bolivia on 19-22 April 2010. ALBA is demanding goals to stabilise the concentration of carbon dioxide at 300 ppm, with a limitation in temperature rise of between 1 and 1.5°C. ALBA urges developed countries to reduce their emissions by 40% to 50 % for the 2013-2017 period compared with 1990 levels. ALBA believes that developed countries must give an assurance that their technologies are free of patents and intellectual property rights. The ALBA countries are hoping for great things from the ADP and defend the application of the principle of common but differentiated responsibility in all the working groups⁴⁴⁷. In terms of financing, ALBA is calling on the industrialised countries to contribute 1.5% of their GDP to the Green Climate Fund and urges democratic access to resources⁴⁴⁸.

444. IISD, 2011c, pp. 4 and 6, IISD, 2011a, p.12 and FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/MISC.2.

445. FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/MISC.2

446. For further information on this meeting, see: <http://pwccc.wordpress.com/2010/04/24/peoples-agreement/> and <http://pwccc.wordpress.com/2011/04/05/G-77-china-alba-back-bolivia-in-climate-talks-in-bangkok/>. : IISD, 2011a, p. 17, IISD, 2011c, p 4.

447. IISD, 2011d, p. 46

448. IISD, 2011d, p. 5

Brazil⁴⁴⁹

Brazil would like the Annex I Parties to reduce their emissions by 40% for the 2013-2017 period compared with 1990 levels and to define their commitments using a top-down approach reflecting the scientific data. It has also expressed the willingness to reduce its GHG emissions by 36.1% to 38.9% by 2020. Brazil is looking for a "robust legally-binding instrument" for post-2020⁴⁵⁰. It is also emphasising the distinctive nature two ADP work components - preparing an agreement and raising the ambition⁴⁵¹. It reiterates that the Kyoto Protocol is a key component in raising ambitions, main through such mechanisms as the CDM⁴⁵². Brazil is also in favour of instituting a compensation mechanism for loss and damage caused by the negative impacts of climate change in developing countries. It calls for the full application of the Consultative Group of Experts (CGE) work programme. Brazil considers that financing should come mainly from public funds to ensure predictability and must be supplemented by auctioning of assigned amount units (AAU).

China⁴⁵³

China is open to introducing certain measures to combat climate change through nationally appropriate mitigation actions, provided that the developed countries offer technological and financial support which can also contribute to the sustainable development and energy safety of the country. China has announced that it will reduce its emissions by 40% to 45% per unit of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by 2020 compared with the 2005 level⁴⁵⁴. China wishes the contribution by developing countries to the global mitigation effort to depend on these Parties complying with their financing and technology transfer commitments. It believes that the prerequisites established by the Annex I countries only hinder progress in the substantive debate. In addition, it is insisting that the discussions on mitigation efforts by developed and developing countries remain separate and that the ADP work plan can only be prepared fully once the work of the AWG-KP and the AWG-LCA has been completed⁴⁵⁵. China believes that the work should continue in compliance with the principles stated in the Bali Action Plan⁴⁵⁶.

449. Communication by Brazil to the UNFCCC Secretariat, 29 January 2010: http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/application/pdf/brazilcphaccord_app2.pdf, IISD, 2011a, pp. 16 and 17, IISD 2011bc, p. 4

450. IISD, 2012a.

451. IISD, 2011d, p. 23

452. IISD, 2011d, p. 28

453. FCCC/KP/AWG/2009/MISC.8 and FCCC/AWGLCA/2009/MISC.4 (Part I). IISD 2011a, p.1 4, IISD 2011c, p. 6

454. IISD, 2011d, p. 20

455. IISD, 2011d, p. 42

456. See: http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg-lca/application/pdf/submission_on_response_measures.pdf

Coalition for Rainforest Nations⁴⁵⁷ The aim of this coalition is recognition of the efforts made by developing countries to slow down emissions caused by deforestation. This coalition hope that the REDD+ partnership objectives will be achieved.

Environmental Integrity Group (EIG)⁴⁵⁸ The EIG mainly supports the creation of new market mechanisms and the strengthening of the CDM. It also believes that the international consultation and analysis (ICA) should facilitate developing country mitigation measures, build up capacities and improve transparency.

European Union⁴⁵⁹ The European Union wishes the rise in the average global temperature to be stabilised at 2°C. The European Union is committed to reducing its emissions by 20% by 2020 compared with 1990 levels and by 30% if the other developed countries, including the United States, commit to similar reductions and if the most advanced developing countries commit to contributing to this objective based on their respective responsibilities and capabilities. It emphasises that a robust and transparent emission compatibility system is necessary to achieve the objectives and to ensure that the MRV system works. It reaffirms its preference for a legally-binding framework under the Convention containing the essential elements identified in the Cancún Agreements and the need for robust market mechanisms and a top-down approach. The EU is pressing for the second commitment period to last eight years. It believes that the principles of the Convention form a good basis for the future regime, but must be interpreted to reflect the common but differentiated responsibilities and the constantly changing respective capacities of countries⁴⁶⁰. The EU emphasises that the ADP mandate remains to negotiate a new legally-binding instrument applicable to all and fears the introduction of the Bali Action Plan in the new mandate⁴⁶¹.

G-77/China⁴⁶² Given the historical responsibility of developed countries, G-77/China considers that the negotiations for a post-2012 regime should focus on the Annex I Parties adopting restrictive targets for reducing GHG emissions covering all sectors of the economy. G-77/China believe that the mitigation efforts by developed countries should be defined under a top-down approach and reflect the scientific data. The group is seeking more support from developed countries, especially for financing the adaptation and technology transfers. The G-77/China has underlined the importance of Annex I Parties depositing QELRO to avoid a vacuum between the commitment

457. Parker, et al., 2009. and <http://www.rainforestcoalition.org/Press.aspx>

458. IISD, 2010b, pp. 9 and 11

459. FCCC/AWGLCA/2011/MISC.6/Add.4, p. 6, FCCC/AWGLCA/2011/MISC.6/Add.3, p. 12, IISD, 2011c, pp. 4 and 12

460. IISD, 2011d, p. 72

461. IISD, 2011d, p. 31

462. IISD 2011c, pp. 9, 10 and 15, IISD 2011a, p. 13

periods and thus maintain the Protocol and its flexibility mechanisms⁴⁶³. The G-77/China is insisting that the outcome of the ADP comply with the objective, the principles (mainly the principles of historical responsibility and of common but differentiated responsibility) and the provisions of the Convention⁴⁶⁴. It supports the creation of an insurance mechanism for loss and damage caused by extreme events and the setting up of a technical and performance indicators committee to measure the support for capacity building.

Group of Least Developed Countries (LDC)⁴⁶⁵

The LDC Group demands stricter global targets, short-, medium- and long-term **adaptation plans and long-term financing**. It underlines also the need to strengthen and create regional centres and networks to facilitate the implementation of adaptation measures. It supports that the work of the ADP must focus on both the raising of pre-2020 ambitions and the post-2020 regime. **It urges a second commitment period of five years covering 2013-2017 and on the need to settle the question of the gap in the mitigation ambition**⁴⁶⁶.

India⁴⁶⁷

India is demanding the adoption of ambitious reduction goals for the Annex I Parties. India supports developing country implementation of nationally appropriate mitigation actions on a voluntary basis provide the developed countries provide financial and technological support. India is in favour of the objective of limiting the rise in temperature to below 2°C provided that this includes the principle of fair distribution of the carbon space based on the **per capita cumulative share of emissions**. India has stressed that developed countries' compliance with commitments should include improving support relations provided to developing countries. India has stated that the ADP work plan must reflect the historical responsibility of developed countries and that the discussions should also be based on the **Bali Action Plan**⁴⁶⁸ **and the Convention principles**⁴⁶⁹. India also insists that the work on sectoral emission reductions (air and maritime transport) be guided by the Convention principles⁴⁷⁰.

463. IISD, 2011d, p. 7

464. IISD, 2011d, p. 15

465. IISD, 2011a, pp. 20 and 9

466. IISD, 2011d, p. 8

467. IISD, 2011a, pp. 16 and 17, IISD 2011b, p. 14

468. See: http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg-lca/application/pdf/submission_on_response_measures.pdf

469. See: http://unfccc.int/files/documentation/submissions_from_parties/adp/application/pdf/adp_india_03082012.pdf

470. IISD, 2012a, p. 4

471. IISD, 2011a, pp. 17 and 18, IISD 2011c, p. 4

Japan⁴⁷¹ Japan supports a new, unique and legally-binding instrument including all the major economies. Japan supports the global objective of a 50% drop in emissions by 2050. It also supports continuing with the CDM provided that it is improved and notes that the new market mechanisms should enable a broad spectrum of approaches, including for the projects and sectoral approaches⁴⁷². Lastly, it sees the ADP as an appropriate framework for discussing the mitigation ambition⁴⁷³.

Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)⁴⁷⁴ The OPEC countries emphasise the need to consider the potential negative impacts of mitigation measures of the Annex I Parties on the economies of developing countries.

Republic of Korea⁴⁷⁵ The Republic of Korea has presented its low-carbon growth strategy targeting a 30% reduction in emissions compared with business as usual. It supports the idea that a post-2012 regime should include incentives to encourage developing countries to make voluntary commitments to reduce GHG emissions in the form of nationally appropriate mitigation actions, provided that the developed countries offer technological and financial support. The Republic of Korea insists that the second commitment period should last for eight years and that amendments to the Doha Protocol must be adopted to ensure the implementation of the second commitment period⁴⁷⁶. Lastly, it has restated several times its commitment to an enhanced, global and ambitious multilateral climate change regime⁴⁷⁷.

Russia⁴⁷⁸ Russia is in favour of adopting a binding agreement including large emitter countries. It is opposed to withdrawing the special status of countries with economies in transition. It underlines that a new and global agreement is the main objective of the work of the ADP and warns the Parties against using the group's work programme as a tool for reviewing the "fragile and multifaceted" balance of interests agreed in Durban⁴⁷⁹.

