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Centre for Science and Environment

POLICY BRIEF

GLOBAL STOCKTAKE UNDER THE PARIS AGREEMENT



Centre for Science and Environment

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INTRODUCTION

The architecture of the Paris Agreement is a hybrid and provides for both bottom-up and top-down elements. While it can be argued that the Agreement predominantly comprises bottom-up elements, marked by countries choosing their own country-specific climate action plans and targets, there are also topdown mechanisms to consolidate and strengthen the implementation of the Agreement. One such mechanism is the Global Stocktake (GST) mentioned in Article 14 of the Paris Agreement, which serves as a crucial review exercise to periodically assess collective progress toward the Agreement's long-term goals, enhance implementation of the Agreement and scale ambition. The Global Stocktake gains further relevance as it is one of the few elements of the Paris Agreement that explicitly talks about taking equity into consideration. The first Global Stocktake will be undertaken in 2023 and every five years thereafter. This policy brief reviews the status of negotiations with regard to GST, puts forth the design of the Global Stocktake and highlights key policy recommendations.

OBJECTIVE OF THE GLOBAL STOCKTAKE

The objective of the Global Stocktake laid out in Article 14 of the Paris Agreement is 'to take stock of the implementation of the Paris Agreement to assess the collective progress towards achieving the purpose of this Agreement and its long-term goals.'¹ The 'purpose and long-term goals' as mentioned in the Agreement are to address climate change by limiting the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and to strive for 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, increase climate resilience and switch over to low-carbon development.²

The language specifying the objective of GST also establishes, in the process, the overall yardstick of the long-term temperature goal against which the progress of collective climate actions and efforts is to be measured. In a separate section, Article 7 of the Paris Agreement, the global goal on adaptation of enhancing adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability to climate change is created. This is with the view to contribute to sustainable development and ensure adequate adaptation response *in the context of temperature goal* (emphasis added). Therefore the global goal on adaptation also contextualizes the overall objective of carrying out the required and appropriate efforts keeping in view the long-term temperature goal.

To conduct the process of GST, Parties are required to give inputs. This information is related to the sources, some of which are identified by the Agreement text itself and mentioned below:

- The overall effect of the nationally determined contributions (NDC) communicated
- Adaptation communications and reports
- Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports
- Mobilization and provision of support

On the critical question of the outcome of the Global Stocktake, the Agreement mentions that the outcome shall inform Parties in updating and enhancing climate actions and support; it will also enhance international cooperation, though in a nationally determined manner. Thus the stocktake will help determine how much more countries need to do. Countries are required to review their climate targets on the basis of output from Global Stocktake, also taking into consideration the latest science, global policy advances and available technology.³ The process also ensures progressivity in the sense that parties go forward in their commitments and formulate new targets, more ambitious than their previous targets and commitments.⁴ GST thus provides for a strong review and ratchet mechanism meant to counterweigh the otherwise strong decentralized character of the climate regime.⁵

It is important to note that while the input information has to come primarily from individual Parties, the assessment of progress is collective. The outcome of the stocktake also has a clear individual component with the enhancement and updating of actions and support by countries individually. Global Stocktake, therefore, has both collective and individual elements.

The Agreement text elucidates the principles to conduct the Global Stocktake and mentions that such a process will be conducted 'in light of equity and best available science.'⁶ The clause thus paves the way for advancement of equity and differentiation deliberations in the climate regime.

SCOPE OF GLOBAL STOCKTAKE

The Global Stocktake process is comprehensive in nature and covers all the elements of climate change, i.e. mitigation, adaptation, and means of support and implementation (finance, technology transfer and capacity building).

The component of adaptation within the stocktake finds elaborate mention. Article 7 of the Paris Agreement, dealing with adaptation, specifies that Global Stocktake 'shall recognize adaptation efforts of the Parties, enhance the implementation of adaptation action, review the adequacy and effectiveness of adaptation and support provided for adaptation and review the overall progress made in achieving the global goal on adaptation.'⁷ However, so far, adaptation has been a rather neglected area in the climate regime even though the Paris Agreement specifically talks about parity of mitigation and adaptation.