Saudi Arabia⁴⁸⁰ Saudi Arabia, a major oil exporter, emphasises the need to take account of potential negative impacts from mitigation measures by Annex I Parties on the economy of developing countries, above all those exporting fossil energy. Saudi Arabia thus supports compensation for loss and damage attributable to the impacts of response measures. It favours an international consultation and analysis procedure (ICA) based on the rules which are already in place in order to fill the gaps in the compatibility system.

472. IISD, 2011d, p. 25

473. IISD, 2011d, p. 54

474. IISD, 2010b, p. 27; IISD, 2010c, p. 5; OPEC, 2006

475. FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/MISC.2, p. 74

476. IISD, 2011d, p. 48

477. IISD, 2012a, p. 44

478. IISD, 2011a, pp. 17 and 18

479. IISD, 2011d, p. 32

480. FCCC/AWGLCA/2011/MISC.6/Add.3,p.27, IISD, 2011, p. 12

South Africa⁴⁸¹

South Africa supports positive incentives to stimulate the participation of developing countries. It underlines the importance of trust in reviewing the ambition level under the Durban Platform⁴⁸². Like the BASIC members, South Africa believes it will only possible to prepare the ADP work programme fully once the work of the AWG-KP and the AWG-LCA has been completed and that the outcome of this work will reflect the historical responsibility of developed countries⁴⁸³.

The African Group⁴⁸⁴

The African Group suggests that the Annex I Parties achieve a 40% drop in their emissions by 2020 compared with 1990 levels. It insists that measures related to bunker fuels respect the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. It is campaigning for an international assessment and review process (IAR) for the developed countries. The Group has underlined the need to extend the CGE mandate until 2016 at least and supports a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol lasting five years rather than eight⁴⁸⁵. It is insisting that the outcome of Doha covers all the components of the Bali Action Plan and recognises the urgent needs of Africa, especially in terms of adaptation. Lastly, the group calls for strengthening the mandate of the Nairobi Work Programme and more involvement of the region in the CDM mechanism⁴⁸⁶.

United States⁴⁸⁷

Having rejected any negotiation process under the auspices of the UNFCCC, the United States did a U-turn in 2007 by maintaining that the Convention was the appropriate forum for negotiations on a post-2012 regime⁴⁸⁸. The United States wishes to give precedence to a **national target for reducing GHG emissions**. It wishes to operationalise Copenhagen's target of 2°C and supports a legally-binding agreement including the commitments of all the major economies⁴⁸⁹. They have committed conditionally to reducing their emissions by **17% compared with 2005 by 2020**⁴⁹⁰. The United States is demanding greater participation by developing countries in reducing GHG emissions. In addition, the United State emphasised that the

481. IISD, 2011c, pp. 3 and 12

482. IISD, 2011d, p. 32

483. IISD, 2011d, p. 42

484. IISD, 2011a, pp. 9, 16, 17 and 20, IISD 2011c, p. 6

485. IISD, 2011d, p. 7

486. IISD, 2012a, p. 4

487. FCCC/AWGLCA/2010/MISC.2, p.79

488. The United States made these statements mainly at the G8 Summit at Heiligendamm in June 2007 and during the meeting of APEC leaders in Sydney in September 2007.

489. IISD, 2012a, p. 53

490. IISD, 2011d, p. 17

Cancún Agreements should form the basis of negotiations (as opposed to the Bali Action Plan). It is in favour of a bottom-up approach. It has highlighted the essential components of the Durban Platform, including an instrument with legal force for all Parties⁴⁹¹. Lastly, the United States shows itself very open to working on cooperative approaches to sectoral reductions, like air and maritime transport⁴⁹².

491. IISD, 2011d, p. 32

492. http://unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg-ca/application/pdf/2012_08_21_submission_of_the_united_states_on_cooperative_sectoral_approaches_final.pdf

Sheet 9.

UNFCCC side discussion forums

The United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (Rio+20) was a major feature of 2012. The green economy and international governance of sustainable development therefore featured heavily on the international environmental stage. Nevertheless, a few forums assembled countries around questions of climate change. A description of each of these meetings is provided below.

United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development

Participants: United Nations member countries

Description: The United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, also called Rio+20, was held on 20-22 June 2012. The event ties in with the "Earth Summits", flagship events that aim to structure the international governance of sustainable development. The event in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 led to the adoption of Agenda 21 and to the advent of international conventions on climate change, biodiversity and, subsequently, combating desertification. Although there was mixed satisfaction with the outcome of the Conference, the countries managed to sign a joint document⁴⁹³. This document calls for ambitious measures to be taken urgently, in accordance with the UNFCCC principles and provisions, and underlines that the financing must come from various sources - public and private, bilateral and multilateral -, including new sources, to support mitigation and adaptation measures adapted to the countries, the development and transfer of technologies and the creation of capacities in the developing countries. Lastly, the signatories urge the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol Parties to comply fully with their commitments and the decisions adopted under these instruments.

Ministerial meetings of BASIC countries⁴⁹⁴

Present: Brazil, South Africa, India and China.

Description: The BASIC countries met several times in 2012 to settle on a common position. They not only welcomed the decision establishing a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol, they also welcomed the establishment of the Durban Platform targeting the entry into force of a new global agreement by 2020⁴⁹⁵. On the other hand, they wished to recall that its mandate is not to renegotiate or rewrite the Convention, its principles and provisions, mainly the principle of common but differentiated responsibility. They welcomed the outcome of

493. Final text of Rio+20 "The future we want", see: <http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N12/436/89/PDF/N1243689.pdf?OpenElement>

494. Joint declaration of the 11th meeting of BASIC Ministers, see: <http://www.info.gov.za/speech/DynamicAction?pageid=461&sid=29011&tid=76046>

495. Joint declaration of the 10th meeting of BASIC Ministers, see: <http://moef.nic.in/downloads/public-information/10th-BASIC-Meeting-Delhi-Joint-Statement.pdf>

Rio+20 during their meeting in July 2012, recalled that the submission of QELRO by Annex I Parties had a shortfall in ambition and underlined the importance of a positive conclusion to the work of the AWG-LCA. The Ministers also took a tougher stance on the inclusion of international aviation in the EU's emissions trading system.

In 2012, the participant countries met officially in New Delhi, India on 13-14 February, in Johannesburg, South Africa on 12-13 July and in Brazil in September 2012.

G8 Summits

Member countries (8): United States, Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy, Canada and Russia

Description: This group of the eight most developed countries in the world meets annually to discuss economic questions and global issues such as combating climate change. Developing countries are frequently invited to G8 summits⁴⁹⁶. The European Union is represented at each meeting. During the last G8 meeting at Camp David, United States on 18-19 May 2011, the assembled leaders discussed means of combating global warming⁴⁹⁷. They recognised the need to increase the mitigation ambition level by 2020 if we wish to limit the increase in global temperature to below 2°C effectively. They welcomed the launch of the Durban Platform and the importance of implementing the Cancún Agreements. Lastly, they underlined that any legal instrument should apply to all the Parties, both developed and developing countries.

G20 Summits

Member countries (19 + European Union): Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States and the European Union.

Description: This group of twenty of the most developed countries in the world meets annually to discuss economic questions and global issues such as combating climate change. During their meeting in Los Cabos, Mexico in June 2012, the G20 countries committed to implementing fully the outcome of Cancún and Durban⁴⁹⁸. They also agreed to examine how to mobilise the resources effectively taking into account the UNFCCC objectives, provisions and principles aligned with the Cancún Agreements.

In 2012, the G20 met in Los Cabos, Mexico on 18-19 June 2012.

496. For example, in 2010, invitations were extended to South Africa, Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, Colombia, Haiti and Jamaica.

497. Camp David G8 declaration, see: <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/05/19/camp-david-declaration>

498. Los Cabos G20 declaration, see: http://g20.org/images/stories/docs/g20/conclu/G20_Leaders_Declaration_2012_1.pdf

7th UN-REDD programme's Policy Board Meeting⁴⁹⁹

Present: 16 countries

Description: The UN-REDD programme, launched in 2007, is a joint initiative between the FAO, UNEP and UNDP. This programme intends to help LDC to prepare the implementation of REDD. During the seventh meeting, the group reviewed the progress in implementing national programmes and approved the social and environmental principles of the programme and the criteria as a reference framework for the REDD+ countries. The Board also renewed the working group responsible for preparing a framework for the national programmes, which is in charge of identifying the prerequisites for implementing the REDD+ in the member countries. Lastly, the Board created a working group on the revision of the Policy Board to guide the finalisation of terms of reference and supervise the implementation of the review.

In 2012, the UN-REDD programme policy board meeting was held in Asunción, Paraguay on 28 March and in Brazzaville, Republic of Congo on 26-27 October.

499. *Report of the Seventh Policy Board Meeting*, see: <http://www.un-redd.org/Policy-Board/tabid/102628/Default.aspx>

Sheet 10.

Basic information on the Kyoto Protocol flexibility mechanisms

To allow Annex B countries a certain flexibility and lower the cost of reducing GHG emissions, three market mechanisms have been included in the Kyoto Protocol: joint implementation (JI), the clean development mechanism (CDM) and emissions trading (see Table 4).

Joint implementation (JI)

Under JI, two Annex I Parties can trade emission reduction units (ERU) from projects to reduce GHG emissions or to build up the carbon sinks⁵⁰⁰. There are two tracks for participating in the JI projects⁵⁰¹, depending on whether a Party satisfies or does not satisfy all the eligibility criteria, mainly involving the holding of a national inventory:

- Track 1 applies if both Parties comply with all the criteria. In this case, State negotiates with State and the credits (ERU) are subtracted from the number of assigned amount units (AAU) granted initially to the country hosting the project;
- Track 2 applies if one Party does not comply fully with all the criteria. The project then proceeds under the same process as the one set up for the CDM. An independent auditor must validate the project and satisfy himself as to the number of GHG emissions actually avoided. The allocation of credits (ERU) generated by the project is governed by the JI Supervisory Committee.

The JI Supervisory Committee operates under the authority of the CMP. It is responsible for checking the reductions in GHG emissions coming from JI projects carried out under Track 2 and must also account for these activities in an annual report submitted to the CMP⁵⁰². During CMP2, the Parties adopted the internal regulations of the Supervisory Committee and the forms for the description of the JI project as proposed by the Supervisory Committee in its annual report. In addition, in respect of guidelines, the Parties decided to adjust the thresholds for small JI projects in line with the revised thresholds for small-scale projects under the CDM⁵⁰³.

Clean development mechanism (CDM)

The CDM allows an Annex I Party to obtain certified emission reductions (CER) by performing projects to reduce GHG emissions or build up the carbon sinks in the territory of a non-Annex I Party⁵⁰⁴.

To be eligible for the CDM, a project must meet the principle of additionality, i.e. it must lead to a reduction in GHG emissions which would not have occurred without it. A "baseline scenario" - a business-as-usual situation - has to be defined, therefore, so that the additionality of

500. By virtue of Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol.

501. Decision 9/CMP.1

502. *Ibid.*

503. The thresholds for activities of small-scale projects under the CDM were revised in Decision 1/CMP.2.

504. By virtue of Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol

a project can be assessed. The CER calculation must also take account of leaks, i.e. the net variation in GHG emissions produced outside the scope of a project, but which is nevertheless attributable to the project⁵⁰⁵.

The procedures and rules governing the CDM were laid out in the Kyoto Protocol before being defined more precisely by the Marrakesh Accords at the COP-7 in 2001. The CDM Executive Board is the body responsible for supervising the CDM and must submit recommendations to the CPM⁵⁰⁶. For this purpose, it submits an annual report containing information on the progress made from Executive Board actions for the implementation and correct operation of the CDM.

The CDM has evolved rapidly since its introduction in 2001. More than 4,568 CDM projects had been registered by September 2012 and more than 997 million CER had been issued⁵⁰⁷.

GHG emission trading (and emission trading systems)

GHG emission trading, as a Kyoto Protocol flexibility mechanism, provides for GHG emission trading by the national governments of Annex B Parties between themselves in order to achieve their mitigation targets more easily. Following a market logic, a country can choose to reduce its own GHG emissions or purchase some from elsewhere. The GHG emissions are therefore reduced where they cost the least, which makes the reduction efforts all the more effective.

The three flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol form "emission trading systems". These systems, which together form the carbon market, are booming. The carbon market is made up of regulated and voluntary market systems:

- the *regulated market* has come about thanks to "cap-and-trade systems", the result of national, regional or international regulations;
- the *voluntary market* results from speculation in the value of reduction credits or the demand by consumers or companies that want to offset their GHG emissions.

The so-called "voluntary" market runs on the fringes of the regulated market. It does not rely on the legal obligations of participating entities to generate the demand. Purchasers of reduction credits are either speculators anticipating an increase in the value of credits in the future or businesses seeking to comply with voluntary commitments or businesses and consumers wishing to offset their GHG emissions. The voluntary markets accounts for a small share of the carbon market, but is growing rapidly: 123.4 million tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent were traded in 2008, double the volume of transactions on the voluntary market in 2007⁵⁰⁸. In 2009, 93.7 million tonnes of CO₂eq. were traded on the voluntary market. This drop over 2008 can be partly explained by the recent financial crisis. Nevertheless, the volumes traded still

505. Decision 3/CMP.1

506. Decision 17/CP.7

507. See: <http://cdm.unfccc.int/index.html>.

508. Hamilton, *et al.*, 2009

equate to a rise of 39% over 2007⁵⁰⁹. 128 million tonnes of equivalent carbon dioxide were traded in 2010 and 93 million in 2011. The value of its transactions in 2011 reach US\$572 million⁵¹⁰.

The global market is also compartmentalised over and beyond the division between the regulated market and the voluntary market, due to the fact that the cap-and-trade systems are not fungible. Indeed, each market is virtually independent. The prices of different carbon units vary according to supply and demand in the various market segments.

509. Hamilton, *et al.*, 2010

510. Hamilton, *et al.*, 2012

TABLE 4.
KYOTO PROTOCOL FLEXIBILITY MECHANISMS

Mechanism	Parties involved	Transaction unit*		Description
Emissions trading (Article 17)	Between the Annex B Parties	AAU	<i>Assigned Amount Unit</i>	Allocation of AAU based on the GHG emission reduction objective published in Annex B and market trading.
		RMU	<i>Removal Unit</i>	Allocation of the RMU based on Land Use, Land Use Changes and Forestry (LULUCF) for the sequestration of GHG and trading within a market system.
Joint implementation (JI) (Article 6)	Between the Parties included in Annex I	ERU	<i>Emission Reduction Unit</i>	Issuing of an ERU to finance an activity to reduce GHG emissions in another Annex I Party, in the 2008-2012 period.
Clean development mechanism (CDM) (Article 12)	Between an Annex I Party and a non-Annex I Party.	CER	<i>Certified Emission Reduction</i>	Issuing of an CER to finance a project to reduce GHG emissions in a non-Annex I Party, in the 2008-2012 period.
		tCER	<i>Temporary CER</i>	Issuing of a tCER, valid until the end of a given commitment period, for an afforestation and reforestation activity under the CDM, in the 2000-2012 period.
		ICER	<i>Long-term CER</i>	Issuing of an ICER, valid until the end of a given commitment period, for a reforestation activity under the CDM, in the 2000-2012 period.

Sheet 11.
Forthcoming UNFCCC events

26 November-7 December 2012

COP18	CMP8	AWG-KP-17 (continued)	AWG-LCA-15 (continued)	SB-37
-------	------	-----------------------	------------------------	-------

TERMINOLOGY SHEETS

Sheet A.

UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol document listings

Name	Description
Decision x/CP:x	COP decision
Decision x/CMP:x	CMP decision
FCCC/AWG/LCA/x	AWG-LCA preparatory document or provisional or current agenda
FCCC/CP/x	COP preparatory document or provisional or current agenda
FCCC/KP/CMP/x	CMP preparatory document or provisional or current agenda
FCCC/KP/AWG/x	AWG-KP preparatory document or provisional or current agenda
FCCC/SBI/x	SBI preparatory document or provisional or current agenda
FCCC/SBSTA/x	SBSTA preparatory document or provisional or current agenda
FCCC/SB/x	Preparatory document or provisional or current agenda of the two subsidiary bodies
/ARR/x	Report of the individual examination of the GHG inventory (from 2005)
/WEB/IRI/x	Report of the individual examination of the GHG inventory/Document published on the Web only (listing used until 2004 inclusive)
/ASR/x	GHG inventory annual status report
/WEB/SAI/x	GHG inventory summary and assessment report/Document published on the Web only
/COM/x	National communication
/DPR/x	Demonstrable Progress Report
/IDR.x	In-depth Review
CDM EB-x	CDM Executive Board Report
SMSN/IGO/x	Document submitted by intergovernmental organisations
SMSN/NGO/x	Document submitted by non-governmental organisations
	Technical Paper
/TP/x	Text added to a document presented previously (Addendum)
/Add.x	Amendment to a text
/Amend.x	Correction of a text
/Corr.x	Conference Room Paper
/CRP.x	Information series containing general information
/INF.x	Limited distribution document: Draft report or text
/L.x	Miscellaneous documents: Points of view of Parties and observers; list of participants
/MISC.x	
/Rev.x	Text revision which supersedes the text published previously
Non paper	Internal, unofficial document to facilitate the negotiations

Note: x indicates a serial number.

Source: http://unfccc.int/documentation/introductory_guide_to_documents/items/2644.php

Sheet B.

Abbreviations and acronyms

Abbreviations and acronyms French - English

French		English	
ADP	Groupe de travail spécial sur la plate-forme de Durban pour une action renforcée	<i>DPA</i>	<i>Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action</i>
AIE	Agence internationale de l'énergie (www.iea.org)	<i>IEA</i>	<i>International Energy Agency</i>
AND	Autorité nationale désignée	<i>DNA</i>	<i>Designated national authority</i>
APEID	Alliance des petits États insulaires en développement (www.sidsnet.org/aosis)	<i>AOSIS</i>	<i>Alliance of Small Island States</i>
CAI	Consultation et analyse internationale	<i>ACI</i>	<i>International Consultation and Analysis</i>
CACAM (de l'anglais)	Groupe de pays de l'Asie centrale, du Caucase, de l'Albanie et de la Moldavie	<i>CACAM</i>	<i>Central Asia, Caucasus, Albania and Moldova Group</i>
CCNUCC	Convention-cadre des Nations Unies sur les changements climatiques (http://unfccc.int)	<i>UNFCCC</i>	<i>United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</i>
CdP	Conférence des Parties à la Convention-cadre des Nations Unies sur les changements climatiques	<i>COP</i>	<i>Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change</i>
CEE	Communauté économique européenne	<i>EEC</i>	<i>European Economic Community</i>
Conseil exécutif du MDP	Conseil exécutif du Mécanisme pour un développement propre	<i>Executive Board of the CDM</i>	<i>Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism</i>
CRP	Conférence des Parties agissant comme Réunion des Parties au Protocole de Kyoto	<i>CMP ou COP/MOP</i>	<i>Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol</i>
DAR	Dispositif d'allocation des ressources	<i>RAF</i>	<i>Resources Allocation Framework</i>
Dialogue de la CCNUCC	Dialogue sur l'action de coopération à long terme pour faire face aux changements climatiques à travers l'amélioration de la mise en application de la Convention	<i>UNFCCC Dialogue</i>	<i>Dialogue on long-term cooperative action to address climate change by enhancing implementation of the Convention</i>
FA	Fonds pour l'adaptation		<i>Adaptation Fund</i>
FEM	Fonds pour l'environnement mondial (www.gefweb.org)	<i>GEF</i>	<i>Global Environment Facility</i>
Fonds pour les PMA	Fonds pour les pays les moins avancés	<i>LDCF</i>	<i>Least Developed Countries Fund</i>
FSCC	Fonds spécial pour les changements climatiques	<i>SCCF</i>	<i>Special Climate Change Fund</i>
FVC	Fonds vert pour le climat	<i>GCF</i>	<i>Green Climate Fund</i>
G-77 /Chine	Groupe des 77 et Chine (www.G-77.org)	<i>G-77/China</i>	<i>Group of 77 and China</i>