Finance is another tricky issue in climate negotiations as much of the participation of countries, especially developing ones, in scaling up their mitigation and adaptation actions depends on support of climate finance from developed countries. This area will also be subjected to the Global Stocktake process. The Agreement text says that the stocktake shall take into account the relevant information provided by developed country Parties and/or Agreement bodies on efforts related to climate finance. In the same vein, the efforts related to support on technology development and transfer for developing country Parties would also be within the purview of the Global Stocktake process as also the issue of capacity building.

FACILITATIVE DIALOGUE (2018)

The Decision text under the Paris Agreement also establishes a *Facilitative Dialogue* scheduled to be conducted in 2018. The scope of the Facilitative Dialogue is not comprehensive, unlike the Global Stocktake, and is intended to review progress towards the Paris Agreement's *long-term mitigation goal only*, and to inform the preparation of nationally determined contributions, the next round of which is due in 2020 (emphasis added). The facilitative dialogue is therefore the first Global Stocktake scheduled to take place in 2018 but with limited scope.⁸

MANDATE FOR APA (WITH REGARD TO STOCKTAKE)

The Conference of Parties (COP) decision paragraph number 100 under the Paris Agreement requests the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Paris Agreement (APA) to develop modalities for the Global Stocktake referred to in Article 14 of the Agreement and to report to the Conference of the Parties (COP), with a view to making a recommendation to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA) for consideration and adoption at its first session. It also requests the APA to identify the sources of input for the Global Stocktake.⁹

WHAT THE PARIS AGREEMENT DOES NOT TALK ABOUT

- **Timelines:** The Agreement text makes no mention of the timelines regarding when exactly the process will start, whether there would be interim deadlines to follow, when Parties should communicate the information and when the process will be complete.
- **The entities:** There is no clarity on who will conduct the stocktake and if there will be a separate body constituted for the purpose, who the other actors involved in the process are and how observers can be engaged in the process.
- Form of stocktake: The text does not elaborate on the form of the Global Stocktake, whether it would be a multi-pronged process, a technical or a diplomatic process or combination of both.
- **Equity:** Though it is clearly mentioned that stocktake would be conducted in accordance with equity, it does not describe how it would be incorporated in the process. While establishing the transparency framework, the Paris Agreement mentions clearly that it would have an element of *flexibility*, indicating equity and that special circumstances of Small and Island Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs) would be taken into consideration. However, there is no elaboration of equity with reference to GST in the Agreement.
- **Inputs to the stocktake:** Even though there is a non-exhaustive list of inputs for Global Stocktake, there could be more sources not mentioned in the text. The Agreement does not define who the contributors of inputs to the GST should be.
- **Indicators or parameters:** Inputs and information must be collected and assessed according to agreed indicators for each element of the GST, according to which gaps in the current state of efforts can be determined, which can then necessitate increase in ambition of Parties domestically.
- **Output of the Global Stocktake:** While the outcome of the GST is defined, which is to enhance ambition and facilitate cooperation, there is no reference in the Paris document as to what the form of the output of the stocktake process will be—whether it will be in the form of a political statement, political declaration, recommendations or decisions.
- **Raise of ambition:** The Agreement clearly mentions that the outcome must 'update and enhance' the Parties' actions and support and enhance international cooperation for climate action but fails to provide a clear link on how it will be established. In other words, the text does not elaborate on how the outcome of the Global Stocktake will inform in upscaling future NDCs, enhance adaptation and means of implementation efforts, and how greater cooperation will be attained among the Parties and observers.
- **Cross-cutting issues:** GST relies on the information and output of several other elements of the Paris Agreement, including the transparency framework, Paris Committee on Capacity Building, Facilitative Dialogue (2018) etc. The Agreement does not mention how different components will complement each other.