French		English	
GCE	Groupe consultatif d'experts des communications nationales des Parties non visées à l'Annexe I	CGE	<i>Consultative Group of Experts on non-Annex I national communications</i>
GEPMA	Groupe d'experts sur les pays les moins avancés	LEG	<i>Least Developed Country Expert Group</i>
GES	Gaz à effet de serre	GHG	<i>Greenhouse gas</i>
GETT	Groupe d'experts sur le transfert de technologies	EGTT	<i>Expert Group on Technology Transfer</i>
GIEC	Groupe d'experts intergouvernemental sur l'évolution du climat (www.ipcc.ch)	IPCC	<i>Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change</i>
GRULAC (de l'espagnol)	Groupe régional de l'Amérique latine et des Caraïbes	GRULAC (de l'espagnol)	<i>Regional group of Latin America and Caribbean Countries</i>
GTS-ACV	Groupe de travail spécial de l'action concertée à long terme au titre de la Convention	AWG-LCA	<i>Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention</i>
GTS-PK	Groupe de travail spécial sur les nouveaux engagements pour les Parties visées à l'Annexe I au titre du Protocole de Kyoto	AWG-KP	<i>Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol</i>
HFC	Hydrofluorocarbures	HFC	<i>Hydrofluorocarbons</i>
ICA	Consultation et analyse internationale	ICA	<i>International consultation and analysis</i>
IAR	Évaluation et révision internationales	IAR	<i>Independent assessment and review</i>
MDP	Mécanisme pour un développement propre (cdm.unfccc.int)	CDM	<i>Clean Development Mechanism</i>
MOC	Mise en œuvre conjointe (ji.unfccc.int)	JI	<i>Joint Implementation</i>
MRV	Mesurable, notifiable et vérifiable	MRV	<i>Measurable, reportable and verifiable</i>
MAAN	Mesures d'atténuation appropriées au niveau national	NAMA	<i>Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions</i>
OACI	Organisation de l'aviation civile internationale	ICAO	<i>International Civil Aviation Organization</i>
OCDE	Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques	OECD	<i>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</i>
OMI	Organisation maritime internationale	IMO	<i>International Maritime Organization</i>
OMM	Organisation météorologique mondiale	WMO	<i>World Meteorological Organization</i>
ONG	Organisation non gouvernementale	NGO	<i>Non governmental organization</i>
OPEP	Organisation des pays exportateurs de pétrole	OPEC	<i>Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries</i>
OS	Organe subsidiaire	SB	<i>Subsidiary Body</i>
OS CST	Organe subsidiaire de conseil scientifique et technologique	SBSTA	<i>Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice</i>
OS MCE	Organe subsidiaire de mise en œuvre	SBI	<i>Subsidiary Body for Implementation</i>

French		English	
PANA	Programme d'action national aux fins de l'adaptation	NAPA	<i>National Adaptation Programme of Action</i>
PEID	Petits États insulaires en développement (www.sidsnet.org)	SIDS	<i>Small Island Developing States</i>
PK	Protocole de Kyoto	KP	<i>Kyoto Protocol</i>
PMA	Pays les moins avancés	LDCs	<i>Least Developed Countries</i>
PNA	Plans nationaux d'allocation	NAPs	<i>National Allocation Plans</i>
ppm	Parties par million (volume/poids)	ppm	<i>Parts per million (volume/weight)</i>
PTN	Programme de travail de Nairobi sur les incidences des changements climatiques et la vulnérabilité et l'adaptation à ces changements		<i>Nairobi work programme on impacts, vulnerability and adaptation to climate change</i>
QELRO	Objectifs chiffrés de limitation et de réduction des émissions	QELRO	<i>Quantified emission reduction objectives</i>
R&D	Recherche et développement	R&D	<i>Research and development</i>
REDD	Réduction des émissions découlant du déboisement et de la dégradation	REDD	<i>Reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation</i>
RIT	Relevé international des transactions	ITL	<i>International Transaction Log</i>
SMOC	Système mondial d'observation du climat (www.wmo.ch/web/gcos/gcoshome.html)	GCOS	<i>Global Climate Observing System</i>
SMOT	Système mondial d'observation terrestre (www.fao.org/gtos)	GTOS	<i>Global Terrestrial Observing System</i>
UE	Union européenne	EU	<i>European Union</i>
UQA	Unité de quantité attribuée	AAU	<i>Assigned Amount Unit</i>
URCE	Unité de réduction certifiée des émissions	CER	<i>Certified Emission Reduction</i>
URCE-T	URCE temporaire	tCER	<i>Temporary Certified Emission Reduction</i>
URE	Unité de réduction des émissions	ERU	<i>Emission Reduction Unit</i>
UTCATF	Utilisation des terres, changement d'affectation des terres et foresterie	LULUCF	<i>Land Use, Land Use Changes and Forestry</i>

Abbreviations and acronyms English - French

English		French	
AAU	Assigned Amount Unit	<i>UQA</i>	<i>Unité de quantité attribuée</i>
ADP	Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action	<i>ADP</i>	<i>Groupe de travail spécial sur la plateforme de Durban pour une action renforcée</i>
AOSIS	Alliance of Small Island States	<i>APEID</i>	<i>Alliance des petits États insulaires en développement (www.sidsnet.org/laosis)</i>
AWG-KP	Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol	<i>GTS-PK</i>	<i>Groupe de travail spécial sur les nouveaux engagements pour les Parties visées à l'Annexe I au titre du Protocole de Kyoto</i>
AWG-LCA	Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the Convention	<i>GTS-ACV</i>	<i>Groupe de travail spécial de l'action concertée à long terme au titre de la Convention</i>
BUR	Biennial Update Reports		<i>Rapports biennaux mis à jour</i>
CACAM	Central Asia, Caucasus, Albania and Moldova Group	<i>CACAM (de l'anglais)</i>	<i>Groupe de pays de l'Asie centrale, du Caucase, de l'Albanie et de la Moldavie</i>
CCS	Carbon capture and storage		<i>Captage et stockage du carbone</i>
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism	<i>MDP</i>	<i>Mécanisme pour un développement propre (cdm.unfccc.int)</i>
CER	Certified Emission Reduction	<i>URCE</i>	<i>Unité de réduction certifiée des émissions</i>
CGE	Consultative Group of Experts on non-Annex I national communications	<i>GCE</i>	<i>Groupe consultatif d'experts des communications nationales des Parties non visées à l'Annexe I</i>
CMP ou COP/MOP	Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol	<i>CRP</i>	<i>Conférence des Parties agissant comme Réunion des Parties au Protocole de Kyoto</i>
COP	Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change	<i>CdP</i>	<i>Conférence des Parties à la Convention-cadre des Nations Unies sur les changements climatiques</i>
DNA	Designated national authority	<i>AND</i>	<i>Autorité nationale désignée</i>
EEC	European Economic Community	<i>CEE</i>	<i>Communauté économique européenne</i>
EGTT	Expert Group on Technology Transfer	<i>GETT</i>	<i>Groupe d'experts sur le transfert de technologies</i>
ERU	Emission Reduction Unit	<i>URE</i>	<i>Unité de réduction des émissions</i>
EU	European Union	<i>UE</i>	<i>Union européenne</i>
EUA	European Union allowances		<i>Quota de la Communauté européenne</i>
Executive Board of the CDM	Executive Board of the Clean Development Mechanism	<i>Conseil exécutif du MDP</i>	<i>Conseil exécutif du Mécanisme pour un développement propre</i>
G-77/China	Group of 77 and China	<i>G-77/Chine</i>	<i>Groupe des 77 et Chine (www.G-77.org)</i>

English		French	
GCOS	Global Climate Observing System	SMOC	<i>Système mondial d'observation du climat (www.wmo.ch/web/gcos/gcos-home.html)</i>
GEF	Global Environment Facility	FEM	<i>Fonds pour l'environnement mondial (www.gefweb.org)</i>
GHG	Greenhouse gas	GES	<i>Gaz à effet de serre</i>
GRULAC (de l'espagnol)	Regional group of Latin America and Caribbean Countries	GRULAC (de l'espagnol)	<i>Groupe régional de l'Amérique latine et des Caraïbes</i>
GTOS	Global Terrestrial Observing System	SMOT	<i>Système mondial d'observation terrestre (www.fao.org/gtos)</i>
ICA	International Consultation and Analysis	CAI	<i>Consultation et analyse internationale</i>
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization	OACI	<i>Organisation de l'aviation civile internationale</i>
IEA	International Energy Agency	AIE	<i>Agence internationale de l'énergie (www.iea.org)</i>
IETA	International Emissions Trading Association		<i>Association internationale du marché des émissions (www.ieta.org)</i>
IMO	International Maritime Organization	OMI	<i>Organisation maritime internationale</i>
IPCC	Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change	GIEC	<i>Groupe d'experts intergouvernemental sur l'évolution du climat (www.ipcc.ch)</i>
ITL	International Transaction Log	RIT	<i>Relevé international des transactions</i>
JI	Joint Implementation	MOC	<i>Mise en œuvre conjointe (ji.unfccc.int)</i>
JISC	Joint Implementation Supervisory Committee	CSMCEC	<i>Comité de supervision de la mise en œuvre concertée</i>
JUSS-CANNZ	Japan, US, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway and New Zealand		<i>Groupe du JUSSCANNZ</i>
KP	Kyoto Protocol	PK	<i>Protocole de Kyoto</i>
LDCs	Least Developed Countries	PMA	<i>Pays les moins avancés</i>
LDCF	Least Developed Countries Fund	Fonds pour les PMA	<i>Fonds pour les pays les moins avancés</i>
LEG	Least Developed Country Expert Group	GEPMA	<i>Groupe d'experts sur les pays les moins avancés</i>
LULUCF	Land Use, Land Use Changes and Forestry	UTCATF	<i>Utilisation des terres, changement d'affectation des terres et foresterie</i>
MRV	Measurable, reportable and verifiable	MRV	<i>Mesurable, notifiable et vérifiable</i>
NAMA	Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions	MAAN	<i>Mesures d'atténuation appropriées au niveau national</i>
NAPs	National Allocation Plan	PNA	<i>Plans nationaux d'allocation</i>
NAPA	National Adaptation Programme of Action	PANA	<i>Programme d'action national aux fins de l'adaptation</i>