• Loss and damage: Loss and damage is now a separate pillar in the Paris Agreement; the Parties agreed on support to loss and damage activities at the Marrakech Climate Summit (2016). Though the scope of GST does not include loss and damage per se, whether loss and damage should come within the purview of the GST becomes a crucial question.

OUTCOMES ON GLOBAL STOCKTAKE AT MARRAKECH SUMMIT 2016, COP 22

This section is based on the Informal Note released by the Secretariat at the close of the Summit and the Parties' positions on Global Stocktake submitted ahead of and discussed during the COP.^{10, 11}

Global Stocktake was an important topic at the Marrakech Summit 2016 and Parties actively deliberated on discussions regarding designing its rules of implementation referred to as Modalities, Procedures and Guidelines (MPG). Various aspects of the GST were discussed in detail but much of the work still needs to be done (see *Figure 1: Outcome at Marrakech on GST*).

The discussions of the Parties at Marrakech regarding various aspects of GST primarily centered around three themes—relating to the inputs that should feed into GST, how GST should be conducted and organized, and what the outcome of the GST should be. The themes have various underlying questions within them.

Regarding the first theme of inputs that should feed into the Global Stocktake, the questions discussed at the COP and which require further discussion include additional sources of input, relevance and reliability of sources of input, what exact information the sources of input can provide, what kind of preparatory work would be needed to produce the inputs and whether some guidelines are required. Against this backdrop, developed countries, including Australia, Canada, Japan and the US, called upon the need for GST to be action oriented, reinforce collective ownership and facilitate open discussion. The Parties recognized that different kinds of inputs would be needed for each element of GST, i.e. namely mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation, to make it a robust process,.

The Parties discussed further sources of inputs apart from what have been identified under the Paris Agreement though most of them recognized the role of IPCC as the principle body in providing scientific knowledge as input to GST. Other sources of input include information from National Communications (NatComs), Biennial reports, Synthesis report, IPCC reports, reports from other UN agencies and submissions of parties and other non-party stakeholders. A few Parties such as the Environment Integrity Group (EIG), comprising Mexico, Liechtenstein, Monaco, the Republic of Korea and Switzerland, and the European Commission opined that output from the Structured Expert Dialogue of 2013–15 could also serve as an important source of input of GST.

Regarding means of support and implementation, biennial assessments, report of SCF on finance flows, output of enhanced transparency framework, the Technology Executive Committee's report (TEC), reports of the Paris Committee on Capacity Building (PCCB), the Green Climate Fund's (GCF) report on financial provisions and the Climate Technology Centre Network's (CTCN) were put forth by Parties as possible inputs by Parties.

During the talks on GST, Parties, especially developing countries, laid greater emphasis on adaptation in terms of what inputs can feed into GST to

assess and review adaptation efforts. For adaptation, Parties identified and discussed Adaptation Communications, National Adaptation Plans, National Communications, IPCC's special report on adaptation progress, the Adaptation Committee's (AC) report, UNEP's *Emissions Gap Report, Global Sustainable Development Report*, information from the World Bank and from regional groups and agencies as well as from civil society agencies as possible sources of input by Parties. Additionally, reports from FAO, Climate Change Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS), Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) can also be used as potential useful sources of input for adaptation.

With regard to the second theme of conducting and organizing the process of GST, the questions considered were related to assessing progress to include equity and best available science, who should conduct the GST and who the contributing actors should be, how to address linkages between GST and other mechanisms such as transparency initiative, how the process of conducting GST is effective, fair and manageable can be ensured. Regarding the modalities of the GST, there was a near-unanimous view put forth among Parties that GST would require a technical phase to assess the progress of collective efforts. It could then be followed by a political or diplomatic phase for outcomes to be adopted by the CMA. Parties including New Zealand, AOSIS and Saint Lucia on behalf of the Caribbean community emphasized that the format of the GST could be built on existing models such as the structured expert dialogue of 2013–15 under the 2013–15 review work programme. This was a periodic review under Cancun pledges tasked with the consideration of strengthening the long-term global goal, including in relation to a temperature rise of 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. Some civil society members put forth that the learnings from Facilitative Dialogue held in 2016 on pre-2020 actions could also be used as a source of input for GST.

On the linkage of GST with other mechanisms and processes, there was only recognition of GST as a cross-cutting issue linked with the transparency framework, compliance, accounting etc. Its linkage with other articles of the Paris Agreement such as Article 2 relating to the long-term goal of the Paris Agreement was also recognized.

On the third theme, the outcome of the GST, the related questions on which discussions ensued were regarding the outcome of the GST and what the form and format of such an outcome would be, who should the outcome addressed to, how the outcome will drive ambition and address gaps between support and action and barriers and opportunities, and how adaptation and pre-2020 gaps will be addressed by GST. On the crucial question of equity, developed countries did not take much interest on its importance or how it should be operationalized in GST. The Indian government's stance on GST, like some other developing countries including AOSIS and Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs), have stressed on equity and its application in the GST process but failed to elaborate on how it can be practically implemented.

Although nothing concrete was reached at the end of discussions on GST, *Figure 1* mentioned in the informal note suggests that Parties have agreed that GST would primarily have two aspects—one the process-based part and the other the content-based aspect of the GST. While the procedural aspect caters to the timelines, inputs, mode of process and outcomes, the content-based aspect deals more with assessment of collective progress towards long-term goals of the Paris Agreement.

Figure 1: Outcome at Marrakech on GST



Source: UNFCCC, Informal Note on Global Stocktake, 2016

The process of GST within the three broad headings of sources of input, modalities and outcome as mentioned in *Figure 1* indicates that Parties have broadly agreed to the specifics that GST will have a *preliminary or a preparatory phase*, which would involve collection of sources of input, and a *technical phase*, which would compile and assess collective progress with regard to the climate actions being undertaken by Parties. The outcome phase is more of a *political phase*, where the output of the GST is clear, easy to comprehend and manageable by the Parties at COP, and can be officially adopted by the Parties in COP summit.

The discussions on GST so far have not included loss and damage as a component. However, this is now recognized as a central issue in the Paris Agreement and the discussions at Marrakech on loss and damage held within the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) among other elements involve means of support for loss and damage activities to developing countries. Loss and damage must be seen as a continuum of climate actions and activities and support under it too needs to be accounted for in the Global Stocktake process. The possible sources of input for loss and damage could be the report of the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) on loss and damage, the UN's International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (UNISDR) report on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), reports of the Paris Committee on Capacity Building, World Bank reports, IPCC reports, the report from the Adaptation Committee and the National Adaptation Plans (NAP). Adaptation-related information becomes useful as an input for loss and damage as progress on adaptation determines the extent of loss and damage incurred. Accordingly, more adaptation would mean less loss and damage.

DESIGN OF THE GLOBAL STOCKTAKE

With only the preliminary discussions initiated, almost the entire GST regime is to be created and finer details regarding every aspect need to be worked out. We propose a design of the Global Stocktake process in this section, which talks about timelines, modalities and how to incorporate equity in the process.

Timeline: The process of Global Stocktake must start two years before COP in 2023, i.e. 2021. While the domestic process of gathering sector-wise information and submitting it must be done in the first year, the technical phase should be completed in the second year, following which the outcomes of the GST process can be adopted by the Parties at a high-level segment at the Twenty-ninth Conference of Parties (COP 29) to be held in 2023. The outcomes must be adopted as Political Recommendations by the Parties.

Modalities of Global Stocktake

The approach, methodology and assumptions for the GST could be built on the lines of the IPCC review process. The IPCC review process has wide participation from government and experts in multiple stages to ensure a comprehensive, objective and transparent assessment of progress. The GST process should be structured into a preparatory, technical and diplomatic phase.