English		French	
NGO	Non governmental organization	<i>ONG</i>	<i>Organisation non gouvernementale</i>
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development	<i>OCDE</i>	<i>Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques</i>
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries	<i>OPEP</i>	<i>Organisation de pays exportateurs de pétrole</i>
ppm	Parts per million (volume/weight)	<i>ppm</i>	<i>Parties par million (volume/poids)</i>
QELRO	Quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives	<i>QELRO</i>	<i>Objectifs chiffrés de limitation et de réduction des émissions</i>
RAF	Resources Allocation Framework	<i>DAR</i>	<i>Dispositif d'allocation des ressources</i>
REDD	Reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation	<i>REDD</i>	<i>Réduction des émissions découlant du déboisement et de la dégradation</i>
RGGI	Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative		<i>Initiative régionale sur les gaz à effet de serre (www.rggi.org)</i>
SB	Subsidiary Body	<i>OS</i>	<i>Organe subsidiaire</i>
SBI	Subsidiary Body for Implementation	<i>OSMCE</i>	<i>Organe subsidiaire de mise en œuvre</i>
SBSTA	Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice	<i>OSCST</i>	<i>Organe subsidiaire de conseil scientifique et technologique</i>
SCCF	Special Climate Change Fund	<i>FSCC</i>	<i>Fonds spécial pour les changements climatiques</i>
SIDS	Small Island Developing States	<i>PEID</i>	<i>Petits États insulaires en développement (www.sidsnet.org)</i>
tCER	Temporary Certified Emission Reduction	<i>URCE-T</i>	<i>Unité de réduction certifiée des émissions temporaire</i>
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme	<i>PNUD</i>	<i>Programme des Nations Unies pour le développement</i>
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme	<i>PNUM</i>	<i>Programme des Nations Unies pour l'environnement</i>
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change	<i>CCNUCC</i>	<i>Convention-cadre des Nations Unies sur les changements climatiques (http://unfccc.int)</i>
UNFCCC Dialogue	Dialogue on long-term cooperative action to address climate change by enhancing implementation of the Convention	<i>Dialogue de la CCNUCC</i>	<i>Dialogue sur l'action de coopération à long terme pour faire face aux changements climatiques à travers l'amélioration de la mise en application de la Convention</i>
WEOG	Western Europe and Others Group		<i>Groupe de l'Europe de l'Ouest et des autres</i>
WMO	World Meteorological Organization	<i>OMM</i>	<i>Organisation météorologique mondiale</i>

Sheet C.
Lexicon
French - English

French	English
Mesures d'atténuation appropriées au niveau national	Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions
Branche coercitive	Enforcement branch
Branche facilitatrice	Facilitative branch
Captage et stockage du carbone	Carbon capture and storage
Centre d'information sur les technologies	Technology clearing house
Comité de contrôle de respect des dispositions	Compliance Committee
Comité de surveillance de la MOC	JI Supervisory Committee
Comité exécutif du MDP	CDM Executive Committee
Communication nationale	National communication
Conséquences néfastes	Adverse effects
Consultation et analyse internationales	International Consultation and Analysis
Critères d'admissibilité	Eligibility criteria
Échange international de droits d'émissions	International emissions trading
Fonds d'adaptation du Protocole de Kyoto	Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund
Fongibilité	Fungibility
Groupe parapluie (ou Groupe chapeau ou Groupe de l'ombrelle)	Umbrella Group
Inventaire	Inventory
Lignes directrices	Guidelines
Mécanisme de projets	Project-based mechanism
Mécanisme de flexibilité	Flexibility mechanism
Mesurable, notifiable et vérifiable	Measurable, reportable and verifiable
Mesure de riposte	Response measures
Plafond d'émissions	Emissions cap
Plan d'action structurel d'observance	Compliance action plan
Principe d'addition	Additionality
Quantité attribuée	Assigned Amount
Renforcement des capacités	Capacity building
Scénario de référence	Baseline
Système de conformité	Compliance System
Système national d'inventaire	National inventory system
Transfert de technologies	Technology transfer

Lexicon

English - French

English	French
Additionality	Principe d'addition
Adverse effects	Conséquences néfastes
Assigned Amount	Quantité attribuée
Baseline	Scénario de référence
Capacity building	Renforcement des capacités
Carbon capture and storage	Captage et stockage du carbone
CDM Executive Committee	Comité exécutif du MDP
Compliance action plan	Plan d'action structurel d'observance
Compliance Committee	Comité de contrôle de respect des dispositions
Compliance System	Système de conformité
Eligibility criteria	Critères d'admissibilité
Emissions cap	Plafond d'émissions
Enforcement branch	Branche coercitive
Facilitative branch	Branche facilitatrice
Flexibility mechanism	Mécanisme de flexibilité
Fungibility	Fongibilité
Guidelines	Lignes directrices
International emissions trading	Échange international de droits d'émissions
International Consultation and Analysis	Consultation et analyse internationales
Inventory	Inventaire
JI Supervisory Committee	Comité de surveillance de la MOC
Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund	Fonds d'adaptation du Protocole de Kyoto
Measurable, reportable and verifiable	Mesurable, notifiable et vérifiable
National communication	Communication nationale
National inventory system	Système national d'inventaire
Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions	Mesures d'atténuation appropriées au niveau national
Project-based mechanism	Mécanisme de projets
Response measures	Mesure de riposte
Technology clearing house	Centre d'information sur les technologies
Technology transfer	Transfert de technologies
Umbrella Group	Groupe parapluie (ou Groupe chapeau ou Groupe de l'ombrelle)

Sheet D. Themed glossary

Adaptation	Ability of a system to adjust its mechanisms, processes and structure to climate change. Adaptation can be spontaneous or planned; it can occur in response to or in advance of a change in conditions.
Additional reductions	See Additionality
Additionality	Characterises the GHG emission reductions generated by the compensatory projects must be greater than the emissions which would have occurred without these projects. The goal of environmental additionality is to demonstrate that a project produces actual, measurable, additional and long-term GHG reductions.
Affected greenhouse gas source, sink or reservoir	<p>GHG source, sink or reservoir influenced by the activity of a project through modifications to the supply and demand of the market regarding its associated products or service or through physical movement.</p> <p>NOTE 1: Whilst the associated GHG sources, sinks or reservoirs are linked physically to a GHG project, the affected GHG sources, sinks or reservoirs are linked to a GHG project by changes caused by market supply and demand.</p> <p>NOTE 2: An affected GHG source, sink or reservoir is normally found off the project site.</p> <p>NOTE 3: The reductions in emissions or the increases in GHG removals attributable to the affected GHG sources, sinks or reservoirs are commonly called "leaks".</p>
Afforestation	Action of planting trees on land that has had no forest cover for a certain number of years.
Annex B	Annex B is attached to the Kyoto Protocol. It identifies 38 industrialised countries (developed countries and transition countries) that have made commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions during the period 2008-2012.
Annex I	Annex I is attached to the United Nations Framework on Climate Change. It quotes forty industrialised countries (developed countries and transition countries) that have made commitments to stabilise the greenhouse gas emissions at 1990 levels.
Annex II	Annex II is attached to the United Nations Framework on Climate Change. It identifies 24 industrialised countries (including in Annex I) that have agreed to provide financial and technological aid to developing countries to combat climate change.

Anthropogenic	Greenhouse gas emissions caused by human activities are called anthropogenic when they do not come from natural emissions. These are additional emissions which can be considered as pollution.
Assigned amount units (AAU)	Units issued by the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol in their national register. The amount assigned is calculated according to emissions of the base year and quantified emission reduction commitments. This quantity is expressed as a percentage.
Associated greenhouse gas source, sink or reservoir	<p>A GHG source, sink or reservoir with material or energy flows entering or exiting the project or which are contained within it.</p> <p>NOTE 1: An associated GHG source, sink or reservoir is normally found upstream or downstream of the project and can be located on or off the project site.</p> <p>NOTE 2: An associated GHG source, sink or reservoir can also include activities relating to the design, construction or declassification of a project.</p>
Baseline	This is a historical level used to calculate subsequent changes in greenhouse gas emissions. This level is determined micro-economically or macro-economically. It is of crucial importance in determining the additionality level of reductions resulting from joint initiative projects or those implemented under the Clean Development Mechanism or the Joint Implementation.
Baseline scenario	<p>Hypothetical reference case that represents in the best possible way the conditions that would be the most likely in the absence of the greenhouse gas project.</p> <p>NOTE: The baseline scenario coincides with the GHG project chronology.</p>
Business as usual	Greenhouse gases resulting from general trends in an economy with no emission control policy. This reference is used to estimate the effectiveness of policies and measures undertaken to combat greenhouse gas emissions.
Carbon dioxide capture and storage	The process of increasing the carbon content of a carbon reservoir other than the atmosphere. This process designates the separation of CO ₂ from flue gases or from processing fossil fuels to produce CO ₂ -rich fractions and long-term storage underground in exhausted oil and gas reservoirs, coal seams and saline aquifers.
Carbon leakage	Part of GHG emission reductions in Annex B countries that may be offset by an increase in emissions in non-constrained countries above their baseline levels. This can occur through (i) relocation of energy-intensive production units in non-constrained regions; (ii) increased consumption of fossil fuels in these regions through decline in the international price of oil and gas triggered by lower demand for these energies; and (iii) changes in revenues (thus in energy demand) due to improved economic conditions.