1. *Preparatory phase*: As reiterated, Parties must start the process of collecting data and input from national sources well in advance based on their respective national circumstances and capabilities. Parties also need to be issued guidelines so that the inputs received from different Parties are easy to comprehend and comparable. Domestically, Monitoring Reporting and Verification (MRV) structures and mechanisms are crucial institutions for reporting climate actions and support.

However, the prime challenge currently envisaged in providing information is that countries, especially developing countries, lack proper MRV structures to report and collect information. Quantifying adaptation efforts and support seems more difficult even as countries struggle with the process domestically. That adaptation is important is reflected in the fact that 83 per cent of the submitted climate action plans of countries in the form of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) (of 137 parties) have an adaptation component.¹² There need, therefore, to be clear rules on reporting for adaptation needs, costs and finance although currently the accounting rules of adaptation are still to be agreed on by Parties internationally. The Paris Agreement entrusts the Adaptation Committee and Least Developed Countries Expert Group (in paragraph 43) to develop methodologies for assessing adaptation needs. Though discussions at COP 22 in Marrakech started on providing further guidance on the character and minimum information for the adaptation component of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), ie. a-NDCs, they did not reach any conclusion. Further discussion is required on reporting efforts and support provided to developing countries. Related to the element of support, the definition of climate finance to include adaptation finance is also essential.

The Paris Agreement establishes a transparency framework for reporting of climate actions and reporting for support provided. This provision of Paris Agreement provides a useful opportunity to develop adequate structures and institutions to monitor, report and verify who is doing what in climate change and who is providing what to whom as they deal with climate change.¹³

The rules and guidelines of the framework are mandated to be created by 2018. The process of creation of MRV must start at the earliest with support from developed countries to establish sound and effective reporting mechanisms domestically. Parties must provide credible and latest inputs for GST by December 2022. Civil society must also contribute to providing inputs to the process of GST.

2. Technical phase: As reiterated, mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage, and means of support and implementation are fundamentally different components of GST and therefore the form, structure and content of the inputs regarding the three components would be different. Therefore, the technical phase should comprise four different workstreams, each convened by two facilitators or conveners, one each from developed and developing countries for each of the components (mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage, and means of support) which can have different modes of work. The technical phase should be conducted through 2023. Mid-session climate meetings and workshops could be conducted apart from the regular climate meetings to facilitate work within different workstreams.

As already mentioned, Parties broadly discussed sources of input for mitigation, adaptation and means of support at COP in Marrakech. In this policy brief, we have also proposed that loss and damage must be within the purview of GST too and provided possible inputs for it. In the technical process under GST, the inputs under each element must be assessed against respective indicators. The comprehensive and exhaustive list of indicators used in this policy brief offers useful parameters against which information should be collected and measured in view of the long-term goals. In the ensuing discussions on GST, Parties need to agree on the list of broad indicators, given in *Figure 2: Design of Global Stocktake*, which would make their work more streamlined and channelized in collecting and submitting information for the GST process.

Workstream I—Mitigation

Under Workstream I, comprising mitigation, the broad indicators are meant to measure the decrease in carbon emissions and ways to switch over to a low-carbon growth scenario. Such ways link to adoption of renewable energy sources, energy-efficient ways, sustainable transport and waste management. A complete list of indicators is given in *Figure 2: Design of Global Stocktake*, which can be used to assess and measure efforts related to mitigating climate change.

Workstream II—Adaptation

For components of adaptation under Workstream II, we propose the indicators broadly used for the outcomes as mentioned in the Paris Agreement, including:

- a) Increase of adaptive capacity of community/population
- b) Specific sector-wise preemptive efforts for increasing adaptive capacity and resilience and
- c) Reducing vulnerability to climate change.

Under the first broad category, potential indicators are the Human Development Index (HDI); vulnerability index; number of food-secure households; adoption of National Adaptation Plans (NAPs); adoption of Nationally Appropriate daptation Actions (NAPA); availability and extent of local institutions in adaptation activities, which will determine the capability of a country to adapt; availability of human resources; gender participation in adaptation activities (in per cent); and employment generation in environmental sector (in per cent). For ascertaining actions and efforts to increase resilience, reduce vulnerability and increase adaptative capacity, the sectors employed are agriculture, forestry, water supply, health and infrastructure development as are generally recognized under adaptation. For each of the sectors, indicators are listed to measure adaptation efforts in that specific sector. For instance, the broad indicators used to measure progress in adaptation activities in agriculture can be increase in crop yield, extent of crop-diversification techniques, coverage of stress-tolerant seed varieties, extent of micro-irrigation network, adoption and types of soil management practices-including no-till practices and nitrogen/nutrient stewardship-extent of access to climate information services, protection of indigenous seeds, traditional knowledge of agriculture and extent of integrated pest- and disease-management practices. Likewise for water supply, potential indicators include access to adequate and safe drinking water, reduction in electricity units due to use of water pumps, number of rainwater harvesting structures built, number and extent of water-efficient technologies used and number of water meters installed (see Figure 2).

Some indicators used for the health and infrastructure development sectors are based on seven global targets under the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, including substantially increasing the availability of and access to multi-hazard early warning systems and disaster-risk information and assessments to people, substantially reducing global disaster mortality, and substantially including health and educational facilities.¹⁴ Adaptation still requires a lot of deliberations to establish domestic reporting and accounting structures of action and support.

Workstream III—Loss and damage

A major indicator for loss and damage would be the successful implementation of adaptation actions as more adaptation would imply less loss and damage. The Vulnerability Index would also help determine which countries are more prone to climate-related loss and damage. Other indicators for loss and damage under Workstream III include those related primarily to response in the face of climate-induced loss and damage after calculating estimated values of loss and damage in different temperature scenarios. The indicators used, therefore, include the extent of disaster-reduction policies and measures, quantified losses in person and kind due to climate impacts, response and relief measures in the event of climate impact and extent of coverage of safety nets to farmers and fisherfolk.

Workstream IV

Under Workstream IV, indicators that can be adopted to assess means of support and implementation relate to access, distribution and kind of finance provided to different countries, number of technological solutions provided to developing countries to increase climate resilience and switching to low-emission pathways. The availability and capacity of institutions engaged in planning and designing the project for approval of funds is also used as an indicator (see *Figure 2*).

The output obtained against indicators within different workstreams must be assessed towards the extent of implementation of long-term goals that serve as the main objective of GST as also enshrined in the Paris Agreement. For mitigation, the output report must determine progress towards the overall temperature goal of 2°C as the benchmark. It should highlight gaps and challenges. Likewise,

with regard to adaptation, the global goal on adaptation could be employed as the overall yardstick for assessment of adaptation inputs. Even though the broad components of the global goal on adaptation, namely enhancement of adaptive capacity, strengthening resilience and reducing vulnerability, have been agreed on, many of the finer details relating to financial goals, adoption of NAPs and sound MRV structures for reporting and measuring adaptation efforts need to be determined. It is important that GST takes into account the outcomes of further deliberations on adaptation in the climate negotiations.

For means of support, the output measured against indicators must assess progress towards support commitments made by the developed countries and identify gaps and challenges. Developed countries have made a commitment of US \$100 billion by 2020; the floor is extended till 2025. Assuming parity in mitigation and adaptation as re-enforced by the Paris Agreement, the support provided to activities measured under indicators should be assessed against the goal of US \$50 billion in mitigation and adaptation. The Adaptation Gap Report 2016 though indicates that the costs of adaptation could range from \$140 billion to \$300 billion by 2030, and between \$280 billion and \$500 billion by 2050.¹⁵ The report also mentions that in 2014, total bilateral and multilateral finance for climate change adaptation reached US \$25 billion, of which US \$22.5 billion targeted developing countries.¹⁶ Considering this, the goal of \$50 billion for financial adaptation could serve as a useful starting point after which the floor could be raised in future climate talks.