NOTE: The term also refers to the situation in which a carbon capture activity (tree planting, for example) on one piece of land inadvertently, directly or indirectly, triggers an activity, which in whole or part, counteracts the carbon effects of the initial activity.

Carbon market	Name for a group of greenhouse gas emissions trading and transaction mechanisms. The carbon market designates both the voluntary market for the voluntary compensation of GHG emissions and the regulated markets that make the regulated emitters compliant.
Carbon neutrality	Objective of no longer emitting GHG, or more realistically, action of investing in one or more projects that will avoid producing an equivalent quantity of GHG than generated by the entity seeking carbon neutrality.
Carbon sink	Any process, activity or mechanism, natural or artificial, that removes a greenhouse gas, an aerosol or a precursor of a greenhouse gas from the atmosphere (for example, trees, plants and oceans).
Certified emission reductions (CER)	Certified emission reductions (CER) are emission credits obtained through CDM projects. These credits can be applied directly to fulfil the quantified commitments of Annex B countries.
Clean development mechanism (CDM)	Flexibility mechanism provided for under the Kyoto Protocol (Art. 12). It assumes the implementation of emission reduction or avoidance projects in the developing countries. The CDM projects require at least three partners: the developing country (project host), the private investor (project manager) and the Annex B country from which the private investor comes.
Climate change	Climate variations that are attributed directly or indirectly to human activity, altering the composition of the atmosphere, and which are added to the natural variability of the climate note during comparable periods.
CO₂ equivalent	The concentration of carbon dioxide (CO ₂) that would cause the same amount of radiative forcing as a given mixture of CO ₂ and other greenhouse gases. NOTE 1: The CO ₂ equivalent is calculated using the mass of a given GHG multiplied by its global warming potential. NOTE 2: Annex B lists global warming potentials established by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.
Compensatory credits	Emission right representing a tonne of sequestered or removed equivalent CO ₂ , given to the promoter of a compensatory credit project to reduce GHG emissions.
Compliance	Obligation whereby the emitter is required to comply with his objectives of GHG emission reductions. The verification of compliance with the commitments and mandatory objectives is an essential factor in a mandatory emission reduction system. Compliance includes the verification modalities.

	<p>ties, the organisation responsible for verifying the compliance and the possible sanctions.</p> <p>Synonym: obligation compliance</p>
Controlled greenhouse gas source, sink or reservoir	<p>A GHG source, sink or reservoir that operates under the guidance or influence of an author of a greenhouse gas project proposal through financial, political, management or other instruments.</p> <p>NOTE: A controlled GHG source, sink or reservoir is normally found on the project site.</p>
Emission cap-and-trade system	<p>System that assigns rights to companies for their greenhouse gas emissions based on governmental environmental objectives. Compensatory credits issued thanks to a GHG reduction project can also be traded in this system.</p>
Emission reduction units (ERU)	<p>Units converted from an assigned amount unit (AAU) or a removal unit and handed to the project participant under joint implementation activities.</p>
Emission right	<p>Any emission right symbolising the reduction of GHG emissions by one metric tonne of equivalent carbon dioxide, i.e. an emission unit, an emission quota or a compensatory credit. These rights can be traded inside international or national carbon trading systems.</p>
Emissions unit	<p>Under the cap-and-trade system, an emission unit designates a right of emission generated by the government according to the declared GHG emissions verified by the companies. A right of emission relates to the authorisation to emit 1 tCO₂eq.</p>
Energy intensity	<p>Ratio of energy consumption to economic or physical output. At the national level, energy intensity is the ratio of total domestic consumption or final energy consumption to Gross Domestic Product or physical output.</p>
Fossil fuel	<p>Natural gas, petroleum, coal or any solid, liquid or gaseous fuel derived from these materials.</p>
Fungibility	<p>Quality of what is consumed through use and which can be replaced by other similar products. In the context of the carbon market, fungibility makes no distinction between the categories of units and considers them all identical (one AAU would therefore be equivalent to a JI project unit and also to a unit resulting from an internal measurement of energy efficiency).</p>
GHG inventory	<p>Assessment that measures the GHG emissions from activities of an entity (country, business, municipality, etc.). This assessment is calculated in relation to a reference year.</p>

Global warming potential (GWP) or planet warming potential (PWP)	<p>Index describing the radiation characteristics of greenhouse gases. The GWP or PWP represents the combined effect of the time these gases remain in the atmosphere and their relative effectiveness in absorbing outgoing infrared radiation. This index approximates the time-integrated warming effect of a unit mass of a given greenhouse gas in the atmosphere, relative to that of CO₂.</p> <p>NOTE: The reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change contain planet warming potential tables.</p>
Greenhouse gas emission	Total mass of a GHG which is released into the atmosphere during a given period.
Greenhouse gas emission or removal factor	<p>Factor reporting the activity data on the GHG emissions or removals.</p> <p>NOTE: A greenhouse gas emission or removal factor can include an oxidation factor.</p>
Greenhouse gas emission reduction	Calculated drop in GHG emissions between the baseline scenario emissions and the actual emissions avoided by a project.
Greenhouse gas programme	Voluntary or mandatory, international, national or sub-national system or plan which records, counts or manages the emissions, removals, greenhouse gas emission reductions or improvements in greenhouse gas removals.
Greenhouse gas reservoir	<p>Physical unit or biosphere, geosphere or hydrosphere component capable of storing or accumulating a GHG removed from the atmosphere by a greenhouse gas sink or a GHG captured at its source.</p> <p>NOTE 1: The total mass of carbon contained in a GHG reservoir at a given moment can be called reservoir carbon stock.</p> <p>NOTE 2: A GHG reservoir can transfer GHG to another reservoir.</p> <p>NOTE 3: Collecting a GHG at its source before it enters the atmosphere and storing the GHG collected in a GHG reservoir can be called GHG capture and storage.</p>
Greenhouse gas source	Physical unit or process releasing a GHG into the atmosphere.
Greenhouse gases (GHG)	Gaseous constituents of the atmosphere, both natural and anthropogenic, that remove and re-emit the infrared radiation. They help maintain the heat in the Earth's atmosphere. These gases are produced by both natural and anthropogenic processes. The main gases are water vapour, carbon dioxide (CO ₂), methane (CH ₄), dinitrogen oxide (N ₂ O), chlorofluorocarbons, hydrofluorocarbons (HFC), nitrogen trifluoride (NF ₃), perfluorocarbons (PFC) and sulphur hexafluoride (SF ₆).
Hot air	Due to their industrial recession in the 1990s, certain Annex B countries to the Kyoto Protocol (like Russia and Ukraine) received higher emission limitation targets than their total amount of emissions without taking any measures for domestic reduction. This quota surplus (hot air) could potentially be sold to other countries via flexibility mechanisms.

Improvement in greenhouse gas removals	Calculated improvement of greenhouse gas removals between a baseline scenario and a project. The removal designates the penetration of greenhouse gases in a living organism that assimilates these gases and therefore the disappearance of the removed greenhouse gases.
Joint implementation (JI)	Flexibility mechanism provided for under the Kyoto Protocol (Art. 12). This mechanism is used by the governments of industrialised countries and their companies to finance greenhouse gas emission reduction projects in the other industrialised countries (mainly the Eastern European countries and Russia). In return, these States receive emission credits that they can sell or deduct from their own national efforts.
Land Use, Land Use changes and Forestry (LULUCF)	Land use and their changes (forest, agriculture, natural areas, etc.) have a significant influence on carbon storage (sink) and methane (CH ₄) releases and therefore on climate change. They contribute to the anthropogenic emissions taken into account by the Kyoto Protocol. The problem of land and forest use goes hand in hand with the concerns of two other conventions: biodiversity and desertification.
Materiality	An item of information, an error or an inaccuracy are normally considered as material if they can influence people building on them. This concept comes into play when verifying project data and embodies the idea that there is a threshold beyond which the search for other potential errors is not longer justified in terms of time, money or the efforts required. Thus, if the error found generates a difference in the emission reductions of the project which is below the set threshold, this error is viewed as negligible or, in other words, immaterial.
Mitigation	Human intervention to reduce the sources of greenhouse gases or reinforce the sinks of greenhouse gases, either by extending the surface area or by improving their removal capacity.
Monitoring	Continuous or periodic assessment of emissions and removals of GHG or other GHG-related data.
Reduction in emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+)	International issue of the post-2012 climate regime on the financial provisions and the transfer of technology under the reduction plan for emissions caused by deforestation and forest degradation. This issue also includes the protection and sustainable management of forests and the promotion of forest carbon stocks in the developing countries resulting, for example, from adapted silvicultural practices or plantings.
Reforestation	Planting of forests on lands that had previously contained forests but have been converted to other uses.
Removal units	Units issued by the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol and which covers the net removal by carbon sinks of GHG from Land Use, Land Use Changes and Forestry (LULUCF) activities.