Parties need to agree on a figure for support for loss and damage even though discussions on this subject initiated at Marrakech. Some developing-country Parties and climate activists at Marrakech demanded \$50 billion support, though this was not the agreed figure.

The synthesis report on means of support and implementation must also identify barriers in funding apart from already recognized generic barriers, including poor legal, economic and regulatory frameworks, immature and volatile financial markets and currency exchange risks.

The technical phase of the GST must result in four different synthesis reports within the four workstreams: mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage and means of support. The four synthesis reports should culminate in one synthesis report for discussion at the political phase of the GST, as shown in Figure 2.

3. *Political phase/outcome phase*: The political phase should comprise a highlevel segment where the synthesis report of the technical phase, as resulting from the culmination of four synthesis reports, could be discussed by the Parties and adopted by the CMA as Political Recommendations. Even though GST assesses collective progress, the outcome is directed individually at Parties. It is in this phase that equity can be best operationalized as mandated by the Paris Agreement. Accordingly, responsibility and capability must be used as parameters for Parties to raise their individual climate ambitions once the gaps in progress are identified and discussed. This would imply developed countries raise ambitions with regard to climate actions and support more than the developing countries.

The political phase must be a platform for exchange of ideas and information related to best practices of implementation of climate plans and targets. It should also be a platform to identify key opportunities and partnerships for countries to develop their future course of climate action.



Figure 2: Design of Global Stocktake

KEY POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE GLOBAL STOCKTAKE

- The Global Stocktake process must be conducted with the technicalities and modalities along the lines of the IPCC review process adopted. It must be an open and transparent multilateral process.
- The GST process should start two years ahead of Conference of Parties (COP) in 2023 and should have preparatory, technical and political phases.
- The creation of robust reporting structures for action and support at national levels is a prerequisite to effective GST. Transparency and accounting frameworks, therefore, are critical to GST.
- Developed countries must provide support to developing countries in establishing effective monitoring and reporting structures for assessing climate actions and support provided.
- Loss and damage must also be within the purview of the Global Stocktake process.
- Parties must be provided with clear guidelines so that inputs are clear, understandable and comparable. Parties must submit their inputs to Secretariat by December 2022.
- Inputs and submissions to the GST must also be provided by observers and other UN designated bodies, not restricted only to IPCC reports.
- Reports from FAO, Climate Change Agriculture and Food Security (CCAFS), Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) and International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) can be used as additional sources of input for adaptation.
- The technical phase must be comprehensive and exhaustive and must involve mid-session meetings and workshops to facilitate it.
- The technical phase should comprise four workstreams for each of the four elements, namely mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage and means of support. Under each element, progress must be assessed against indicators. Each workstream must be headed by two conveners, one each from developed and developing countries.
- Parties must agree on broad indicators for each component of GST. This would make the process of collecting and submitting information streamlined and comparable.
- The temperature goal for mitigation and global goal of adaptation can be effective benchmarks for assessing overall progress of climate efforts and identifying loopholes.
- The output of the technical phase must be four synthesis reports which must also highlight gaps and challenges towards attainment of climate goals. The reports should be compiled into one synthesis report.
- The output in the form of one synthesis report must be discussed at the political phase of the GST at a high-level segment at COP in 2023. The output must be discussed and adopted as Political Recommendations by the CMA.
- Equity can be operationalized in GST by increase in ambition of climate efforts of countries. Here, historical responsibility and capability must be used as indicators to implement equity.
- The political phase of GST must be a platform to exchange ideas and best practices of implementation of climate commitments and facilitate partnerships among countries.
- All relevant documentation and discussion pertaining to review mechanism should be publicly accessed.
- The learnings from the Structural Expert Review 2013-2015, Facilitative Dialogue of 2016 to assess pre-2020 actions and the Facilitative Dialogue of 2018 must feed into the Global Stocktake process.

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