Sequestration	CO ₂ sequestration projects can contribute in two distinct and sometimes complementary ways to carbon sequestration: (i) by extracting the carbonic gas from the atmosphere and storing it as over- and underground biomass; (ii) by producing additional renewable biomass where the waste-to-energy conversion can avoid the recourse to fossil fuels.
Standard of performance	Simplified approach of additionality and the baseline scenario. Rather than seeking to prove the additionality and to determine the baseline scenario for each project, the standard of performance is an approximate evaluation that establishes a generic baseline scenario as a quantitative standard of performance. Any project where the emissions are below this predefined standard is considered as additional.
Supplementarity	In the context of the UNFCCC, supplementarity refers to the option available to the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol to introduce, in addition to the Kyoto mechanisms, suitable domestic policies, energy-related or otherwise, to fulfil the GHG emission reduction objectives in the long term.
Target user	<p>Person or organisation identified by those in charge declaring information relating to greenhouse gases and which relies on this information to take decisions.</p> <p>NOTE 1: The target user can be the customer, the responsible party, the administrators of the GHG programme, regulators, the financial community or other stakeholders involved such as local authorities, ministerial departments or non-governmental organisations.</p> <p>NOTE 2: The level of assurance is used to determine the accuracy a validator or verifier gives to his validation or verification plan to detect any errors, omissions or false declarations.</p> <p>NOTE 3: There are two assurance levels (reasonable or limited) that result in validation or verification reports that are formulated differently. See ISO 14064-3: 2006 A.2.3.2 for sample validation and verification reports.</p>
Tonne of carbon equivalent	See CO ₂ equivalent
Voluntary market	Carbon credits trading mechanism not linked to national or international regulations.
Vulnerability	Vulnerability defines to what extent a system can be degraded or damaged by climate change. It depends not just on the sensitivity but also on the adaptability of the system to new climatic conditions.
Woodland clearance	Conversion of forest to non-forest. Synonym: Deforestation

Source:

- Climate Glossary (Husseini and Brodhag, 2000).
- IPCC Glossary (IPCC, 1995).
- Stockholm Environment Institute and Greenhouse Gas Management Institute (2011).
- CDM Rulebook.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adaptation Fund Board (2009a). *Operational Policies and Guidelines for Parties to Access Resources from the Adaptation Fund*. http://www.adaptation-fund.org/images/AFB.Operational_Policies_and_Guidelines.pdf.
- Adaptation Fund Board (2009b). *Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Adaptation Fund Board*. Bonn, 15-17 June. http://www.adaptation-fund.org/images/AFB.B.6.14.final_report.pdf.
- Agrawala, S. and S. Fankhauser (2008). *Economic Aspects of Adaptation to Climate Change: Costs, Benefits, and Policy Instruments*. Paris: OECD.
- Bodansky, D. (2012). *The Durban Platform Negotiations: Goals and Options*, Harvard Project on Climate Agreements, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, July. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/22196/durban_platform_negotiations.html
- Davis, C. and F. Daviet, (2010), *Investing in Results: Enhancing Coordination for More Effective Interim REDD+ Financing*. Washington D.C.: World Resources Institute. November. <http://www.wri.org/publication/investing-in-results>
- Global Environment Facility (GEF) (2005). *The GEF resource allocation system*. 17 October. http://www.gefweb.org/Operational_Policies/raf/documents/RAF_C.27.inf.8.Rev.1_%20Oct_17_2005_French.pdf.
- GEF (2010a). *GEF-5 Operational procedures for the system for a transparent allocation of resources (STAR)*. GEF/C.38/9/Rev.1. http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/C.38.9_Rev1_GEF-5%20Operational%20Procedures%20for%20STAR_0.pdf.
- GEF (2010b). *GEF-5 Programming document, Sixth Meeting for the Fifth Replenishment of the GEF Trust Fund*, 12 May 2010, GEF/R.5/31. <http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/GEFR.5.31.pdf>
- GEF (2010c). *Summary of negotiations fifth replenishment of the GEF Trust Fund*, GEF/A.4/7. <http://www.unccd.int/publicinfo/pressrel/docs/gefa47.pdf>.
- GEF (2010d). *Status Report on the Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) and the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF)*. 1 July. <http://thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/Satus%20Report%20on%20the%20Climate%20Change%20Funds%20-%20May%2031%202010%20Rev.1.pdf>
- Gagnon-Lebrun, F., H. Olivas and C. Figueres (2005). *Navigating the COP/CMP: a Guide to the COP/CMP process*. Centre Hélios and ÉcoRessources Consultants.
- IPCC (2005). *Capture and storage of carbon dioxide, summary for policymakers and technical summary*. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/special-reports/srccs/srccs_spm_ts_fr.pdf.
- IPCC (2007a) *Summary for policymakers in 2007 Climate Change Assessment: Climate change mitigation*, Contribution by Working Group III to the fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Cambridge University Press,
- Hamilton, K., M. Sjardin, A. Shapiro and T. Marcello (2009). *Fortifying the Foundation. State of the Voluntary Carbon Markets 2009*. New York and Washington D.C.: Ecosystem Market Place and New Carbon Finance.

- Hamilton, K., M. Sjardin, M. Peters-Stanley and T. Marcello, 2010. *Building Bridges. State of the Voluntary Carbon Markets 2010*. New York and Washington: Bloomberg New Energy Finance and Ecosystem Marketplace.
- Hope, C. (2009). *How Deep Should the Deep Cuts Be? Optimal CO2 Emissions over Time under Uncertainty*. *Climate Policy* 9 (1) : 3-8.
- IISD (2011a). Earth Negotiations Bulletin, *Highlights of AWG-LCA-14 and AWG-KP-16: Thursday, 9 June 2011* (SB-34), Vol. 12, No. 506, International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), Reporting Services.
- IISD (2010b). Earth Negotiations Bulletin, *Summary of Bonn discussions on climate change: 6-17 June 2011* (SB-34), Vol. 12 No. 502, International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), Reporting Services.
- IISD (2011c). Earth Negotiations Bulletin, *Report of the United Nations Conference on Climate Change in Bonn: 6-17 June 2011* (Final SB-34), Vol. 12 no. 513, International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), Reporting Services.
- IISD (2011d). Earth Negotiations Bulletin, *Compilation of reports from the Durban Conference*, International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), Reporting Services.
- IISD (2011e). Earth Negotiations Bulletin, *Report on the Durban Conference: 28 November-11 December 2011* (Final COP-17), vol. 12, No. 534, International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), Reporting Services.
- IISD (2012a). Earth Negotiations Bulletin, *Compilation of reports from the United Nations Conference on Climate Change in Bonn*, International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), Reporting Services.
- IISD (2012b). Earth Negotiations Bulletin, *Report of the Bonn Conference on Climate Change* (Final SB-36), Vol. 12 no. 546, International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), Reporting Services.
- IISD (2012c) Earth Negotiations Bulletin, *Highlights of the intersession period: Monday, 14 May 2012* (SB-36), Vol. 12 no. 535, International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), Reporting Services.
- IISD (2012d) Earth Negotiations Bulletin, *Highlights of AWG-LCA-15 and AWG-KP-17: Wednesday, 16 May* (SB-36), Vol. 12 no. 538, International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), Reporting Services.
- IISD (2012e) Earth Negotiations Bulletin, *Highlights of discussions in Bangkok on the climate*, Thursday, 30 August, Vol. 12, No. 549, International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), Reporting Services.
- IISD (2012f) Earth Negotiations Bulletin, *Highlights of discussions in Bangkok on the climate*, 3-8 April 2012, Vol. 12 no. 555, International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), Reporting Services.
- IISD (2012g) Earth Negotiations Bulletin, *Highlights of AWG-LCA-15 and AWG-KP-17: Tuesday, 22 May* (SB-36), Vol. 12 no. 543, International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), Reporting Services.
- Kartha, S. and Erickson, P.(2011). *Comparison of Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 pledges under the Cancun Agreements*, Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI). <http://sei-us.org/publications/id/393>

- Massawa, E., T. Downing, S. Huqet M. Alam (2009). *Negotiating Adaptation: International issues of Equity and Finance*. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), Stockholm Environment Institute et International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED). <http://www.unep.org/climatechange/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=vyttfYtHi4Y%3d&tabid=389&language=en-US>.
- Mucci, M. (2012) *Measurement, Reporting and Verification: A note on the concept with an annotated bibliography*. April 2012, International Institute of Sustainable Development, Winnipeg, Canada: International Institute of Sustainable Development (IISD).
- Müller, B., *Plan C, The role of the Kyoto Protocol in a legally binding outcome* (2011) Oxford Energy and Environment Brief.
- Murphy, D. and J. Drexhage (2009). *State of the UNCCFC negotiations: Outcome of the Bonn discussions on climate change, March 2009*. Winnipeg, Canada: International Institute of Sustainable Development (IISD).
- Neuymayer, E. and Plümper, T. (2007). *The Gendered Nature of Natural Disasters. The Impact of Catastrophic Events on the Gender Gap in Life Expectancy, 1981-2002*. Annals of the American Association of Geographers, Vol. 97, no. 3, pp. 551-566.
- Parker, C., A. Mitchell, M. Trivedi, N. Mardas (2009). *The Little REDD+ Book*, 2nd édition. Oxford, United Kingdom: the Global Canopy Programme.
- UNDP (2009a). UNFCCC negotiation: *Summary of Bonn sessions (AWG-LCA-5 and AWG-KP-7)*, 29 March-8 April 2009. United Nations Development Programme, Bureau for Development Policy, Environment and Energy Group. 20 April.
- UNDP (2009b). *Summary of the Bonn Climate Change Talks (1-12 June 2009)*. United Nations Development Programme, Bureau for Development Policy, Environment and Energy Group. 22 June.
- UNDP (2012). *Taking stock of Durban: Review of Key Outcomes and the Road Ahead*, (April 2012), United Nations Development Programme http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/Environment%20and%20Energy/UNDP_DURBAN_FR_22_5.pdf
- UNDP (2010). *The Emission Gap Report, Are the Copenhagen Accord Pledges Sufficient to Limit Global Warming to 2°C or 1.5°C?* (November 2010). United Nations Environment Programme <http://www.unep.org/publications/ebooks/emissionsgapreport/index.asp>
- UNDP (2011). *Bridging the Emissions Gap, Bridging the Emissions Gap to Meet 2-Degree Target Doable* (November 2011). United Nations Environment Programme http://www.unep.org/pdf/UNEP_bridging_gap.pdf
- Stasio, K. (2011). *Seven Elements Developed Countries Should Include in their "Fast-Start" Climate Finance Reports*, Washington D.C.: World Resources Institute. April 2011. <http://www.wri.org/stories/2011/04/seven-elements-developed-countries-should-include-their-fast-start-climate-finance-r>
- Stasio, K. et al. (2011). *Summary of Developed Country 'Fast-Start' Climate Finance Pledges*. Washington D.C.: World Resources Institute. November 2011. <http://www.wri.org/publication/summary-of-developed-country-fast-start-climate-finance-pledges>
- Schwarte C. and Massawa E. (2009), *Equity issues in the climate change negotiations*, European Capacity Building Initiative

- UNFCCC, (2007). *Investment and Financial Flows to Address Climate Change*. Bonn, Germany: The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.
- World Bank (2009). *Status of Resources of the Adaptation Fund Trust Fund*. 21 September. http://www.adaptation-fund.org/images/AFB.B7.10_Status_of_Resources_of_the_Adaptation_Fund_Trust_Fund.pdf.
- World Bank (2010). *Financial status of the adaptation fund trust fund and the administrative trust fund*, 31 July 2010, Prepared by the World Bank as Trustee for the Adaptation Fund. AFB/EFC.2/5. http://www.adaptation-fund.org/system/files/AF_Financial_Status_Report_Jul%2031%202010%20-%20Final.pdf.
- World Bank (2011). *Gender & climate change, 3 things you should know*, November 2011, <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/Resources/244362-1232059926563/5747581-1239131985528/5999762-1321989469080/Gender-Climate-Change.pdf>
- WRI (2010). *Guidelines for Reporting Information on Public Climate Finance*. WRI issue brief. World Resources Institute (WRI). December 2010, http://pdf.wri.org/guidelines_for_reporting_information_on_public_climate_finance_2010-12.pdf
- WRI (2011a), *The Measurement, Reporting and Verification of Climate Finance*, Workshop report (12 June 2011) World Resources Institute (WRI). http://pdf.wri.org/mrv_of_finance_workshop_summary_2011-06-12.pdf
- Yamin, F. and J. Depledge (2004). *The International Climate Change Regime: A Guide to Rules, Institutions and Procedures*. Cambridge, University Press.
- French-speaking information network to facilitate the circulation of current news on sustainable development in French: <http://www.mediaterrre.org/>

EcoRessources proposes innovative solutions for managing GHG and climate change combined with an expertise in environmental economics and natural resources.

Analysis of international climate change negotiations

EcoRessources offers in-depth analyses of international climate negotiations. The firm analyses especially the challenges and opportunities offered by the options for the development and implementation of an international climate regime. EcoRessources also investigates the potential role of various sectors like agriculture and forestry and how they could be effectively included in such a regime.

Decision support and analysis of climate change policies

EcoRessources conducts studies on preparing and implementing climate change policies for the NAMA and tradable permit schemes and also for adaptation to the impacts of climate change. Our team has the expertise to assess the economic impacts of these policies and to advise on best climate change practices.

EcoRessources specialises in assessing the integral costs and benefits of implementing adaptation strategies and associated risks. These tools are used to assess the fair economic, social and environmental value of various options currently available to counteract the effects of climate change.

Capacity building

EcoRessources develops and offers workshops and training courses adapted to the specific needs of climate change negotiators, governments, private companies and individuals seeking to become proactive in carbon markets and climate change. EcoRessources offers training courses, among other things, on the international climate change negotiations, the NAMA, the market mechanisms and the carbon market.

EcoRessources was created in 2004. Its head office is in Quebec City (Canada). EcoRessources also has offices in Montreal, Lima (Peru), Caracas (Venezuela), Managua (Nicaragua) and Lyon (France). The company offers a global vision and a multilingual and multidiscipline personnel.

EcoRessources Inc.

Quebec City office
825 rue Raoul-Jobin
Quebec City (Quebec)
G1S 1N6 Canada
Tel. : +1 418 780-0158

Montreal office
1097 rue St-Alexandre,
Montreal (Quebec)
H2Z 1P8 Canada
Tel : +1 514 787-1724

Lima office
Avenida República
Oficina 302, San Antonio,
Miraflores, Lima 18, Perú
Tel : + 51 1 446-6531

E-mail: info@ecoressources.com
www.ecoressources.com

The International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF) is an institution founded on sharing a language - French - and common values. It currently groups 77 States and governments, including has to date 57 members and twenty observers.

The OIF carries out political and cooperation actions on all five continents in the following priority areas: French language and cultural and linguistic diversity; peace, democracy and human rights; education and training; sustainable development and solidarity. OIF pays special attention in all its actions to young people and women and to access to information and communication technologies.

The Secretary General runs the political action of the Francophonie as its international spokesman and official representative. Abdou Diouf has been the Secretary General of the Francophonie since 2003.

57 member States and governments

Albania • Principality of Andorra • Armenia • Kingdom of Belgium • Benin • Bulgaria • Burkina Faso • Burundi • Cambodia • Cameroon • Canada • Canada-New Brunswick • Canada-Quebec • Cape Verde • Central African Republic • Chad • Comoros • Congo • Côte d'Ivoire • Cyprus • Democratic Republic of Congo • Djibouti • Dominica • Egypt • Equatorial Guinea • Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia • France • Gabon • Ghana • Greece • Guinea • Guinea-Bissau • Haiti • Laos • Lebanon • Luxembourg • Madagascar • Mali • Mauritania • Mauritius • Moldavia • Principality of Monaco • Morocco • Niger • Qatar • Romania • Rwanda • Saint Lucia • São Tomé and Príncipe • Senegal • Seychelles • Switzerland • Togo • Tunisia • Vanuatu • Vietnam • Wallonia-Brussels Federation.

Twenty observers

Austria • Bosnia Herzegovina • Croatia • Czech Republic • Dominican Republic • Estonia • Georgia • Hungary • Latvia • Lithuania • Montenegro • Mozambique • Poland • Serbia • Slovakia • Slovenia • Thailand • Ukraine • United Arab Emirates • Uruguay.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF LA FRANCOPHONIE

19-21, avenue Bosquet, 75007 Paris France

Tel. : +33 (0)1 44 37 33 00

www.francophonie.org



Institut de l'énergie et de l'environnement
de la Francophonie
IEPF

The Francophonie serving sustainable development

The *Institut de l'énergie et de l'environnement de la Francophonie* (IEPF - Energy and Environment Institute of the French-speaking World) was born in 1988 from a desire of Heads of State and Government for cooperative action to develop the energy sector in member countries. This action was expanded to the environment in 1996.

Based in Quebec City, the Institute today is assisting in:

- training and capacity-building in sustainable development of various categories of development players in French-speaking countries in the energy and environment sectors;
- developing partnerships in the energy and environment sectors for sustainable development.

Its 2010-2013 programme, in synergy with other programmes of the International Organization of La Francophonie, especially under mission D of the Ten-year strategic framework of the Francophonie - "Developing cooperation to ensure sustainable development and solidarity" - IEPF:

- helps to prepare national sustainable development policies and strategies and implement them in the energy and environment sectors; trains and enhances the ability of supervisors and professionals to use and master environmental management tools for sustainable development.
- supports the participation of countries in international negotiations on the environment and sustainable development and the implementation of conventions, through discussions, technical support and mobilization of experts.
- develops partnerships, publishes guides, specialist journals and scientific and technical works in French in the energy and environment sectors.
- coordinates information and expertise networks for sustainable development.
- carries out any other function entrusted to it by the competent OIF bodies.

Institut de l'énergie et de l'environnement de la Francophonie (IEPF)

56 rue Saint-Pierre, 3rd floor

Quebec (Quebec) G1K 4A1

CANADA

Telephone: 1 418 692-5727 / Fax: 1 418 692-5644

iepf@francophonie.org

www.iepf.org

www.mediaterre.org

Negotiator's Guide assessment form - COP18 and CMP8 on climate change

To assist us in improving the next versions of the Negotiator's Guide, we should be grateful if you would assess this version using the scale of 1 to 4 and adding your comments below.

1 = highly satisfactory 2 = satisfactory 3 = rather unsatisfactory 4 = highly unsatisfactory

Clarity of issues:

- ☐ 1
☐ 2
☐ 3
☐ 4

Presentation of sheets:

- ☐ 1
☐ 2
☐ 3
☐ 4

Relevance of the level of detail:

- ☐ 1
☐ 2
☐ 3
☐ 4

Comments on the format:

Other comments:

Please forward the form to one of the addresses below:

ÉcoRessources Consultants
825 rue Raoul-Jobin
Quebec City (Quebec) G1S 1N6
Canada

Fax: +1 418 877-6763
E-mail: info@ecoressources.com

**Institut de l'énergie et de l'environnement
de la francophonie (IEPF)**
56 rue St-Pierre, 3rd floor
Quebec City (Quebec) G1K 4A1
Canada

Fax: +1 418 692-5644
E-mail: iepf@iepf.org

The reality of climate change today is addressed within a difficult political context, characterised by an agenda that is mainly concentrated on long-term mitigation issues and the financing required to assist the developing countries to adapt to the adverse effects of climate change. The 18th Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the 8th Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMP), which will be held on 26 November to 7 December 2012 in Doha, will constitute a critical stage in climate negotiations.

The Doha Conference will be the launch conference planned for the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol. It will mark the advent of a new era in climate negotiations. One of the main objectives of the Doha Conference is to settle on the duration and modalities of the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and to shape the main focal points of the Durban Platform. Doha will therefore test the strength of the Durban compromise, whereby the Parties have approved a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol provided negotiations start on a post-2020 agreement applicable to all countries.

In addition, climate financing will be a major issue in Doha as many developing countries condition their actions around the granting of financial and technological support and for capacity building. The developed countries in fact have undertaken to provide 30 billion US dollars for the period 2010-2012 and 100 billion US dollars a year until 2020. Several outstanding issues augur arduous discussions on the ability of the developed countries to provide this support in a sustainable and predictable fashion.

The aim of this guide is to assist negotiators to a clearer understanding of the main issues which will be discussed at the Doha Conference. Although this guide is intended especially for negotiators from member countries of the International Organisation of la Francophonie (OIF), we hope that it will also be useful to all delegates.



INSTITUT DE L'ÉNERGIE ET DE L'ENVIRONNEMENT DE LA FRANCOPHONIE (IEPF)
56, RUE SAINT-PIERRE, 3E ÉTAGE, QUÉBEC (QUÉBEC) G1K 4A1 CANADA

The Institut de l'énergie et de l'environnement de la Francophonie (IEPF) is a subsidiary body of Organisation internationale de la Francophonie (OIF).

www.iepf.org